Interview with Robert F. Woodward

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR ROBERT F. WOODWARD

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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Q: Ambassador, we were talking about the dual structure of looking at your career.

WOODWARD: As I mentioned to you, I think this discussion divides itself basically into two parts. The first thing, so that we can dispose of it quickly, is the Foreign Service's effect on my life and my own personal welfare. I can say, in summary, that the Foreign Service has turned out to be, really, my whole life. It has been tremendously fortunate for me. I couldn't have asked for a more interesting and educational experience, and it has led, in various respects, to my having a very happy home life and a family that is satisfying, an intellectual life with plenty of questions to contemplate for the rest of my life, and the kind of security that every person in our economic system aspires to. I am grateful for the opportunity I have had to participate in trying to solve some fairly large problems; to make some contribution to what we might call 'progress'; to become well acquainted with understanding people I might only have read about or seen on TV; and to acquire a wide circle of friends and acquaintances from the Foreign Service.

Now the question is: is it advisable to recruit people in the way that I was recruited? I came from a family of very modest circumstances in Minneapolis [Minnesota].

My father never made more than $5,000 in a year, but he was a thoughtful man and read quite widely. Of course, his income was more than it would be now, because I'm speaking of the Twenties. I had a public school education. I went to the University of Minnesota, because every person who graduated from high school in Minnesota was eligible for education in the university. I almost quit, in discouragement with my progress, and indifference because I was working after school and was much more interested in my work than I was in the university courses. My father pleaded with me not to quit, one of the most important things I can say that he ever did for me, one of the specific things, except for his example.

I finished the university with very mediocre grades. My advisor, who had been assigned because I elected, for my last year in the university, a course in preparation for the diplomatic and consular service which was offered in the university catalog. Toward the end of that year, when a written examination for the Foreign Service was offered at the St. Paul Post Office, my advisor said that he didn't think I should take the examination because I wasn't a good enough student. I, nevertheless, did take it, and qualified, at least, to take the oral, which I failed. I took the written examination right over again; fortunately, there were two examinations given in the same year. It was the heart of the Depression, and I took the first examination in January 1931, and the second examination in July 1931.

I might mention, parenthetically, because I think this of interest concerning the tactics of the administrators in the State Department, that at that time, there were some very astute gentlemen, Wilbur Carr, Herbert Hengstler (in charge of administration) and perhaps some others, who had the idea that they would quickly have another examination and hire a few more unclassified vice consuls, because they foresaw a drastic reduction in their appropriation in the Depression in the next year. They were planning for the “necessity” of discharging a lot of Foreign Service officers (who were discharged arbitrarily) on the basis of their lesser qualifications. They discharged 100 in June 1933, but they had taken in a few youngsters to take their places. This was their method of getting rid of “dead wood.”

There was no authorization in the law for the discharge of 100 Foreign Service officers, but they did it. Anyhow, this is one of the reasons I got in.

Another reason that I managed to make it was that living in Minneapolis, I was close to one Foreign Service post, and they were saving money on transportation. They assigned me to Winnipeg as my first post.

Q: You didn't go to Washington, then, for training?

WOODWARD: Not until later on, no. I had a year and a half in Winnipeg, and I was assigned to the training school in the Department.

I went to Winnipeg, and my travel expenses were, as I recall, $16 in a day coach; I took all my baggage in a sea trunk, in the baggage car with me. I had $30 in cash to my name when I arrived at my first post. The beginning salary seemed magnificent—it was $2,500 a year, which very quickly, after my arrival in January 1932, was docked 15%. Then we had a month without pay, and then, paradoxically, had the beginning of a very small rental allowance, but it was quickly postponed and temporarily eliminated.

Q: These were all Depression-generated economies.

WOODWARD: Yes. But this was, of course, more than I'd ever made in my life. Having come from a relatively hard-working background—I had worked after school since I was 12 years old—I was willing to do any chore and take on any job that my boss assigned. I think this probably has been a quality which has contributed greatly to my getting along in the Foreign Service—doing anything. This is one of the reasons that I began to think that it's very unfortunate, in a way, that we cannot attract people of high intellectual and scholarly qualifications and wealthier family backgrounds and keep them, because they may not be willing to perform the odd chores that are required of every neophyte in the Foreign Service.

Q: I know as a supervising consular officer, one of the great problems is to get young officers to learn the trade at the consular counter.

Mr. Ambassador, what led you to your specialization in Latin American affairs?

WOODWARD: After the training school of four months in the State Department, which followed my 18 months in Winnipeg, I was assigned, arbitrarily, to Buenos Aires. There I floundered, trying to learn Spanish from a professor ineptly recommended to me by the consul general.

Q: Did you pay for the professor yourself?

WOODWARD: Oh, yes. There was no language training for Foreign Service personnel at that time in the State Department, nor any help abroad, except in the cases of Japanese and Chinese and Russian, exotic languages—perhaps Arabic, I don't know. But in any event, one, of course, had to pay for his lessons and had to find time outside of working hours to take them, because I didn't feel that I could take time from my job, and I was ambitious enough to not want to be wasting time in the office.

In any event, this may be of some interest. My boss had a certain interest in Germanic things, and he had a German professor who was teaching Spanish to a good many people, a very nice fellow named Dr. Spanhaus. He recommended him. I took lessons from him for a year, when one day I was talking with a man who was just about the only Argentine I ever had any conversations with, a lawyer who had been educated at Cornell. Of course, we had our discussions in English, and he, having had his American experience, was willingly helping us with cases in which we had to settle the estates of Americans who had died or with other legal questions.

Q: You were doing consular work.

WOODWARD: Entirely consular work, yes. The consulate was quite separate from the embassy. Anyhow, this lawyer recommended, when I told him I wasn't making much progress in my Spanish, that I should stop right away and do nothing for a month, and he would then introduce me to someone he thought would be a very good teacher for me, a young lady who had graduated from a language training school, which was like a teacher's college, and who wasn't really doing anything. He thought she should be working, and he thought it would be good for me.

So this worked out. I took lessons from this young lady every morning before work, at 8:00 o'clock in the morning, for the rest of my time in Buenos Aires, which was another 18 months. The results were not only that I became reasonably fluent in the language, although not in the least polished, but I also became very fond of my teacher, who was a very attractive and very admirable woman, a young lady three or four years younger than I was.

You're asking about my specialization. When I came home on leave—and I might mention, parenthetically, that this was at the officer's own expense at that time; there was no paid leave. I paid a shipping board vessel captain $3 a day for my travel to Brooklyn from Buenos Aires, and signed on as assistant purser. There's a slight inconsistency there—nominally an employee of the line, but paying the captain. So it cost me $90 to get home.

I went to the Chief of Foreign Service Personnel. In those days, even the lowliest vice consul discussed these things with the Chief of Foreign Service Personnel. He said, “Well, your successor in Buenos Aires is coming from Budapest, from Hungary, so the logical thing is for you to go there.”

I had been discussing very seriously with this teacher in Buenos Aires the possibility of matrimony. I said to him, “I'm making a little progress in my Spanish. I'd like to consolidate it if I can. I think I could be more useful in the Foreign Service if I knew the language much better. Perhaps it would be better for me to go to a Spanish-speaking post.”

Well, he said, “By coincidence, the minister to Colombia was just in here yesterday, and we were talking about some new officer for his staff. I'd like to have you talk to him.” And I did. I not only talked with him, but he and his wife invited me to a Sunday lunch in her father's apartment here in Washington.

I liked them and was very much attracted to them, Mr. and Mrs. William Dawson. William Dawson apparently approved of me sufficiently, so I was assigned to Bogota.

Interestingly enough, Dawson was a great linguist. He was one of the finest linguists the Foreign Service has ever produced, and spoke impeccable Spanish, impeccable French, and German. When I arrived in Bogota, he said, “Now I know you're interested in improving your Spanish, so if you wish to discuss matters in the office with me in Spanish, we can do that. Of course, if we get stuck, we can revert to English. But we can always talk to each other in Spanish.”

I said, “That will be splendid.” So we did that for all the time, the next 15 months that I was in Bogota. We had all our conversations in Spanish. Of course, there were exceptions on social occasions and things like that. Anyhow, he was a wonderful man and a lifelong friend. After he retired and after I retired, we had lunch here in Washington frequently and talked nothing but Spanish. He was a great fellow.

There was one secretary of the legation, just one, a second secretary, a very nice guy, who was not very much interested in the reporting work, and allowed me to do all the drafting. But he had very interesting hobbies. He read symphonies for a hobby. This man, Winthrop Greene, once led the symphony orchestra in Bogota, and I had the very interesting experience of witnessing and listening to his directing the orchestra. Well, one day we were walking down the street at lunchtime, and Winthrop said to me, “You know, Mr. Dawson's French really isn't as excellent as people say it is. He sounds just like a Paris radio announcer.” [Laughter] Who could wish to speak French better than that? [Laughter] Anyhow, I thought that was very funny.

To get back to the question of the recruiting of Foreign Service officers in the way that I was recruited, I think probably this gets the kind of material which may be, in the long run, perhaps the most useful for representation abroad. It's now obvious to anyone who reads the newspapers that our policies have great inconsistencies, incoherencies, and there is a very disturbing clouding of the law and shadings of immorality in the conduct of foreign relations. The basic consistency that we have in our foreign relations is the basic grass-roots standards of the Americans who are recruited for it. I think that taking them from the heart of Iowa or Nebraska or Minnesota, and taking people often from humble origins, they turn out generally to be people of homespun principles such as honesty and fairness. I always dreamed that the United States, in its foreign relations, should be known for honesty and reliability and the ability to keep commitments—being fair and considerate, and having a certain sympathy with those who are less fortunate than we are. It may be advantageous for the U.S. to be represented by people who have had a humble enough life themselves so that they understand the situation of persons abroad and can have some compassion for them.

Also people from these humble backgrounds are quite often likely to be those who take a direct approach to the solving of problems. I think if I can attribute any one thing more than another to my own progress in the Foreign Service, it's that I was always trying to solve the problem that was given to me. I started doing this in Winnipeg and progressed on through Buenos Aires, and my next post after Bogota, which was Rio de Janeiro. These assignments led to my going to the State Department, where I got my real education during four years of work in one of the geographical action bureaus of the State Department, the Latin American Bureau. Those four years were much better than any university education I could ever have had, and I worked as a jack-of-all-trades. From one month to another, I would be transferred to a new country desk, and be handling the affairs of our relations with one country after another. So in the course of those four years, I think I had some work pertaining to every country of Latin America.

Q: Did you learn your drafting skills there, or had you already picked up quite a bit from the posts where you had served?

WOODWARD: My drafting skills—I don't know whether it's fair to call them skills.

Q: You have a reputation for drafting well.

WOODWARD: Well, let's say increasing accuracy in drafting started with the fact that when I was working after school at the University of Minnesota, I was working for a while as a printer's devil. That's the boy who does all the odd jobs in a small printing plant. Then I ran the plant, which was very small; I ran it entirely by myself; there I had to set type by hand. One acquires a certain knowledge of spelling and punctuation and so forth from setting type. But then I found—I remember it was a ridiculous thing—the boss there, when he was asked to write a letter of recommendation for me for the Foreign Service, said, “Bob, you draft the letter for me.” I addressed it to the Chief of Foreign Service Personnel, and I misspelled the word “personnel.” And I've never forgotten it. One of the things, perhaps, that helped me is that when I make a mistake like that, I never forget it, I'm so embarrassed by it.

Going on to Winnipeg, the chief there was a very odd and interesting guy. He was a Far Eastern expert. Incidentally, this is maybe amusing. In the very first conversation I had with him on the 20th of January, whenever it was, in the middle of the Winnipeg winter, when I first came to the office, he said, “You know, I don't know how I happened to be assigned to Winnipeg. I had been in the Far East since 1904, and I was a language officer, and here I am married to the daughter of the British consul general in Hangzhou, have been for years, and I was dedicated to China. So when we were assigned to Winnipeg, I looked all over the map of China to find that post, and I couldn't find it. I just don't understand this, and here I've been in the Foreign Service for about 30 years. The Department could at least have assigned me as Minister to Colombia.” [Laughter]

But to get back to something sensible, he was a meticulous drafter, and he asked me early in the game, although there were three or four other non-career vice consuls there—and one consul who apparently he did not want to ask help him—he asked me to draft his political reports, which were quarterly reports to the Embassy in Ottawa. He reported on the developments in the Prairie Provinces, which were Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. So he would go over my drafts, and he would correct them meticulously. I learned an immense amount about accuracy of expressing myself on paper from Mr. P. Stuart Heintzelman, who was the Consul General. The reports were not very good reports; they were not analytical; they were mostly just factual, a consolidation of summaries of newspaper reports from the provinces. But this gave me excellent training in just writing English, a course in English composition.

The same was true in Buenos Aires, the post I had after the training school. There, there was a consul who reviewed all of our drafting, and we were encouraged. We were answering trade inquiries, we were handling a lot of miscellaneous work. But most of our reporting was in competition with the office of the commercial attach#, which was a separate office operated by the Department of Commerce in the same building. They were doing some very good trade reporting. The object of our operation was to outdo the commercial attach#. So we wrote reams of reports, and soon discovered that if reports were over 50 pages long, they would be graded “excellent” automatically by the Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce rated them.

So I wrote a series of reports on the competition between U.S. imports into Argentina and imports from one important European supplier after another, so that there would be a question of U.S.-versus-French trade, U.S.-versus-German trade, U.S.-versus-British trade, and I would fill pages with statistics, showing exactly what the imports had been over a series of years in each category. This made it easy to write reports over 50 pages, and they all got “excellents.” So this pleased the consul general. He gave me a moderately good report, even though I didn't seem to have many other qualifications.

Q: I would like to move ahead to your ambassadorial assignment. I notice that you had been the deputy chief of mission, as you moved along in your career, for an astounding number of times. You'd been in Bolivia, Guatemala, Cuba, and Sweden, all countries of some importance to the United States. Obviously, you were on what would be called today "the fast track." Did you have the feeling that you were being groomed for preferment in the Foreign Service at the time?

WOODWARD: I don't think anyone is really groomed, do you? But this was the most perfect education for developing some plans as to what one would do in the hypothetical circumstance of being appointed an ambassador.

In the first place, I didn't go to Bolivia as deputy chief of mission until I had been four years as a desk officer in the Latin American division in the State Department. And there one begins to form, very concretely, I think, if you make any kind of serious analysis of the problems you're working on, how you would handle the problem that you are writing instructions or drafting instructions to the ambassador to handle. You have a good chance to see, from his reporting and what you hear about him, from travelers and officers who are returning, how he performs his duties. You then automatically begin to think, "Now, this is the way I would have done it?" So that you are getting an excellent education as a desk officer. Then you go to work directly for an ambassador abroad, and you have perhaps an even better, but somewhere narrower, scope, because you're working on one country. This led, more or less automatically, to preparation for being appointed as an ambassador.

The best place in the State Department to be appointed an ambassador is as an officer in one of the geographic bureaus, and with the proper grade, the old class I, presumably, in the Foreign Service, to be eligible for it.

It so happened that when I was a class II . . .

Q: This is in the old ratings of FSO-2, was it?

WOODWARD: Yes. One was the highest.

Q: One was the highest, and then there was also career minister, I think.

WOODWARD: I don't think the category of career minister had—it was just being created about that time. I was class II, and I was deputy to a man back in the Latin American bureau, a man I greatly admired. His name was Paul Daniels. I never have known anyone who could dispatch more work than that man could, very efficiently and effectively, day after day. He not only ran the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, but he was the ambassador to the OAS [Organization of American States] at the same time. He performed both of these functions with great efficiency. He was rather a stern fellow, and he knew, usually, that he was correct in what he wanted to do. Some of the officers in the State Department, who had to cross-check his work, such as the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, didn't always agree with him, and they had a few little collisions, which made my boss somewhat unpopular. The result was that he was eased out of the job in a rather disillusioning way, for me, and so I said at the time. I was given the opportunity to go to Rio de Janeiro as counselor of embassy, and even offered by the Assistant Secretary for Administration (I think it was Jack Peurifoy), the job of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Middle Eastern Affairs, and I'd never been to the Middle East. But the third choice was to go to the National War College, which I took.

After I finished the National War College session in 1949 and '50, I was assigned as counselor of embassy in Stockholm. I began to realize that the best possible place from which to become an ambassador was back right where I had been, but I hadn't been quite ready for it, wasn't quite high enough in grade. My next assignment was as Chief of Foreign Service Personnel; I was there when W. F. Scott McLeod came in to be my superior.

Q: This is Scott McLeod, who was known as Senator Joseph McCarthy's hatchet man.

WOODWARD: Yes. When he came in, I let the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs know that I would be delighted if he would request my services as his deputy, which he did. McLeod was a little put out that I was being requested, but I told him that I thought he would want to have his hands free to pick a person that met with his complete approval, someone he would select himself as chief of personnel. So he was reconciled to this.

I went back in to the Latin American bureau, and then after a year and a half, was eligible for the appointment as an ambassador, and I was nominated as Ambassador to Costa Rica.

Q: Before you went to Costa Rica, you had been DCM, you had been a desk officer. What ideas did you take with you of things to do and not to do as an ambassador, that you had learned from your various jobs?

WOODWARD: Perhaps the first and simplest element that occurred to me was to try to work persistently in whatever way seemed appropriate at the moment to solve the problems we had with the particular country. We always did have problems with every country. They were mostly economic and trade problems. In some cases, there were grievances of American companies against the government for allegedly unfair treatment, such matters as allegedly unfair taxes or exchange regulations. Anyhow, the idea of problem solving was probably the most important.

Secondly, we were engaged in aid programs very early in the game in Latin American affairs. The aid program really began about 1938 and '39. It was something which was not being done in other parts of the world, unless there were very special requests, such as for technical advice; then there would be an ad hoc effort to find a technical expert. But a law was promulgated in 1938 to facilitate the loan of technical experts from any U.S. Government agency to assist any Latin American government. One of my bosses in the Latin American division, Ellis Briggs, in 1939, was made chairman of an interdepartmental committee which was authorized to respond to requests from Latin American countries for

technical advisors, and to work out arrangements for a participation between the foreign government and our government in paying the additional expenses over the basic salaries, which, in most cases, continued to be paid by the U.S. Government.

As I say, my boss, who was Ellis Briggs, was the chairman of this committee. He started looking around for someone to work out the details. This was sort of breaking new ground. He asked me if I would try to work out the question of how much extra it would cost for a technical expert to live in a country where he would be assigned. As a matter of fact, this resulted in a rather interesting little development.

The first request was from the Government of Venezuela for someone to reorganize the Venezuelan National Library. We got from the Library of Congress an offer of the services of a very competent lady librarian to go down to Venezuela and do this. Expenses at that time were very high in Venezuela. There was a very disadvantageous exchange rate, which had been distorted because of the large oil shipments from Venezuela. So the additional expenses for this lady to go to Venezuela came up to a fairly substantial amount as compared with her salary, which she was getting regularly from the Library of Congress.

So I prepared the documentation and the suggested reimbursement of part of this from the Venezuelan Government. One of the clauses in this law was that the President of the United States had to approve each of these requests and transactions. So the file went over to the White House through my chiefs and Sumner Welles—first Ellis Briggs, then Larry Duggan, then Sumner Welles, and then to the White House. The Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, delegated such Latin American affairs to Sumner Welles. But the file came back. Up at the top of the file, in President Roosevelt's handwriting, [it would be interesting as a collector's item to get that notation]—he said, “I think that these allowances being given to Miss So and So are really too high. My sources of information [and we learned that they were some of the people from the Creole Oil Company, a Standard Oil subsidiary] say that this can be done on a more reasonable basis.”

Well, immediately we recalculated the costs, and we pared down some items, and sent the file back to the White House, and the President approved it, but this notation by President Roosevelt is on the file, in his own handwriting. It was a minor but, to me, interesting early experience.

In any event, this technical assistance program went ahead. I handled several of these requests in addition to my regular country-desk work, and finally we got a man to do them full-time, who did them very well. So this was an interesting beginning of a new program.

Soon after that, I think about the time I went to Bolivia, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs was created under Nelson Rockefeller. This was divided into three sections, to give assistance to Latin American countries in health, education, and agriculture. In almost every country of Latin America, we had experts in those three branches of work. We were thinking in terms of trying to assist the American republics, as a method not only of generating friendship and showing our desire to be helpful, but actually to make a substantial contribution to their economic and health and educational development.

Larry Duggan, my boss, had separately made quite an innovation in establishing a section on cultural relations, which was separate from the Latin American bureau, but very closely related to it, and physically in the next corridor of the Department.

In other words, he was trying to develop new ideas on how we could strengthen our relations with Latin America. Of course, before World War II, there was a much greater concentration on relations with Latin America than there has been since.

My thinking was channeled into the question of how can we help these countries. That, I think, led me to develop the idea that if I should ever be made an ambassador, that I would try to pay a great deal of attention not only to ways in which the United States could, without exorbitant expense, contribute to concrete, new developments in the country to

which I might be accredited, but also to take an interest in anything else that was being developed by the government and people of the foreign country, which appeared to have potential for contributing to their own development. I thought that we could show that we were interested in improvement and in growth and development by showing an interest in both the things that we might be able to do and the things that they were doing on their own.

Jumping rather drastically to my last foreign assignment, eventually, to Spain, I think that one of the interesting aspects of the assignment to a European country, for a person whose entire training had been in Latin America (with the exception of my period in Stockholm and my early few months in Canada), the interesting thing was using some of these methods and attitudes that we had in the Latin American section in a European country.

We had had a considerable aid program in Spain, which was of a different type, in that we were giving Spain substantial amounts of money to import scarce materials during a very difficult time for them. The Spanish paid for these materials in local currency and the U.S. used a part of this local currency to build and operate three air bases, a naval base, and a pipeline system to fuel the aircraft. We also used this local currency to pay the costs of our State Department, Foreign Service operations. But there was a very large amount of local currency left over, and we loaned back to the Spaniards most of the remaining local currency for economic development projects. A great many of such development projects had been carried out before I arrived in Spain, and I made it a practice to try to go around and admire the results of all of the various projects that had been developed with these local currency loans. The irrigation projects and reforestation projects were some of the most conspicuous ones. There had been improvements in their transportation system and in their railroad system. I believe our relations were helped by showing that the United States is really very much interested in improvements, in growth. So that was a

large element in my performance of my job as an ambassador when I went to Costa Rica and subsequently in Uruguay, in Chile, and in Spain.

One of the projects that I had worked on during my years in the State Department before I went to Costa Rica was the construction of unfinished sections of the Inter-American Highway. The U.S. had agreed to contribute to the development of this road from the United States down to Panama. I believe it was in a law of '34 that we promised the U.S. would provide two-thirds of the cost of constructing, up to a certain modest standard, any part of the highway that was unfinished, if the other government would provide a third of the cost. We got into the practice of even loaning them the money for the third that they paid.

This highway had been nearly completed. The Mexicans had completed their part at their own expense. They did not wish to be beholden to the United States for the highway. They had done their part. The highway was pretty well completed in most of the other countries, but there were a number of gaps, and the biggest gaps were in Costa Rica, which was the country to which I happened to have been appointed.

So before I went to Costa Rica, I was determined that I was going to start in immediately to compile the information to show approximately what it would cost to complete the highway in all the sections, not only in Costa Rica, but in the other countries. It so happened that the headquarters of the Public Roads Administration, which was doing the work that we had promised to contribute to, was in Costa Rica. So immediately, the head man, who was a very able guy named Marvin Harshberger, and I got our heads together, and we began compiling the data.

Am I getting ahead of myself?

Q: Not really, no.

WOODWARD: This leads into a very interesting incident. In Costa Rica, the Public Roads Administration had taken on the job of directly supervising the construction work on a modest section of the highway entirely by itself, with the required one-third contribution from the Costa Rican Government and participation by Costa Rican engineers. This section was the link that would complete a highway between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, in the northern extremity of Costa Rica.

At the time I arrived in Costa Rica, unbeknownst to me, a group of some 450 men was being trained in the barracks of the Somoza Government in Nicaragua, to attack Costa Rica and try to overthrow the government of Jose Figueres.

Q: Excuse me. Which Somoza is this?

WOODWARD: The eldest.

Q: Anastasio.

WOODWARD: Anastasio, known as “Tacho” Somoza. Somoza, afterwards, said to me personally that he didn't really give them much help—just “a handful of firecrackers.”

The CIA was apparently aware of the fact that Somoza was harboring and giving some assistance to this crew of the so-called Caribbean Legion, which, in this case, consisted of Costa Rican dissidents, but also a large number of volunteers and mercenaries or soldiers of fortune from all over the Caribbean region. These people, as I say, of whom I was totally unaware, were preparing to attack the Figueres Government.

Oddly enough, when I went around and made my protocolary calls, before going to Costa Rica, one of the people I called on was the director of the CIA, Mr. Allen Dulles. He made the very odd remark to me, “I want to assure you that the CIA is not going to attempt to overthrow the Figueres Government.” I didn't know quite what to make of that remark. [Laughter] But I later discovered that what he really meant was that the CIA was not

reporting on this subject, but was aware of it. The reason that the CIA was apparently turning a deaf ear to this was that Somoza had been of assistance in the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala a year or so before that.

Q: This was the Peurifoy period.

WOODWARD: Yes, that had occurred, just a few months before. Apparently, Somoza had let his airfields be used for planes that flew over Guatemala City in the course of that incident. Therefore, out of appreciation to him for his services, nothing was being said about this. That's the only way I could make out the reason that I didn't know about it; nobody told me about it. My CIA man told me afterwards that he knew all about it.

Q: But you mean you went out as ambassador—because in reviewing, before talking to you, this was on the front pages of the major newspapers, the tension between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. But our intelligence people kept you in the dark?

WOODWARD: Yes. Our intelligence people not only kept me in the dark, but the tension you refer to has long been a chronic thing between Nicaragua and Costa Rica; there wasn't any particular new development in the papers that I'm aware of during this period, until the “invasion” of Costa Rica actually took place in January 1955.

In any event, one day in January 1955, I received word, by radio telephone, from the Public Roads Administration people who were working up in northern Costa Rica (through Marvin Harshberger, who was their boss in San Jose) that this invasion was occurring, an invasion of 450 men coming across the border. The Public Roads people who were constructing the highway within a few miles of the Nicaraguan border naturally pulled back to their base camp, which was some 25 or 30 miles from the border. They had a large quantity of trucks, and they began to get some indications—one or two stragglers or scouts came in and said the invaders were going to try to get the Public Roads trucks in order to ride into San Jose. So we, of course, told the Public Roads people to bring their

trucks farther back from the Nicaraguan border, and they brought them all back to the town of Liberia, the biggest town in northern Costa Rica.

Immediately, the Assistant Secretary for Latin American affairs got in touch with the Costa Rican ambassador in Washington and suggested to him that he call a meeting of the OAS Council and have an immediate investigation started. I thought this was a rather friendly act to Costa Rica on the part of my chief, Henry Holland, who was a very able fellow; he was obviously not following the policy of the CIA.

The investigating committee came down very promptly, and they started shuttling back and forth by airplane between Managua and San Jose, trying to get Somoza to call off the invasion, although Somoza said he wasn't running it at all, that he had only let them use his barracks for training. Well, the investigating committee wasn't getting very far in this effort to try to negotiate a cease-fire, when, about four days after the invasion had begun, one of the airplanes which had been obtained by the insurrectionists flew over San Jose and fired off machine guns, on the horizontal, dropping the empty shells along the main streets of the town of San Jose. That one airplane flight really worked up feeling in Costa Rica.

Oddly enough, Henry Holland had telephoned me at 8:00 o'clock in the morning, just before this happened. It was early, because I seem to recall that I was still asleep when he telephoned. He said, “Bob, is it raining down there?”

And I said, “No, it's a beautiful day.”

And he said, “Well, you want to watch out. It may be raining.” And he knew this was going to happen, you see. Anyhow, it did happen immediately. I had just laid down the telephone when I heard that airplane overhead. Our house was 5 miles out of town. The airplane had just shot off its machine guns over the city of San Jose.

This occurred on a Thursday morning; the next day, I was talking to Holland on the phone, and I said, “The investigating committee is doing a very fine job of trying to knock heads together, but I think the Costa Rican Government is probably going to ask us for some airplanes that can match the airplanes of the guerrillas.” The invaders had two or three little planes; they had a DC-3 that had been given them by the dictator of Venezuela, and they had the World War II P-51 that had been loaned by the Guatemalan Government.

Q: These are the guerrillas.

WOODWARD: The guerrillas, yes. The fellow who had shot the guns off over the streets of San Jose was a man who, I think, was an American soldier of fortune, and was operating an old World War II fighter plane, a big propeller P-51. The propeller was almost bigger than the airplane. Well, anyhow, he was operating this old World War II crate. Jerry Delarm was his name.

The Costa Ricans didn't have any Air Force; they did have a good commercial airline with a couple of Convairs and maybe one or two DC-3s, and they had some damn good commercial pilots. So I told Henry, “I think they're probably going to ask us for some airplanes, pronto, to try to meet this threat.”

Well, a couple of hours later, I received a telephone call from the foreign minister asking me if I'd come down to the foreign office, that the President Figueres was going to be there, and a couple of other people. They said they'd been talking this over, and decided that they wanted to ask the United States if the United States would sell them a couple of these same P-51 airplanes. So I immediately telephoned Holland, and he said he would look into the availability of the planes.

In the meantime, I said, “I think you ought to call a meeting of the OAS Council,” (under the system by which the council would be constituted as a “provisional meeting of foreign

ministers" under the Rio treaty) to approve this sale, if we could make the sale to them. I said, "I think we ought to make this sale and get these airplanes down here fast."

Henry said, "Spell out what you are suggesting in a telegram and send it right away so I can show it to Mr. Dulles."

Henry Holland found, through the Pentagon, that the desired airplanes could be obtained from the Texas National Guard at Kelly Field.

I found out later that Holland spent a good part of Saturday morning arguing with Mr. Dulles at his house about this, and Dulles finally approved the sale. My argument, which was used by Holland, was, "We ought to get the OAS into this and make it a multinational thing." We already had the multi-national investigating committee there. "We ought to get as much participation from the inter-American organization as possible to make up for the bad reputation we have because of U.S. unilateral action in the overthrow of President Arbenz of Guatemala," this had been done as a much more arbitrary action, without the participation of the OAS.

So Henry Holland had agreed with this, and Mr. Dulles finally agreed with it. They called a meeting of the OAS for that Saturday night. This had been an idea Friday noon; the request had been made Friday afternoon. The meeting of the OAS was held on Saturday evening. It didn't wind up 'til about 1:00 a.m., and it came out with a resolution not just approving our sale of four P-51 airplanes, but requesting the U.S. to sell the airplanes to Costa Rica!

Q: Kelly Field—I think it's in San Antonio.

WOODWARD: Yes. And the Texas National Guard was prepared; as a result of the Guatemalan exercise, they already had experience in this, because they had loaned P-51s for that, or at least instructors in piloting P-51s.

Anyhow, the resolution that came out requested us to make the sale. This made it really multinational, you see, with much more multinational responsibility than just approving our individual action.

The pilots told me later that on Sunday morning, one of them was out mowing his lawn near Kelly Field; he said he got a telephone call telling him to be ready to take off at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon in a P-51, to refuel and rest in Mexico City, and go right on to Costa Rica. The three airplanes arrived in Costa Rica on Monday morning at about 10:30 at a new airport that was being built. The building was still under construction, but a very fine airstrip, 8,000 feet long had been completed—so recently that these were the first planes to use it. Naturally, I was out there with the Costa Ricans to receive and welcome these planes. [Laughter] (I had received a telephone call on Sunday from the Commandant at Kelly Field expressing concern that the airplanes might get into combat with the U.S. insignia on the wings; I had promptly asked the Costa Rican Director General of Civil Aviation to be ready to change the insignia.) When the P-51s landed and before the pilots had managed to loosen their harnesses, there were painters under the wings, painting out the U.S. insignia and putting on the Costa Rican insignia. The Cosa Ricans responded to this request very efficiently.

The American pilots promptly asked, “Where are the people we're supposed to train to fly these planes?” Five Costa Rican pilots were lined up in front of them, and the chief American pilot said, “Well, here is an instruction book for each of you. I want you gentlemen to master this by 5:00 o'clock this evening. If you can answer a number of questions the first thing tomorrow morning and if you feel you're prepared, you can take the planes off.”

The result was that two of the Costa Rican pilots of the LACSA airline checked out the next day. Their names, oddly enough, were Guerra and Victory—~”war” and “victory.” These two Costa Ricans checked out on Tuesday morning and piloted the planes so well that on Wednesday morning, they were up over the encampment of the 450 invaders in

northern Costa Rica and fired on them. This effectively ended the revolutionary attack. The sale of the airplanes to the Costa Rican Government ($135,000, including ammunition!) showed clearly that the U.S. and the OAS were opposed to the military invasion.

Then there was a lot of mopping up. The 450 men immediately ran back into Nicaragua, and they stayed right across the border. Somoza let it be known that if anybody fired into Nicaragua, he was going to send the whole Nicaraguan Army in to conquer Costa Rica. He was blustering about it.

The men stayed right next to the border. The five-man investigating committee of the OAS, with a very able American representative on it, John Dreier, developed the ingenious idea of declaring a non-combat zone for about 3 kilometers on each side of the frontier. Well, that had the effect only of allowing the guerrillas to come across into Costa Rica and kill a few cows in somebody's pasture there in order to feed themselves. One little group made a lateral end-run and came into Costa Rica some 30 miles inland from this place, and the Costa Ricans sent a daring little group in a DC-3 up to the town which these fellows attempted to get, and chased them back into Nicaragua.

Well, the upshot, finally, was that since they couldn't get the people out of this border demilitarized zone, the investigating committee said, “All right. We will cancel the demilitarized zone and let the Costa Ricans chase them into Nicaragua if they will.” Well, immediately the guerrillas all went farther back into Nicaragua; they were disbanded and were sent wherever they wanted to go. The Nicaraguan Government did nothing to continue the military effort, and the invasion was over.

Q: It sounds as though Allan Dulles was working on Foster Dulles to keep the pot boiling a bit, as far as the planes were concerned; in other words, Foster Dulles was a bit reluctant to sell the planes. But the State Department knew that this attack was going to take place beforehand; otherwise, you wouldn't have received a call from the Department of State.

Was there a feeling later that the CIA was more involved in this attempt to overthrow Costa Rica than that?

WOODWARD: No, I don't think there was. I think that the CIA attitude was only that, “We will turn out backs on it and not report on it. If Somoza wants to help this group of the so-called Caribbean Legion, that's up to him. He's our friend, and we'll let him do what he wants to do.” I think both the Dulles brothers had a distinct distaste for Figueres. They thought he was a rather dangerous leftist or radical. But he was democratically elected, no doubt about that. It seemed to me that it was a very good opportunity for the United States to get back on track in using the inter-American machinery and to protect a democratically-elected government.

Q: What was your impression of the Figueres Government when you were down there?

WOODWARD: I think their measures were very well intentioned. I think Figueres had a somewhat “contrived” and rather phoney liberal stance, but his was a more democratic attitude, I think, than the opposition, the conservative coffee-growers and ranchers.

Q: In Costa Rica.

WOODWARD: In Costa Rica, yes. It's very difficult to appraise the merits of opposing parties of this kind. There was no element of communism in either party. There was a communist oriented candidate who had been in the Costa Rican Government long before, and both the main parties seemed to be equally opposed to him. So I thought it was a pretty fair government, on the whole, but I am not as enthusiastic about it, in retrospect, as I was at the time.

Q: Did you have any problem in reporting? Did you find yourself at odds with the State Department? Were they looking for more critical reports?

WOODWARD: No. No, there wasn't enough interest in it. As far as I know, I never heard Mr. Dulles make any real invidious comments about the Figueres Government. But when I went in my farewell call, before I went to Costa Rica, Secretary Dulles said, “You want to remember, Woodward, that the people that we have to depend upon in Latin America are the so-called dictators. They're the people who will cooperate with us.” Well, I was going to a country that did not have a dictator, but the neighboring country had one: Somoza. [Laughter] Q: But you didn't feel under any particular pressure in order to meet this type of —I won't say “bias”—but a slant?

WOODWARD: No, I didn't, really. I think it shows that the man on the ground can have some influence on what the United States Government does. I was pushing for support to a democratically-elected government, and also for more participation of the OAS, which can take part of this burden off the United States.

Q: How did you find you were supported by your staff at the embassy in San Jose? Did you feel you had a good, solid staff, or was it a weak one?

WOODWARD: There were only one or two who would have any bearing on this particular situation. I was very lucky in my deputy chief of mission, Allan Stewart. He had had a lot of experience in Venezuela and Colombia, as a newspaperman. He'd come into the Foreign Service, had been in Chile, and was more knowledgeable about Latin American thinking and politics than most of the people that I had run across in the Foreign Service. He was all in favor of doing what we could to help the Costa Rican Government in this situation.

There was another man there, who had been there for over 20 years as a more or less permanent member of the staff, named Alex Cohen. He was very helpful, because he knew the country so well and knew the Costa Ricans. From that point on, really, the rest of the staff might as well have not existed for any political problems. They were very competent in their fields, in the economic section, administrative, consular, and cultural relations. We had a very good man in cultural relations, who, I thought, happily

concentrated on relations with the University of Costa Rica, which he did very effectively. He built up quite a cooperative relationship there. Incidentally, he was Willy Warner, who wrote Beautiful Swimmers, about the crabs and crabmen of Chesapeake Bay.

Q: Oh, yes, and a book about deep sea fishing, too. Distant Waters.

WOODWARD: Right. He's a good man.

Q: You were then assigned to Uruguay. Had you asked for this, or had this come as a normal assignment?

WOODWARD: Entirely without any participation on my part. Dick Rubottom was at that time the Assistant Secretary in charge of Latin Americans Affairs, and he told me that he'd like very much to recommend me for Uruguay. It was a very attractive post at that time, attractive in the sense that it was a thoroughly democratic country. No one had ever heard of the Tupamaros at that point. So I went there in 1958 and stayed, happily, til 1961.

There I tried to resolve every specific problem we had in relations with Uruguay. We had a couple of rather conspicuous ones when I arrived. One was a countervailing duty that the United States had put on a certain very high-quality type of wool called wool tops, coming from Uruguay, and the countervailing duty was hurting the sale of this product greatly. It was based upon the charge that the Uruguayan Government, with a series of multiple or dual exchange rates, was giving a more favorable exchange rate for the sale of this product than warranted by the home market price. Anyhow, I got that one straightened out. We got the market opened up again for the wool tops. There wasn't any real domestic competition from the United States. This wasn't because these wool imports were hurting the market for domestic wool in the U.S.; the fact was that the high price for wool resulted in the American consumers being deprived of genuine wool which was being steadily supplanted by synthetic fibers.

Q: Was this a problem with the Commerce Department?

WOODWARD: No, it was the Treasury Department. I came back to Washington and I argued with people in the Treasury Department, after presenting a very detailed written argument with facts and Figueres.

At the same time, there was another very serious problem. There were two American packing houses, Swift and Armour, operating in Uruguay, and both of them were having very hard times. They were having a lot of labor difficulties and a lot of trouble getting cattle on the cattle market. The government had a big packing house of its own, and the allegation made to me by the American managers was that they couldn't buy any top-grade cattle in competition with the government packing house. So one thing led to another, and just after I arrived in Uruguay, the Uruguayan Government seized both of these packing plants.

Well, coincidentally, and entirely separately, Vice President Nixon was coming on a visit to Uruguay, just before this happened. I think the seizure happened, if I recall, three days before he came.

Q: The Uruguayan Government knew he was coming. It was a scheduled visit?

WOODWARD: Yes. The packing houses had sent down a man to represent their interests, who was negotiating, to try to get this straightened out. I thought he had some pretty good ideas. I think he was already working on this before they actually seized the plants. In any event, I had reason to believe that this was going to be straightened out, so I recommended to Nixon, when he arrived, that he say only that he was confident that a mutually satisfactory settlement of this dispute could be worked out, and to not make any drastic remonstrances or do anything that might antagonize the Uruguayan authorities. I'll say this, that Vice President Nixon had the most remarkable memory of everything he was briefed on, and was most articulate in making his comments and statements; one could not have asked for more cooperation. He did exactly as I suggested.

Shortly after this, the packing house representative was able to work out a most interesting agreement. The packing houses hadn't made any money for years. So Swift and Armour, which, incidentally, just before this, had combined, at least in their foreign operations, offered to give these plants to the workers if the Uruguayan Government would make a loan to the workers to give them operating capital, and if the American companies could be exempted from the regular legal requirement of payments to employees upon termination of employment. Well, the companies were exempted from the rather large cost of termination pay; the government made the loan; the workers were given the plants. I wonder how they're operating today; maybe these packing plants are still being operated by the workers. The packing houses were reconciled to disposing of their responsibilities and their property in this way.

Q: Was this a fairly common practice of the government taking over property, nationalizing property? Or was this a penalty because Swifts and Armour . . .

WOODWARD: Nationalization was not a common practice, no. This was something pretty unusual for the Uruguayan Government. They were inclined to be pretty fair, on the whole, but so much resentment of sorts had been worked up over these two plants, that they did it in this case. It was an exception. Of course, it's been done in many countries and other industries—for example, the copper companies in Chile.

Q: A packing plant seems to be somewhat removed from the sort of extraction type of natural resource type nationalization. Somehow this became a focus for political unhappiness.

WOODWARD: It did. I think it was partly a rather illogical chain of reasoning, in that the market or the need was falling off. Britain was the great buyer of meat, and there was always a little lurking resentment because of the U.S. hoof-and-mouth disease embargo on fresh meat. We wouldn't take any fresh carcasses. We would buy some canned meat that had been thoroughly boiled. This was in the background. The Uruguayans wanted to

stimulate their business with Britain, and they were anxious to get it into Uruguayan hands, and see if they couldn't rebuild the industry a little more. It was, as I say, an exceptional measure.

Q: There were some political problems. Castroism was beginning to take root within the student groups at that time, along with some anti-Americanism. If I recall, there were some problems at the time.

WOODWARD: That was the beginning. There was sympathy for Castro. Castro took over the Cuban Government on January 1, 1959, and this packing house business had all occurred before that. It occurred in 1958. I arrived in Uruguay in April of 1958. Yes, during my time in Uruguay, Castro came on a visit. I happened to be at the airport when he came in. I was meeting my son; he had been over in a boarding school in Buenos Aires, and he was coming over for a visit. A great crowd greeted Castro, and I tried to be inconspicuous, because I didn't know quite what the U.S. Government's attitude at that point was toward Castro, although we were still making an effort to find some kind of working relationship. Phil Bonsal was still U.S. ambassador in Havana and getting absolutely nowhere, because Castro wouldn't even receive him.

The Tupamaro business wasn't at all apparent at that time. The real activity was later and became a very nasty business. They kidnapped the British ambassador and kept him in a cage for over a year; he wrote a book about it.

Q: What you were seeing, then, was incipient sort of general anti-Americanism that was beginning to build up a bit in the university and student body?

WOODWARD: Not really, no. I didn't perceive any anti-Americanism to speak of. There undoubtedly was quite a bit, you know, amongst student groups and whatnot, but no, as a matter of fact, it had never occurred to me there was any real anti-Americanism. We'd always had a very good relationship with the Uruguayan Government. It had become

inefficient because of the nine-man presidency. It was a committee presidency, you know. They had one member of the committee named as the protocolar president each year.

Q: Did we have a particular policy toward Uruguay, except to wish them well? Did you go out with instructions to further any policy, or was it more one of keeping good relations?

WOODWARD: One of keeping good relations. The only instructions I had were—well, at that time, there was a standard boilerplate instruction, which was given to every outgoing ambassador, which was to maintain comity and friendship. But I was aware of some specific problems. Particularly the packing house problem had become very widely known, because it had been rankling for a long time. Luckily, that problem was solved fairly early during my stay.

We finally got down to the point where there was one residual problem that was a very knotty one. It was called the “cross-ties” case. The cross-ties case had come about because the Uruguayan National Railways had bought a lot of cross ties in the U.S. made out of southern pine and collected together by a Mississippi entrepreneur, and shipped, I think, from Miami to Uruguay. The National Railways had sent an inspector to the port of shipment in the U.S. to inspect the ties, and he had declared that many of them were defective, and that the railroad wouldn't take delivery until the defective ties were replaced. The great pile of ties accumulated on the wharfs, in Miami or in Galveston. Anyhow, the sellers of the ties, the man who was getting these together, had a great friend in the United States Senate, and there had been some emphatic complaints to the State Department by this senator from Mississippi.

Q: The two senators that I recall from Mississippi were Stennis and Eastland. They'd been there for a long time.

WOODWARD: It was Senator Eastland who was the great supporter of this man, who had his headquarters in Meridian, Mississippi.

In any event, I finally spent several days and nights putting together what I guess is still a definitive analysis of the “cross-ties problem.” This complaint has come up time after time in the years since I left Uruguay in 1961. My gosh, 26 years ago! My report on this is still the bible on the “cross-ties case.” What it demonstrates pretty clearly is that defective cross ties were being panned off on the Uruguayan National Railways, and that therefore, they had a good reason not to accept this shipment, which, I guess, rotted on the wharf. They may have made some kind of settlement since, and even taken some of the better ties in the pile that was on the wharf. I had a very fine predecessor in Uruguay; his name was Jefferson Patterson. He apparently had confidence in the legitimacy of Senator Eastland's complaints; he pursued this question so much that I think it really affected his assignment in Uruguay. I got the impression that the Uruguayans were not too unhappy to see him go, because he'd been so vigorous and so courageous in pursuing this ~”cross-ties case.” It seems very odd that a case of this kind can affect a man's standing, but I think it's quite possible, because I always felt as though he was not fully appreciated as he should have been.

Q: You mean fully appreciated in the Department of State?

WOODWARD: No, in Uruguay. His wife is still in Washington and very vigorous; she is a great public benefactor. She came from the family that developed the Goodrich Rubber Company, and he came from the family that founded the National Cash Register Company, so they had the wherewithal to be very generous.

I just mention this as a way in which one case, really, affects a man's relationship with a foreign government. Of course, at the same time, there were constant arguments, constant ill feelings over the packing houses, and I think that was an element in Ambassador Patterson's relations because he was vigorous in making official representations on behalf of the American companies .

In any event, I thought that the problems in our relations with Uruguay were either all solved or swept under the rug by the time I left. [Laughter]

Q: You mentioned that the Pattersons came from a great deal of money. Did you find it difficult, coming with your Foreign Service salary and allowances, to replace people who apparently could, at least, entertain in grand style? Did that have any effect on your ability to operate in Uruguay?

WOODWARD: Really, not in the least. No. The representation allowance was more or less a standard one, for entertaining, about $5,000 a year, with additional amounts for general events such as important official visits. I also, early in the game in Costa Rica, had developed a practice which I assume is used by many other chiefs of diplomatic missions, in that I kept a separate account of all expenditures for what you might call non-representational entertainment—that is, food and lodging and meals for Americans.

Q: We were discussing the question of representation.

WOODWARD: Yes. You asked if there was a problem because of following on the heels of someone who obviously was very well-to-do. It helps to maintain a separate account of expenditures which are not chargeable as representation expenses, because, as you know, representation expenses are only those for entertaining people of the country that you're accredited to, and other foreigners. If you maintain a separate account of the other expenditures which are really business expenditures, mostly relating to individuals or groups who come from the United States and for Americans resident abroad and who require some assistance, and for whom you naturally want to do everything you can to help, this adds up to quite a large sum in a year. The Internal Revenue Service regards these as legitimate business expenses, so I would accumulate a rather large total of expenditures of this type, and this reduced my taxable income. That helped a lot. That enabled one to supplement representation more effectively.

Another method I used in my first post as an ambassador in Costa Rica was to try to find wholesale sources of supply so that I could have, without really worrying about the expense, a reception for any group that came along, and feel that I wasn't going to go broke doing it. One of the first things I discovered was that in Costa Rica, where the favorite drink was Scotch whiskey, that I might be able to buy Scotch on a wholesale basis if I got it directly from a distiller in Scotland, rather than going through the normal channels. We had a little official commissary, and there was a mark-up, and the ambassador was usually the largest user of the commissary Scotch. But I called up a friend in the British legation, the secretary, a helpful man, and I said, “Aren't there some good distillers in Scotland that aren't represented here?” Because I knew that whenever I bought any Scotch, the local dealer for that brand had to receive his normal commission, even though it's sold through the U.S. commissary.

He said, “Oh, yes, there are a lot of them.” He gave me a list of about 20, and I picked out those that seemed to have fetching names, and wrote to five or six. [Laughter]

Q: Glen-something or other.

WOODWARD: Yes. I asked for their literature, and then ordered a small shipment. I ordered four cases, let's say, each from about four distillers. Well, in the course of this, I succeeded in finding a very good Scotch, which is made by a company called Patterson, interestingly enough, in Glasgow. In the course of it, I also got some terribly bad Scotch from other distillers, very cheap. It was all a low enough price. Patterson's best, which was thoroughly good Scotch, came up to all the regular well-known brands, was only $18 a case, $1.50 a bottle. I got some that was lower priced, less than $1.00 a bottle. In one instance, we were having a cocktail party, when one of the fellows on our embassy staff came up to me. We had a very pleasant relationship. He said, “Bob, what is this stuff you're serving?”

I said, “Why? What are you talking about?”

And he handed me a glass and said, “Taste this.” Well, it was pretty bad. So I immediately told the waiter not to use any more of that. One of these brands was really quite punk, and some of the others weren't very good.

So a few days later, I was at a meeting of the diplomatic corps, and I was talking to a little group, including the Salvadoran ambassador. I said, “You know, I've got some very poor Scotch. I didn't pay much for it. I don't know what I'm going to do with it.”

The Salvadoran ambassador said, “What do you want for it?”

I said, “I'll sell it to you for exactly what I paid for it, which is $1.00 a bottle.”

He said, “I'll take every bit you've got.” So I sold him all of the dubious Scotch, and, of course, he was entitled to free entry, so there was no question about the legitimacy of this. I discovered later that he was peddling Scotch; he was selling it to local citizen buyers. I should not have lent myself to this measure if I'd had known what he was doing with it, but he seemed to want it badly. That's the way I got rid of the bad Scotch. I kept on buying from this man Patterson, visited his plant in Glasgow years later. When I was in Spain, I went up to Holy Loch to see how the submarine tender operated, because we were requesting the Spanish Government to permit the nuclear submarines to come into the base at Rota, and I wanted to see how that operated. So I went in to see Mr. Patterson, a very nice guy.

Q: When you were in Uruguay, President Eisenhower came on a visit. Was this a high point in your career or just a hectic one? Was it useful?

WOODWARD: It was an immensely popular visit. President Eisenhower made a really superb impression there. He also made a very fine impression on me and on my wife. He was a thoroughly agreeable man, just as amiable as one could be. He made a speech to the joint houses of the Uruguayan legislature, and was the object of a lot of attention. He was just there 24 hours, less than 24 hours. He made a rather interesting comment

to me at the breakfast table. I was sitting next to him, and his brother Milton was on the other side. He said, “Say, Woodward, do you think this fellow Hunt should stay here?” Howard Hunt was the CIA station chief. He'd already been assigned to headquarters at Washington, and his successor was on the job, but he had been ordered to stay for a couple of weeks extra because President Eisenhower was coming, and he knew the police well and could help arrange all the proper protection and such details as the installation of telephones along the right-of-way.

I said that I didn't see any reason for him to stay. I said, “I know the new man quite well.” He happened to be the same man who was in Costa Rica, who, through no fault of his own, had not informed me of the invasion that was coming. But he was a good fellow, and I said, “I don't see any reason for Hunt's staying. I don't think he should be kept here.” He's been assigned to Washington. I often wonder if I'd said, “He ought to be kept here,” if it would have had any effect on what he subsequently did. [Laughter]

Q: Your little bit of Watergate there.

WOODWARD: Yes. Anyhow, we got out to the airport a couple of hours later. President Eisenhower was leaving. The then-chairman of the nine-man council, a man from an agricultural political party—the protocolary president for that year—and I were the last two to say goodbye to President Eisenhower as he climbed the ladder into his plane. He turned around, when he got up a couple of steps, and he said, “Oh, by the way, Mr. President, about that man you spoke to me about. He won't be able to stay here, but as long as I'm President [which was another eight months], I can promise you that Woodward will stay here.” [Laughter] So Hunt left, and I was, of course, baffled by this exchange of comments, but I assumed from this conversation that Hunt had decided he wanted to stay in Uruguay.

Only a day or two later, the one American farmer that I knew in Uruguay—I don't think there was any other American farmer—came into the office, as he did from time to time.

I always encouraged him to talk, because he was a good friend of the man who was chairman of the presidential council. He said, “Say, would it be possible for Hunt to get two helicopters for President Nardone, the kind of helicopters President Eisenhower has? Hunt said he could get those for him.”

I said, “Well, I don't know how he'd do it, but who knows? I just don't know how he'd do that.”

Then he said, “How about all that telephone equipment that was installed along the line of the motorcade?” (This is always a precaution, because the President of the United States might be called on to “push the button.”)

I said, “Well, Hunt might be able to get that.”

“Hunt said he thought he could get that for President Nardone, too.”

This was all after the event, because Hunt was going to go on to Washington. But it indicated that he had decided that he wanted to stay. I figured out later that the reason he wanted to stay was that he was making a little money on a number of adventure stories he'd written. He was getting royalties on these paperbacks, and presumably some of them were very good adventure stories, and selling quite well. He had told me one day that if he could only get four or five more published, it would bring in royalties about equal to his salary as station chief, and that would enable him to live the way he wanted to live. He had a fairly large house, a couple of cars, but wasn't doing anything particularly flamboyant otherwise. He was a rather pleasant guy.

Q: Uruguay was not a particular place to be the flamboyant station chief.

WOODWARD: No, but I guess he thought it was a good place to have a little time off to write. As far as I was concerned, it was always a good idea for the CIA man to be doing something other than his regular work.

Q: [Laughter] Keep him out of trouble.

WOODWARD: Yes. Incidentally, if there's any one emphatic conviction that I have in relations abroad, and I don't speak on the basis of a very wide experience in many regions of the world, it is that the undercover activity, the action programs of the CIA, have done more to harm our foreign relations than any other one thing. I believe these have had a very bad effect upon our relationship with other countries, upon our own standards and principles, and upon our international reputation.

I say this because, like many other more or less idealistic people from the bush league and from the Midwest, I've always had the conviction that the United States was a very honest, fair-dealing, above-board country, that we are not engaged in skullduggery that was going to be harmful and embarrassing to foreign governments, and that one of our greatest strengths was our reputation for integrity and fair dealing. This has been destroyed, in many respects, by the CIA. Perhaps the action programs should not be totally eliminated. There may be some incredible unpredictable eventuality in which it's important for the President and Secretary of State to have access to some instrumentality such as these undercover programs. But I think it's a thing that should be used once in a decade or once in a generation, and we should not have thrown away our reputation for above-board dealings.

Q:I note that there was a rather busy time after you left Uruguay, where you were first assigned to Chile, and then you went back to Washington. How did this work out?

WOODWARD: Of course, I was delighted to be transferred to Chile. This was the very beginning of the Kennedy Administration, and I went there happily. I knew there were some very serious problems between the Chilean Government and the American mining companies, and I thought that perhaps my approach of burrowing into the detail of all of the pros and cons of the points of view of all parties concerned, might enable me to

contribute to a better working relationship between the American mining companies and the Chilean Government, so I was eager to get into this.

When I was in Washington, en route to Chile, I happened to have an appointment with Chester Bowles, the new Under Secretary, just after he had learned of the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Bowles said, “What are we going to do about this Bay of Pigs thing? What are we going to do?”

I, of course, didn't have a very adequate answer. I said, “I think they're just going to have to tough it out, just weather it.”

I went off to Chile, after some briefings in the State Department. I heard about the Alliance for Progress plans, and I knew there was going to be a group of experts coming down from Washington very soon, visiting all of the Latin American countries to discuss with the foreign government authorities various departments what we were proposing in our conception of an Alliance for Progress, trying to get their full cooperation and their contributions of ideas. Q: This is at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration.

WOODWARD: It was the beginning of the Kennedy Administration. This was in April of 1961, and he'd come in on the 20th of January, and had this disastrous experience of the Bay of Pigs in the first week of April. The Alliance for Progress was doubly important then to show that we had a positive program, which was constructive and, that we had something to compete with Castro's ideas other than a failed military operation.

When I went to Chile, I industriously tried to become acquainted with the people in every category of the goals and actions of the Alliance for Progress, and they were numerous. They covered everything of an economic or social nature that one could wish for the improvement of a nation. This would apply to all the other Latin American nations as well. We were going to obligate a considerable amount of resources.

I had an odd experience. Well, to me it was rather odd. When I presented my credentials to President Alessandri of Chile, he said, “What about this Alliance for Progress that your President is proposing? We're spending every bit of money we can get our hands on trying to improve this country and trying to improve the lot of the people who are badly off. We don't even allow television in this country, because we have decided that we don't want to expend a lot of money on this non-essential while we still have people who need little houses and need more food and clothing. Let's not get into this luxury operation until we get the more essential operations completed. So we have no television. We don't even give permits for construction of expensive houses. Who is going to provide the money for the Alliance for Progress?”

And I hesitated a bit and said, “Well, I guess there will be considerable contributions by the United States Government, and there will be private investments, if you encourage American firms to come in.”

Well, anyhow, it wasn't long before I received word that this mission was arriving. I had developed acquaintances with all these various branches, with a very able staff there, a very good economic counselor and a very fine counselor of Embassy, a man named Bill Krieg, who was leaving. His wife was ill, and I was very sorry to see him go. But they were very able in arranging these committees in each category and getting all ready for the group.

The group was headed by Adlai Stevenson, and Ellis Briggs was accompanying him. There were some others. Ellis Briggs and Stevenson were the two highest ranking. I took them in to make a call on the president. The president delivered exactly the same speech to them that he had to me about, “Who's going to pay for this?” He said, “These are very fine goals you're talking about and so forth.” They made the same reply I did.

The amusing aspect of this was that while Stevenson and Briggs and I were sitting on a bench, and I was between these two gentlemen—I'd known Briggs for years, and

I don't think I'd met Stevenson before this trip, but he was a very affable fellow, very amiable—they were sitting on either side, and we were all on this little wooden bench. The president was sitting opposite us a few feet away, and there was an interpreter to interpret for Stevenson. Briggs knew Spanish quite well, and I knew it fairly well. Anyhow, as the president was talking to us, I heard someone snoring. I thought, “My God! Is Ellis Briggs asleep?” He had a cane and was leaning on a cane. I looked over at him, and he wasn't the least bit asleep. I could see Stevenson better, because I don't see out of my left eye. Yes, Stevenson was completely alert. I thought, “Now who in hell is snoring?” It was a rather long office, and there was a guard down at the remote end of the room, standing erectly at attention, in his hussar uniform; he couldn't possibly be asleep, because he wouldn't be able to stand up. Well, I was sort of agonizing about this, because I wondered if I was going nuts, hearing this snoring. Suddenly, there was a stirring under the president's desk nearby. The president wasn't sitting at his desk; it was behind him. A great big boxer dog woke up and stretched, so I was relieved of that embarrassment.

We had a series of meetings there for a couple of days, which worked out quite to the satisfaction of the American group, including Stevenson and Briggs. I went out to the airport to bid them goodbye when they were taking off for La Paz, Bolivia. They seemed to be satisfied with what had developed in Chile. Suddenly, I felt very definitely ill, you know, an intestinal problem.

I felt so woozy that once they were gone, I went back to the office. I was supposed to go to a farewell ceremony for the chief of the military mission in the office of the Minister of War. This was in an office building. I was supposed to go at 11:00 o'clock, as I recall, and the press attach# had very kindly organized a luncheon to introduce me to a few members of the press, because I'd only been there for about a month at this point. This was going to be held in a little club of retired naval officers in downtown Santiago. Anyhow, I pulled myself together, and I went to both of these things. I was feeling very, very sick.

I sat down at the luncheon table, at this little club, and was trying to get acquainted with these press people, when a waiter came in and said there was a call for me. The telephone was in the kitchen. I went to take the call. It was Secretary of State Rusk. At the table, I'd been staring at some shrimp, and I thought, “My God, am I going to be able to eat those?” I knew Rusk quite well, because I'd been in the State Department several times when he'd been acting as a coordinating assistant chief for all of the geographical divisions when I had been in the Latin American division. I knew him well enough so I called him by his first name.

He said, “Bob, I want you to come right back to Washington.”

I said, “Dean, I know what you mean. You're scraping the bottom of the barrel.”

He said, “I don't think so. We want you back here to be Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs.”

I said, “I ought to consult my wife, shouldn't I?”

He said, “Call me back in the afternoon.”

Of course, I was so sick then, I struggled through that luncheon, I went home, and I went to bed. While I was in bed—it was sort of “The House of Usher,” an old embassy, a residence that had been used for years—the telephone rang, and it was Chester Bowles, Under Secretary. He started giving me a sales talk on coming back to Washington. I said, “Chet, I've already talked to Dean Rusk about this.”

He said, “Oh, I didn't know that. We both decided we'd try to get you.” [Laughter] So they both had.

I said, “No question but I'll have to come.”

He said, “You won't have to stay very long. If you don't like it, you can leave after two months. It's just because we're in kind of a bad spot now with the Bay of Pigs and all that stuff.”

I said, “I think I ought to stay in Chile for two weeks more because of the Fourth of July. Naturally, we want to have a little reception for the government officials, but the important thing is that the Fourth of July is the 150th anniversary of the establishment of the Chilean Senate, and the Senate was established on that day because it was our Fourth of July. So I think probably I'd better stay til the Fourth of July.” It was just about two weeks later.

He said, “Well, okay.” I had already talked to my wife. She had, rather surprisingly, accepted an invitation to play bridge. She hadn't played bridge for a long time and really didn't encourage the idea much of using time on bridge, because she was always pretty busy. She told me afterwards, “I had a good bridge hand, and you spoiled it.” [Laughter]

Anyhow, we went back. I discovered later that, in a telephone conversation from the hotel , in Santiago, where the Alliance for Progress was staying, Stevenson had recommended me to be Assistant Secretary. The man who had been chosen had pulled out at the last minute; he was Carl Spaeth, who had been in the Department years before and was then dean of the law school at Stanford University. The Bay of Pigs had occurred, and there had been another event that causes a lot of uneasiness. Trujillo had been killed, and there was an upheaval in the Dominican Republic. Anyhow, Carl decided he didn't want the job. As you've probably observed, the system has always been that if a non-career person rejects a job of any significance, the inclination is to turn to the career fellows, and vice versa. If the career fellow reneges, they'll turn to a non-career man.

So I went to Washington two weeks later, on the 7th of July, just after the Fourth of July, and started in immediately to try to work on the Alliance for Progress and the Dominican question, which was one of our most difficult things then.

Q: Looking at it now from the Washington point of view, having been an ambassador a number of times in Latin America, how well did you feel the United States was served by the people then in our embassies, by our chiefs of mission in Latin America? Was it a good body of ambassadors?

WOODWARD: We had an able group of career people as ambassadors. Most of the political appointees were inclined to flounder a bit for a while, and they were of varying temperaments. Some of them have, of course, been really top-notch men, Bunker for example. Q: This is Ellsworth Bunker.

WOODWARD: Yes. He was later our representative to the Organization of American States and in the subsequent developments in the Dominican Republic he did a marvelous job of helping to install a democratically orientated government in the Dominican Republic. He was a man of infinite patience and very good judgment, just a remarkably able fellow. He always worked very quietly and sensibly, no flamboyance of any kind. Of course, he had already been the manager of a big American sugar importing company when he received his first diplomatic appointment. He'd had quite a lot of experience abroad by that time. He'd been ambassador to Argentina and ambassador to Italy. Later, he was on the West Irian [New Guinea] problem, which was a very difficult one. He just had remarkable staying power.

And there have been other very able people, but from the viewpoint of our representation abroad, of course, most of the political appointees have not been as well qualified as career men. They clog up the ordinary procedure of developing career people by filling a considerable percentage of the chief of mission jobs. The great handicap, even if they may be able, is that they do have an effect of stultifying the ordinary progress of people in the Foreign Service, not in terms of the fortunes or selfish interests of the officers themselves, but in trying to keep up a flow of highly qualified and experienced people.

Q: To move up through a rational career ladder.

WOODWARD: Yes.

Q: You were in Washington for about two years, was it, dealing with Latin American affairs?

WOODWARD: You mean during my assignment as Assistant Secretary?

Q: Yes.

WOODWARD: No. I reported for duty on the 7th of July, and I think I left in the first week of March. I was only there that relatively short length of time that Bowles had mentioned.

Of course, Bowles, in the meantime, had gone elsewhere. I think he'd gone back to India. He went to the White House for a while, because he was impractical as Under Secretary, too idealistic. He wasn't sufficiently realistic in what could be accomplished. I remember his conviction that we should be able to lift up the state of the economy and the life of Haiti, a small country of about 3 million people. There has seemed to be absolutely no way that the United States could make very much progress in improving the conditions in Haiti. So that was one specific instance of a certain lack of realism on the part of Bowles, but he was a very well-meaning fellow.

When I had been on the job about five months, when, the first of December, I was asked by Rusk whether I wanted to leave. He said that he would be glad to recommend me for the embassy in Argentina, and I said, “That would be a splendid assignment. I'd like to go there.” But I said, “I want to do exactly what you want me to do. If you want me to stay here, I'll stay, particularly since there's a meeting coming up in Punta del Este [Uruguay].”

We had had the Alliance for Progress meeting in August, and the meeting in Punta del Este, which was the same place we had had the Alliance for Progress meeting, was going to be to try to figure out what could be done about “quarantining” the subversive activities of the Castro Government in the Caribbean countries, in particular. The Cubans

were sending little guerrilla forces into Central American countries; and they sent one to Venezuela and were evidently intent on doing this anywhere they saw an opportunity.

The Colombian Government, Ueras Camargo, the president of Colombia, who had been the Secretary General of the OAS, had told my predecessor said that he thought his government could propose some measures that would have the effect of slowing down or stopping this subversive activity on the part of the Castro Government, and that we should go ahead and have a meeting of the Latin American countries to consider such measures.

Before the meeting took place, it had not been possible to agree on any proposals that were going to be presented. It was getting to be a little nip- and-tuck as to what was going to happen at the meeting. When Rusk mentioned to me that I might go to Argentina, if I wished, I said, “I'd like to see you through this meeting, because I think it's going to be very difficult.” We had about three conversations on this subject. He said, finally, “I want you to stay.”

So I stayed. In the meantime, in the course of this reshuffle—as a number of people have called it, the ~”first of December massacre” . . .

Q: You mean when the Kennedy's . . .

WOODWARD: This was the time when Walter McConaughy, who was head of the Far Eastern division, was sent out to be ambassador to Pakistan, and Harriman was brought to replace him on the first of December of 1961. A couple of other changes were made, and it was decided that Dick Goodwin, who had been the President's advisor and helped him in his campaign on Latin American affairs, would be sent over to be my deputy, and he would help in getting some kind of draft agreement in advance of the projected meeting. He would travel around to get some agreement on what we were going to accomplish at the meeting which was going to take place about the end of January or the first of February.

Anyhow, as the ensuing weeks went by, Goodwin didn't seem to be getting anywhere with this, and the Colombians didn't seem to be getting anywhere with their ideas. We got down to Punta del Este, and the Secretary of State was closeted with the foreign ministers of the big countries and the Colombians who had proposed the meeting. The Argentines and Brazilians and Chileans were closeted with Secretary Rusk. He had Goodwin at his side, trying to figure out some formula which we could apply to curtail the interventions of the Castro Government.

We were getting close to the end of the scheduled period of the meeting, and nothing had been agreed to. I really had not been privy to the main negotiations; I wasn't with the Secretary during his discussions. Trying to do something useful, I tried to find out why one Caribbean country, Haiti, was not inclined to take action unfriendly to Castro. I made it my business to talk with the Haitian ambassador to the U.S., a decent fellow, who was a principal psychiatrist of Port-au-Prince. He and the Haitian Foreign minister told me that the reason that they were not voting with the U.S. is that they felt they were being unfairly treated under the AID legislation, that they had negotiated a loan for the improvement of the airport at Port au Prince, and that this was being stopped now because of the Hickenlooper Amendment to the aid legislation which provided that if any American firm was being unfairly treated by a foreign government, that government was not eligible for aid.

The Haitian Government had run up a debt with one of the American oil companies, buying petroleum, and the allegation was that they weren't paying on this debt. The foreign minister and the ambassador told me that they had made some payments, and they were struggling to get the money together to make additional regular payments and settle the debt, and they thought they were being treated with rather premature drastic action in the suspension of this export-import bank loan.

We had the support of 12 countries for a resolution that all countries should break relations with the Castro Government. A good many of the countries had already done this, but a

blanket resolution recommending that every country in the hemisphere break diplomatic relations would be considered a significant hemisphere-wide condemnation. We already had the support of 12 countries, and 14 would make a majority of the then membership. It has to be a two-thirds majority for a measure of this kind, and it would take two more votes. If we could get the Haitian vote, we would need only one more for a two-thirds majority for this measure.

There was a little hand-operated radio that somebody had rigged up for communicating with Washington, like an old-fashioned telephone. I talked with Ted Moscoso, who was head of the Latin American branch of the AID program, and Mike Barall, who was my economic deputy back in Washington. I said, “The Haitians assure me that they're doing their utmost to pay these bills. Can't you get the legal advisor to agree to raising this embargo caused by the Hickenlooper Amendment?”

Well, they did it, and they called me up and said it was done. As a matter of fact, I got the word almost simultaneously from the Haitians that they'd received word from Port au Prince that the embargo had been lifted. They said, “Now we'll vote with you right down the line.” [Laughter]

We had only about 48 hours left. It was a Sunday, I remember. Rusk called us together, and Rostow was there and Goodwin and Ed Martin, later Assistant Secretary, and myself. He said, “I want you fellows to start from scratch and draft out a completely new proposal, because we're not getting anywhere with the Colombian proposal. The countries aren't willing to break relations.”

So we went off and worked in the wee hours of Sunday night. I went off by myself, and I read carefully all of the Colombian proposal, and I thought it was a good one in all respects. Every essential part of it except for breaking diplomatic relations had been agreed to. There was another resolution which had already agreed upon and which had been proposed, interestingly enough, by the Mexican foreign minister, Tello, who for years

had been the ambassador in Washington. This resolution said that, “Communism and the inter-American system are incompatible.” Now this coming from the Mexicans was a pretty interesting declaration. This resolution had already been agreed to by the meeting, that communism and the inter-American system are incompatible.

So here we had 13 votes for breaking diplomatic relations. The country that we would have thought would be the fourteenth was, strangely enough, the country to which I had just been appointed to before: Uruguay. The Uruguayans were being sort of influenced by the Argentine attitude, which was, in a sense, pro-Castro, but it was not because the Argentine authorities had any great sympathy for Castro; it was because they knew that their own voters included a lot of people who were enthusiastic about Castro. They were about to have municipal and provincial elections, and they were afraid that the opposition might defeat them if they made any real hostile gestures toward Castro. This was a purely internal Argentine political problem. The same thing was more or less true of the Chileans and the Brazilians, too, whose rationale was similar.

In any event, as I boiled over this, I thought, “There isn't anything particularly wrong with this Colombian resolution. Now that we've got the Haitian vote, maybe we can get the Uruguayans to approve that, and that will give us 14 votes. We'd now got carte blanche from the Haitians, so we already knew we had 13. So I thought, “If we get 14 to vote for the Colombian resolution, then Secretary Rusk ought to be able to persuade some of the other big countries to go along with it, because they will know that this action will be taken despite them.” So I suggested this idea to Rusk.

He said, “All right. Let's call the 14 together early tomorrow morning, Monday morning.”

We got them together first thing. The Uruguayan foreign minister was sitting right across the table from Rusk, and I was sitting right beside him, and the interpreter was sitting on Rusk's left, because Rusk didn't know much Spanish. We didn't seem to be getting very far

in the discussion; the Uruguayan foreign minister said, “We really don't have authority to break relations with the Castro Government.”

So the idea occurred to me—I don't know just at what point this occurred to me, but I said to him, spontaneously, (of course, I knew him very well, because he had been foreign minister during most of my three-year assignment) “Mr. Minister, what about this Mexican resolution which has been approved, saying that the inter-American system and communism are incompatible? Could we say that this incompatibility automatically excludes the Castro Government of Cuba from the Council of the OAS—not necessarily Cuba, but the Castro Government—because it's a communist orientated government?”

His political advisor was sitting next to him, a man named Felix Polleri, turned to the minister and said, “Mr. Minister, we could approve that.”

The minister looked rather quizzical, and the interpreter interpreted this to Rusk. I had been talking in Spanish. Rusk looked rather quizzical now. I didn't know it, but Rusk had, the night before, called President Kennedy and asked him to call the president of Colombia, to ask him if he would persuade his foreign minister, who was sitting at the same table, to be a little more elastic. The Colombian hadn't wanted to modify anything in his resolution. He was sitting out there in left field, as it were, at the table, when I made my off-the-cuff suggestion. I don't know whether he would have approved this modification of his resolution.

At that moment, a man came in the room and said, “There's a telephone call for the Colombian foreign minister.” It was his president. He went off to take the call, and the president was asking him to be more elastic. As I say, I don't know whether he would have approved the new idea without this call.

Anyhow, he came back, perfectly willing to go along with any reasonable changes that were being suggested that would accomplish the desired result.

In the meantime, since we expected that he would be approving this, there were a few other clauses that had been slightly controversial in the Colombian resolution, and the Uruguayans and the Colombians worked those out betweenthemselves while the Colombian foreign minister was out of the room. So we were all ready, when he got back, to find out whether he would approve the fundamental idea of the “incompatibility” excluding the Castro Government.

In the meantime, Rusk wasn't saying much of anything. He went out of the room, too. But before he did, he said, “Is there anything in the charter of the OAS that provides for excluding a government?” He was wondering about it.

That proposed resolution was approved by 14. In other words, we had a two-thirds majority. Then Rusk spent the rest of the day talking with the Argentines and Brazilians and Chileans and Peruvians. It was really the Caribbean countries who were afraid of Castro subversion, because several of them had experienced this. They wanted to get this stopped.

Rusk was not able to get the approval of any other country. He came back and reported the failure of his efforts to increase this bare two-thirds majority of 14. The final plenary session was going to be that night. I said to Rusk, “Maybe when it comes down to the final vote at the plenary session, some of the other countries will come around.” We had never wanted to do anything important in the hemisphere, in the inter-American system, without having support from some of the big countries. They were the countries that were really capable of being U.S. military allies. We wanted to have them working in solidarity with us, which seemed a reasonable objective. But in this case, the danger was greater to the Caribbean countries.

The upshot was that the plenary session took place, and the principal resolution was voted on paragraph by paragraph. Every clause received a larger vote than the one paragraph excluding the Castro Government from the Council of the OAS which received the bare

majority of 14. To this day, the Castro Government has been excluded from the OAS Council.

There was another resolution passed at this meeting that I believe was particularly important; it gave the blessing of all of the countries for action that might be taken by any individual country to embargo trade and cut off economic or other relations with the Castro Government. That was passed, and immediately thereafter, when we got back from Washington, United States trade with Cuba was embargoed, except for vital medicines and vital food. And that still persists.

So the two measures, the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS and the embargo of trade, were important. Since the Castro Government sought the support of Moscow, I thought it advisable to make them as dependent as possible on the Russians and give the Russians and the Cubans a good taste of what it meant to have a government totally dependent on the USSR. That's what has been done. It's gradually had a very withering effect on the Cuban economy, and this is still our policy.

We got back to Washington, and Rusk told me that I could go abroad again if I wanted to, and I certainly wanted to. So after some false starts, I went to Madrid.

Q: What were your major instructions in going to Madrid? What did we want out of Spain at that time? This was 1962.

WOODWARD: Our relationship with Spain was very well established by that time. There were no special instructions. It was obvious to me that, because of our air force and naval bases there, we should maintain the best possible relationship. I mentioned to you that the U.S. had already carried out a rather large aid program, supplying Spain with very badly needed materials for their economy. We had spent quite a lot of money, since 1953, when the base agreements were first signed, under the aegis of Jimmy Dunn, who was a very able ambassador, for three very active air bases and a naval base, which was really the beginning of a pipeline supplying fuel to the three air bases. The naval base was used

as a staging place for crews that were going onto the ships of the Sixth Fleet, operating in the Mediterranean. There wasn't a real Sixth Fleet base there, but there was some warehousing of parts and equipment for the fleet. It wasn't until a couple of years after I went to Spain that we arranged for the basing of a squadron of nine submarines and a tender at Rota, which is right across the mouth of the harbor from Cadiz—Cadiz on one side and Rota on the other.

Q: You were there during a major base agreement. I think the ten-year one had run out, and now you had to renegotiate the five-year.

WOODWARD: No, I didn't really have much to do with the actual negotiations. That was all handled in Washington. But I tried to contribute as much as I could in my conversations with the foreign minister and other key Spaniards. They were placing great importance on the aid we were giving them, both military aid as well as economic aid, and on the expenditures that were being made in the operation of the bases, and in our loans back to them of the local currency we got for the materials that we were giving them under the economic program. In addition to these considerations, I felt that the Spanish authorities considered it very important to have this kind of a relationship with the U.S. I expressed some doubts to them as to whether we needed the bases anymore, and I believe this may have had some effect in toning down their rather excessive demands for compensation.

Q: We were phasing out, weren't we, the B-47s at that time, the medium-range jet bomber?

WOODWARD: No, we weren't. We had a squadron of refueling planes that were refueling bombers from the U.S. every day. There was a daily flight of bombers from U.S. bases to the eastern extremity of the Mediterranean, and I think they refueled twice, once on the way east, and again as they returned west in order to give them enough fuel to get back across the Atlantic. This refueling was taking place mostly from the air base at Torrejon, right outside of Madrid, where the fleet of refueling planes was based. The rendezvous

between bombers and refueling planes would take place at a relatively great distance from Madrid, such as at Santiago de Compostela up in northwestern Spain. The refueling operation was quite difficult and a large part of it was done over the water, over the Atlantic or over the Mediterranean.

It wasn't until sometime after I left Spain, when Angie Duke was the ambassador, that a bombing plane cracked up in the process of refueling, and it dropped a hydrogen bomb down on the southern landscape of Spain. There was no explosion, and apparently no danger of one, but the nuclear fuel was spread over the farming country, along the Mediterranean coast of Spain, in one of the poorer provinces of Almeria.

This resulted in the Spanish deciding that they should prohibit refueling over their territory, or even having the refueling planes there. So then a switch was made, and the refueling planes were taken out of Spain.

Q: Maybe to the Azores. I'm not sure.

WOODWARD: I don't know. But anyhow, then I think they put in a squadron of fighter planes to make use of the base at Torrejon. They had some training activities up in northern Spain, there was an air base in Zaragoza, a large barren region not far from there was entirely uninhabited. This became a practice bombing range after the U.S. air base in Libya was closed down.

Q: Wheelus.

WOODWARD: Wheelus. Yes.

Anyhow, as a result of the accident I mentioned, I understand that the cleanup operation was followed by the gift of a desalting machine to the community where that hydrogen bomb had spread radioactive material around the landscape. This farming community badly needed more fresh water, because it was a very arid section of Spain. The U.S.

Defense Department cleaned up all of the debris; it took a long time; they had to sift it out. Angie Duke handled that very well. He went down and bathed in the ocean where the hydrogen bomb was found; do you remember?

Q: I remember this very well. During your watch in Spain, did you have much dealing with Franco at the time?

WOODWARD: Not very much, no. I called on him several times, and I got him to visit a U.S. exhibit of one of our space capsules, which we had at a fair that took place, and a few things like that. He knew that he wasn't in very good favor with several governments, and he always had doubts about U.S. popular opinion which had its roots in attitudes during the Spanish Civil War. So he delegated to his Foreign Minister practically all discussions on foreign relations. I made courtesy calls on him, with high-ranking visitors, such as the Director of the CIA and U.S. commanding officers in NATO. I talked to him several times, but I dealt with the Foreign Minister on all business matters and occasionally with the chief of the Spanish Joint Chiefs of Staff, a very influential general, who was the only living general who had been close to Franco before he ever became dictator. This General, Munoz Grande, was in North Africa with Franco, and had fought with him through the Moroccan campaign, and, incidentally, was in command of the Spanish “Blue Division” that fought on the German side in World War II.

Q: How did you find dealing with the Spanish Government? Was it a difficult government to deal with, to get decisions from?

WOODWARD: No, I didn't find it difficult. The foreign minister was a very intelligent, capable man, Castiella, very much trusted by Franco. I liked the old general who was head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, despite the fact that he had been the general in command of the Blue Division that helped the Nazis in Eastern Europe.

Q: In Russia.

WOODWARD: Yes, in Russia. Q: Did you get any particular instructions on how to deal with the Spanish? Things were on a fairly even keel when you were there.

WOODWARD: Things were on a fairly even keel, and that was a rather happy situation so far as concerned my relations with the CIA in that country. In the first place, the man who was in charge of the station there was a very amiable and cooperative fellow named Jim Noel. He knew that it was very important for us to have a stable relationship with the Spanish Government, because we wanted to operate the bases, wanted to get as much cooperation as we might need for the benefit of our armed services.

So there weren't many CIA activities that could constitute an embarrassment to the United States if discovered. At one point, the CIA wanted to send a political leader who was opposed to the Franco Government on a trip to the United States as a reward for his cooperation in providing information. I was asked to meet this man, and when I found out that, as a guest of the U.S. Government, he was planning to make a statement in the United States opposing the Franco Government, I asked that the trip be canceled so as not to take any chance on disturbing our relationship.

Q: The trip was to have been Government-sponsored?

WOODWARD: Yes. Well, I don't know whether he was publicly going to admit government sponsorship. In any event, I said, “I think this is kind of silly. Our primary mission should be to see that our defense relationships are maintained fully.” The CIA people were very amenable to canceling the trip; no problems about it. I always thought very highly of Jim Noel.

It was a good three years. I enjoyed the assignment in Spain thoroughly, and I visited every one of the 52 provinces in Spain, many of them several times. I took a great personal interest in getting around, always trying to admire anything constructive that was going on, even if we had nothing to do with it, and particularly if the United States

Government was participating in any way with its local currency loans or in any other way, I admired enthusiastically any progress that was being made. It was a kind of technique learned in Latin America and adapted to the European environment.

Q: Did you find, coming from Latin America, that Spain was a fairly easy transition because of the Spanish heritage? Or was it a somewhat different world for you?

WOODWARD: It was a very enlightening and very stimulating change, because I found so many intelligent, able Spaniards, many of them amongst the uneducated people of Spain. I found so many of them who had very good minds that I thought, “As these people improve their educational system, which the Franco Administration was doing, and as they improve their health system which they were doing systematically, and as they get on their feet economically, Spain is going to be a very important country, because they have 33 million people with great potential.” And I think that's true. I became very sold upon the average man in Spain.

What I consider to be the most important thing in U.S. relations with Spain that happened, from the viewpoint of the well being of the Spaniard, during the time I was there, occurred without any intervention on my part at first. The Director General of Public Health heard that Dr. Sabin, who developed the oral polio vaccine, was going to go to Rome to get some kind of an award, so the Director General got in touch with him through the Spanish Embassy in Washington, and asked him if he would stop for maybe as much as a week in Spain, all expenses paid, of course, and give them advice on planning a program for the elimination of polio. Spain had annually a large number of crippling cases of polio, many deaths, I think as many as 1,500 to 2,000 seriously handicapped every year. Dr. Sabin agreed to give them the advice they wanted.

Well, as soon as I heard this, I was, of course, absolutely delighted, and I wanted to get the United States Embassy identified with this as much as possible. I got in touch with the Director General of Public Health and offered to do anything I could to cooperate with him.

We had a couple of get-togethers. I did manage to get the embassy pretty well identified with this program. Sabin explained to the Spanish authorities just exactly how they should proceed. He recommended a company in Great Britain called the Welcome Company, as a source of the three different pills for the three varieties of polio. One pill is given first, and then a couple of weeks later, the other two. This inoculation is given to all children from two to seven years of age, to eliminate the possibility of an epidemic. Dr. Sabin then recommended that, for an initial trial, the Spanish select three provinces out of the 52 provinces, to convince the authorities and the public that the vaccine does not give anyone polio. As you know, there was some suspicion that the vaccine might actually cause polio. This preliminary program was successful, and the Spanish then carried out a nation-wide program.

They had various organizations in Spain, the Falangist Party Organization, doctors' associations and whatnot, so they were able to gather the recipients of the vaccine in all the villages of Spain on successive Sundays, so the program was carried out very methodically. The expense for the whole country was not over $750,000 or $800,000, and polio was virtually eliminated from Spain. I think that was probably the one most significant thing that happened during the three years I was in Spain.

Q: This is the end of your Foreign Service career. You retired in 1965.

WOODWARD: That was my last foreign assignment, yes. I was replaced by Angie Duke, and I was assigned to the department. I was only 56, so I wasn't really of retirement age yet. I was assigned as a so-called advisor to a group that was then trying to negotiate a Panama Canal Treaty. There was a very able lawyer, who subsequently was Deputy Secretary of State, Jack Irwin, who was doing this negotiating. He did all the negotiating. I sat at his side. We had 100 meetings at the Panamanian Embassy, and then the final meetings were in the office of the man who was supposed to be Irwin's boss in this, Robert Anderson, who was up in New York, doing business there. We had the last few meetings in Anderson's office in New York.

The whole negotiation came up with three draft treaties. One had to do with the operation of the present canal; the second was a military cooperation agreement; and the third was an agreement that we would have the right to negotiate for construction of a sea-level canal in Panama. After about two years' of meetings, these three complete agreements were ready; there was then a breathing spell, in which the treaties were to be presented to the committees of the United States Congress for consideration, and the Panamanians were to present the draft treaties for study by the Panamanian Congress. Then we were to present the draft treaties for study by the Panamanian Congress. Then we were to come back and negotiate whatever changes were considered essential, before signature and ratification.

At this point, when the drafting of the treaties had been completed, I thought Jack Irwin did a very meticulous job, but that I never agreed with the fundamental concept of the draft treaty for operation of the present canal, which Irwin had dreamed up when he had made a trip to Panama with the Secretary of the Army, Steve Ailes, who was the sole stockholder of the United States in the Panama Canal. The Secretary of War is legally the sole stockholder, or was at that time. They went to Panama for first-hand observation, and Irwin decided he would propose the creation of an independent corporation to operate the canal. The only relationship the two governments would have with the corporation would be that the board of directors would be composed of a bare majority of U.S. appointees, and the minority would be Panamanian. The Board of Directors would control the canal, and would not only have the administrative control, but it would make all the laws of the canal zone, and it would establish and operate the courts. In other words, it would have control of all three branches of government. My point was that it was a concept utterly foreign to the separation of powers, and that it just didn't seem to me that this was going to be approved by the U.S. Senate. Anyhow, the draft treaties got no further. I retired at the time the draft treaties were turned over to the legislative bodies of the two countries for study and consideration. These treaties were pigeon-holed and the negotiations with Panama later were begun all over again by other negotiators.

Q: Why did you retire, as you mention, at an early age?

WOODWARD: I don't know whether I should broadcast this, but I was offered another embassy at this point. I had wanted to go out in the field again, if I could have been assigned to one of the two or three larger posts, but the then-Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Lincoln Gordon, told me that President Johnson had approved my appointment as ambassador at a post where I had served as a vice consul long before and had found it rather depressing. I told Gordon that I did not see much prospect of accomplishing anything significant at that post. I thought, “What point? I've been to Spain, I've had the best post I could possibly ask for.” So I turned down the assignment.

Q: Is this Bolivia that you're talking about?

WOODWARD: No, no. Turn off the tape recorder.

[Recorder turned off briefly]

WOODWARD: So I said I'd been spoiled by Spain, and I didn't think I wanted to go to the post for which I was already approved. So I felt then I had to retire. You know, it's part of our unwritten code; if you turn down a post—and I had turned down two posts. When I came back from Spain, you know, they tried to persuade me to go back to Uruguay, and I didn't want it.

Q: That seems a little bit peculiar, because one looks at this, and there's a gradual progression, and obviously, Spain is in the class A category, and Uruguay is the B category or a C category.

WOODWARD: Tom Mann was the Assistant Secretary when Rusk got the word that I was going to be supplanted in Spain by Angie Duke. President Johnson liked Angie, who had been his protocol officer. Rusk then told Tom Mann, “Find a place for Bob.”

And Tom said, “The only place that's open is Montevideo.”

And he said, “Well, offer him Montevideo.”

When I got the telegram that Angie Duke was coming to Madrid, I got the offer to go back to Uruguay, which I didn't want to do. But there was another special reason. I don't want it to sound as though I'm being noble about this, but I had had a very, very able and amiable counselor of embassy in Uruguay during most of the time I was there, named Hank Hoyt. Hank had been transferred to Buenos Aires, where he had been counselor of the embassy, and then he was back in the department and was handling River Plate affairs. He was doing it very ably, and he had already been approved to go to Uruguay, all around, and I think even the White House had approved it, when this little personnel crisis arose, and Rusk asked Tom Mann to find me a post. So Tom Mann was prepared to break the bad news to Hank Hoyt, who was their River Plate man, that he wasn't going to go to Uruguay. Well, I liked Hank very well, and I'd been to Spain, and why couldn't Hank Hoyt have a chance to go to a nice post like Montevideo and get his ambassadorship?

I came right back to Washington to talk to Rusk about this, to find out if there wasn't some alternative. In the course of this, I talked to Tom Mann, and I said, “I don't want to go back to Uruguay, and I think that Hank would be an extraordinarily able ambassador there. He's been there, he's been in Buenos Aires, he's been doing all the River Plate affairs here.”

Tom said, “The only reason I suggested that was because it's the only post there was.”

I said, “Well, I think I'll take my chances and stay around here a while.” I was hoping I might get appointed to Buenos Aires or some post that would be more interesting than returning to a former post. So when I got the offer and turned it down, the time had come for me to retire.

Just before I was offered that, I ran into the Administrative Assistant Secretary in the hall, Bill Crockett. Bill said, “You know, the secretary told me that he wanted you to get the very first opportunity in Latin America.”

I said, “That's nice if one turns up.” But it was not one that I liked. So anyhow, I retired. I never look back. I'm delighted to have done so. I had a perfectly wonderful career, and it's given me enough food for thought to last me for the rest of my life.

Q: Looking back on your career, what was your greatest achievement, do you feel, or achievements?

WOODWARD: It's very hard to say. I think that I had a great deal to do with the completion of the Inter-American Highway, which is now open from the United States down to the Panama Canal. I hope that's never going to be needed for military purposes, but it's there. I thought it was going to be a great source of development for Central America, that it was going to promote intercourse, not only in trade, but in people, which would begin to knit together the five small countries of Central America. I thought it would eventually draw a lot of tourists from the United States, but it has turned out to be too long a trip for that. There have been relatively few tourists, even when things have been peaceful. So I'm afraid I was wrong; at least so far I've been wrong about that. It may still, eventually, be a great tourist attraction. The countries are very interesting; a trip on this highway is very interesting.

Politically, the formula which continues to be our relationship—or lack of it—with the Castro Government of Cuba was, to some extent, my invention, as I have mentioned. I think in the long run, the competition between the communist system and the system of democratic capitalism and private initiative is going to be a peaceful competition to see which system works out best for the largest number of people, for the general progress of the country.

I think that our relationship with Cuba is working toward a rather interesting demonstration of this. So far, I think that the leveling theory of communism is a negative kind of economic system, that rather than having inequality, it is better, in the concept of the communists, to have everybody more or less equally poorly off. Now the question: this system may guarantee the minimum of food and shelter for the entire population, a kind of security for which the poverty-stricken people of the world naturally yearn, but it doesn't stimulate the initiative and the inventiveness and the enterprise which has made the United States a really great economy and a great society. I think that even though our system depends, to a certain extent, upon—you can go so far as to say—greed, wanting to accumulate for yourself and wanting to do things that make you and your family better off, in the long run, I am convinced that our system does more to benefit everyone than a system which establishes a low level of equality countrywide, which is the communist system.

It still remains to see whether “Glasnost” [openness] and the proposed economic reforms can make any change in this.

Q: We're talking about the Soviet Union.

WOODWARD: The Soviet Union. Conditions in the Soviet Union, I think, have, in many respects, improved considerably over the last few years. But it is fairly obvious that there are great problems because of lack of incentives, bureaucratic control and stagnation.

The last visit I made to the USSR was with a tour group that went through Central Asia, to Samarkand and Tashkent, and several other cities and towns. It was rather enlightening; I thought people were considerably better off in Moscow in 1983 than the were when I first went there in 1969. They were better clothed, there were many more automobiles. Materially, I thought that things looked considerably better than they had in 1969, when I went before, a difference of about 14 years. But they obviously are going to have to do a lot more to stimulate private initiative and inventiveness, to such an extent that, I think, probably their few real thinkers place an exorbitantly great importance on not doing

anything to stultify the inventiveness of the United States and the Western European countries, on which the Soviet system feeds for their ideas. Maybe there is something in this idea that could engender a certain amount of friendly cooperation eventually. But who knows?

I think this Cuban experiment is an extremely interesting one from the viewpoint of seeing what the communists can do. It's particularly important that the experiment is being carried out in Cuba, because the Cubans were, on the whole, better off at the time that Castro came in, on the average, than the people of any other country in Latin America. Their average income, in terms of goods and services, I think, was probably better than in Argentina or Chile. So the experiment, which I made a little contribution to, may turn out to be, in the long one, one of the most important things that I had to do with in Latin America. Incidentally, I would say that the most damaging thing Castro has done, so far, to Cuba is to have caused the exodus from Cuba of half a million or more Cubans with the best brains and enterprise.

Q: The reverse side of the coin, what was your greatest frustration, you might say, in your senior career?

WOODWARD: My most serious concern was the so-called action operations of the CIA. I can't mention anything other than the Costa Rican incident, which might have been prevented it the CIA had wanted to be more forthcoming. I can't think of any specific instance in which they've caused me a great problem.

I made a comment to Senator Frank Church, after he had had his investigation and made his report, that I was sorry he hadn't included in his investigation an appraisal of benefits the CIA had brought to the United States. In the first place, it would be useful to have an impartial appraisal of the significance of the “intelligence” information they had provided, at least in Latin America, and in other countries where we were not at war, and to form an opinion as to whether it was of great assistance to the United States in any way,

whether the information was in any way significantly of a type that would not normally be reported by an embassy or a consulate.Perhaps more important would be a systematic effort to try to measure the accomplishments of action programs the CIA has carried out, whether they have been necessary, and whether they have been more dangerous and potentially embarrassing than any benefits they have yielded. In other words, to make a really studious appraisal of their whole operation.

Frank Church said he agreed. Of course, this was just an off-the-cuff conversation. He said he agreed that that might have been a very useful thing to do, but it was too late then.

Q: This was during his Senate investigation of CIA activities?

WOODWARD: No, this was afterwards, when he was retired in Washington.

Q: He retired, yes.

WOODWARD: He was with a law firm. I believe.

Q: Yes.

WOODWARD: He was a member of a group that was listening to foreign affairs lectures that we both went to, and it was at one of these lectures that I was talking with him.

Q: I think he's dead.

WOODWARD: He is dead now. He left and went back to Idaho and died of cancer, poor fellow. I just made this comment to him, which is neither here nor there, but I wished that such an analysis could be carried out, that somebody would undertake such an analytical study, at least I might find out whether I'm nutty in thinking that the CIA is a menace, whether they do do enough good to warrant their existence.

One of the things that I argued for during the brief time I was Assistant Secretary, in an interdepartmental committee for support coordination with the CIA, was that there should be some method by which the embassies would be certain to be aware of what their station chiefs were reporting. I was convinced that we were never aware of that in any post where I was assigned—in Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile, or Spain. They went through the motions, I think, of showing certain reports to somebody in the political section of the embassy, but it was clear to me that we weren't getting all they were reporting on subjects which they knew were of interest to us. For example, we were reporting on a presidential election campaign in Uruguay, and one of the CIA officers lightly commented to me, after it was over, and after the Foreign Service officers had guessed wrong, “Of course, we [the CIA] knew who was going to win, and we told headquarters who was going to win.”

I thought, “Well, you 'expletive.' Why didn't you tell me?” [Laughter]

Anyhow, that's the sort of thing that's enough to give you the willies when somebody says, after the event, that they knew the answers, and they reported it correctly, and you didn't.

Q: Was there anything that you might have done differently, looking back on your career? Something of a major nature?

WOODWARD: No, I don't think so. I lament my lack of certain abilities and qualifications, but with what I had to work, in terms of my own abilities, I did about as well as I could each place I went. I should have boned up more on the history of the countries I was assigned to, and I should have perfected the command f the language.

One thing that worried me a lot was that I was a very poor public speaker. On various times when I was assigned to the department, I took public speaking courses, to try to improve in that respect. I went to the Dale Carnegie course. Incidentally, one of my friends in the department, Cecil Lyon, who was an assistant to Norman Armour, our coordinating assistant secretary on whom I depended a lot, was so impressed with my experience in

the Dale Carnegie speaking course, that he took it. He was elected president of his class, and he was called Tiger Lyon. [Laughter] Anyhow, I went through that. Then there was a system by which the Dale Carnegie organization drafted and offered to members of the class that they thought might be qualified, a job helping instruct subsequent classes.I took advantage of that and went through the whole thing again, helping instruct another class.

But what I really lament is that in college, I didn't try to get into public speaking and debating and developing more assurance and ability in oral expression. Over the years in the service, I felt that I developed a certain clear, explicit written expression, first with Mr. Percival Stewart Heinzelman, and then on down the line. I tried to develop the utmost clarity and simplicity in my written expression; particularly when you're writing telegrams, you want to get your ideas across so they are understandable, free of any ambiguity, and not over-lengthy. It was on the oral side that, again, if I were going through college over again, I would try to get on the debating team or find some other way to learn to speak well.

Another thing that I would greatly emphasize is that one would find it very advantageous to learn, while still in school, at least one regularly used foreign language. I, unfortunately, did not do this. Of course, the Spanish language is used in more foreign countries than any other language, so I was lucky to have a series of assignments in Spanish-speaking countries. I had ten Spanish-speaking posts. Thus, I slowly developed adequate fluency; I thought I was so good in Spain that when I came home one time for a few days on consultation, I made arrangements to take a test over at the Foreign Service Institute, my reasoning being that if I was as good as I thought I was, I would have my name put in the Foreign Service Journal as one of those who had outstanding proficiency in the language. Well, much to my disillusionment, I didn't get as high a grade as I thought I was going to; I was certainly fluent, but I was not accurate at all. So I immediately started studying again.

Shortly after that, I was relieved in Spain by Angie Duke, and came back to the Department. There were long dry spells in the Panama Canal negotiations, when the

Panamanians were thinking over certain propositions that Irwin had presented to them. So I had quite a little time (which I might have used to bone up more on the history of the canal), and I devoted a lot of that time to studying Spanish. The absurd result was that after having had my ten Spanish language posts, I improved my knowledge of Spanish by at least 100% and maybe more.

Then, after I had retired, I was proposed by somebody in the Latin American division, to be the candidate of the United States for election to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. I admired their work, although I didn't know much about it. I admired the American who had been on it, Durward Sandifer, who used to be assistant legal advisor in the Department, a good man. So I thought, “Sure, I'd like to try that.” Candidates are all voted on. Most of the OAS countries designate candidates, and the seven with the most votes become members of the commission. I was elected for the three-year term and attended fairly frequent meetings. All business was conducted in Spanish. Even the Portuguese-speaking Brazilian always spoke in Spanish. We wrote all our reports in Spanish. I wrote what few reports I was called on to write in Spanish. So I became really quite proficient in Spanish, because I'd been studying it very diligently and reading out loud to myself all of the classical works that I had never read when I was in the service.

I can remember sitting here early in the morning, reading through one book after another, including all of Don Quixote, out loud to myself, while trying to improve pronunciation and accent by going through the taped courses at the Foreign Service Institute at the same time. I went through the tape courses in both Castilian and Latin-American Spanish (virtually identical, except for a few differences in pronunciation). At the same time or alternating, I was reading out loud, benefitting from the example of the speakers on the tapes, which had remained in my memory sufficiently. There would be no point in reading out loud if you're mispronouncing it or using a bad accent.

The result was that with all this, and the three years on the Inter-American Commission, my Spanish became quite good. At long last, I was virtually bilingual and far more accurate than I'd ever been before.

Q: Looking at your career and how things are today, would you recommend the Foreign Service as a career for a member of your family today?

WOODWARD: My family has been lucky enough so that it's had many of the advantages that I would not have had if I hadn't gone in the service. In other words, some of my own experience and education has been transferable, not directly, but in the environment in which my son and daughter lived as children. I would not consider it as important for them to seek that same education and experience as adults. To me it was absolutely invaluable. I still think that for someone coming from circumstances similar to those of my boyhood, it would be an extraordinarily interesting and educational career, that is, for someone who is not just eager to make a fortune in the first few years of a law career or whatever.

Sure, there are much greater dangers now than there were in the time I was in the career, and I think it is very unfortunate to be working under almost fortress conditions in many countries, even in very peaceful countries. When you go into an embassy office now, it is depressing to have the feeling that you're almost going into a fortress. I never hesitated to walk to work or anything like that. Now that's, I guess, impossible.

I was not disappointed when my own son had no interest in going into the Foreign Service. He has an extremely interesting job now, number two in a firm that's selling computers. He has a very interesting and exciting career in the modern world. My daughter became an architect at Columbia University, and has now married and abandoned the profession, temporarily, at least, to raise a family. So I consider myself very lucky in the progress of my children. They are able to travel.

Q: And they were brought up in the Foreign Service. I think the family becomes Foreign Service.

WOODWARD: That's right. They saw enough of it, so they've had some of the benefits and do not need to repeat it.

Q: You had one addition you would like to make.

WOODWARD: Yes. I was in the State Department when the coup against President Arbenz was carried out.

Q: This was in Guatemala.

WOODWARD: Yes. Up until a few weeks before the military action began against President Arbenz, I was totally unaware that the plans existed for this coup. I knew that there was an officer in the Latin American division whose work was considered to be very secret, and that I was not supposed to do anything to interfere with him. He was the man who was handling all of the liaison of the State Department with the CIA preparations in Guatemala and in Honduras, where there was a military group being formed.

Q: This is what year?

WOODWARD: This was 1954. In any event, along about the end of March of 1954, my chief, who was Henry Holland, a very able lawyer from Houston, Texas, who was Assistant Secretary, called me in, and he said, “Bob, I've just been told by Secretary Dulles about the formation of a plot that's being developed by the CIA to overthrow the government of Arbenz in Guatemala. I told the Secretary that I didn't come in [he'd come in only a month and a half before] to take this job to handle relations with Latin American in this way. I'm tempted to resign. I'd like to have you go away and think about this, and come back in two or three hours, and give me your recommendations.”

Well, two or three hours later, I went back to his office, and I told him that I thought he ought to stay and try to see if he couldn't persuade the Secretary of State to let him do his utmost to resolve the situation of Arbenz in some way other than a military attack sponsored by CIA, with a group forming in Honduras. So as far as I know, I wasn't being hoodwinked on it, and Holland told me a few days later that Secretary Dulles had given him until the end of 1954 to try to “solve” the problem in some other way. Holland held a series of meetings with Latin American diplomats in Washington, but nothing came of them, and the attack on Arbenz's government took place in June 1954. I was offered appointment as ambassador to Costa Rica in July.

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Today is November 21st, 1990. This is an interview with Ambassador Robert F. Woodward on behalf of The Association for Diplomatic Studies. I am Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, we already have a fairly extensive interview covering your entry into the Foreign Service, and your background before that, and then your Ambassadorship. What I'd like to do today is to cover some of the in between things which, I think, were very interesting periods. I'd like you to start, if we may, by moving to 1938 to '42 where you were doing a whole series of desk functions in ARA. I noticed in your interview you mentioned in a previous interview how this was probably the greatest learning place for anybody who wants to be an Ambassador later on. I wonder if you could talk a bit about what you were doing?

WOODWARD: You're right about that, Stuart. The four years I spent in the Division of American Republics Affairs, at it was then called, was really my university education, you might say. I'd gone to the University of Minnesota, and I could have learned a great deal there but I was very busy with my work after school, with which I was more or less supporting myself, and therefore I got into the habit of not studying, and did not take advantage of the wonderful library and educational facilities at Minneapolis. So here I

was assigned to the Bureau of Latin American Affairs, which was short for Division of American Republics, and I discovered that all the people around me (there were let's say a dozen other Foreign Service Officers there), most of them older than I was, had virtually all much better university educations. There were people from all of the Ivy League schools, Stanford and other outstanding institutions, so they started out with a better education, and from them I learned a great deal.

But then the work itself, of course, was very instructive because I had the opportunity to work on what we called the country desk for all the countries of South America at one time or another, and even those of Central America for a while during a rather crucial little period when the officer who was ordinarily in charge was busy with something else. It was during the visit of Somoza to the United States. The dictator of Nicaragua was invited...

Q: Which Somoza was this?

WOODWARD: This was Tacho Somoza, the dictator who had been an accountant for the Dodge Motor Company in the United States and returned to Nicaragua to make his way. I don't know just what the circumstances were in which he came into the Guardia National, which was the Nicaragua army, but he gravitated to the top of that at the time of the Marine occupation. The Marines found him very efficient. Of course, he knew English; he'd worked in the United States for the Dodge Motor Company, and somehow influenced the chain of events so he became in charge of the Guardia. And, after the Marines left, he became in charge of the country. He managed that himself.

Anyhow, he was invited to the United States by President Roosevelt partly as a rehearsal for the program that would be worked out with improvements for receiving the King and Queen of England. The King and Queen had been invited, and I think the White House thought this would be a very good dry run. So my friend, Gerald Drew, who was in charge of Central America first, was sent down to New Orleans to receive Somoza when he arrived in the United States, and to escort him up to Washington. I had thrust

in my hands a great pile of papers which Mr. Drew had been working up; some briefings for the President and the Secretary of State who would have serious matters to talk over pertaining to Nicaragua—pertaining to U.S. relations with Nicaragua and Central America. I was asked to prepare a briefing paper for President Roosevelt. Well, I had not worked on these countries—those particular countries—and I worked a few nights, and prepared a memorandum. One thing I remember, which stands out in my mind, is that when the memorandum I prepared was in the hands of Sumner Welles, who really was the Secretary of State for Latin American relations although he was Under Secretary, he read it, and he called me into his office, which is one of the two times he'd called me into his office of the four years I was there. He said, “This is an exceptionally good job, Woodward,” and he sent it over to President Roosevelt, which made me feel...

Q: Today any paper you would prepare would go through such a mass of people before it would end up on the President's desk.

WOODWARD: This had to go through the Assistant Chief to whom I was responsible. I believe at that time it was Ellis Briggs. It would go through the hands of the Chief who was Larry Duggan, both very estimable characters, and Larry then sent it on to Sumner Welles to whom he was directly responsible. I don't think Mr. Hull had any interest in this particular matter. As a matter of fact I don't believe he had anything but a protocol conversation with Somoza when he came. I never even saw Somoza during his visit. This was my only part of it. Anyhow, this is only an example of the kind of opportunities for further instruction that one gets in one of the political divisions of the State Department.

Q: You learn to speak for yourself very quickly in a country.

WOODWARD: And, of course, you have to produce some kind of a result, so you really have an incentive. I was there four years and during the latter part of my stay I was in charge of what they called the West Coast Affairs. That included Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Chile. In any event I was assigned to Bolivia after those four years and, of course,

I was very well acquainted with some of the people on the staffs in the embassies in the other countries. The result was that the American Ambassador to Peru asked me to stop in Lima and stay a couple of days, and talk things over with him. I was just a young sprout. Actually at that time I think I was about 33 years old, so I wasn't quite so young. But the upshot was that the Ambassador to Peru, who a few years later was assigned as Ambassador to Cuba, asked for my services, so I had an opportunity to serve in Havana for a while.

But getting back to the four years in the State Department, there were some very expert people there. There was a man who was a great expert on all of the work of the Pan-American Union, which later became the Organization of American States, Warren Kelchner. Warren Kelchner was a very learned fellow. Selden Chapin was another of the outstanding men there. He had been a graduate of the Naval Academy, and decided he wanted to go into the Foreign Service rather than stay in the Navy. At that time there was a surplus of graduates, so both West Point and Annapolis were rather glad to have some of their graduates go into other lines of responsible work where they could use the education that the government had given them. I could talk a bit about the work of the Bureau of...

Q: Why don't we?

Again, keeping it as you saw it at your level, what were our concerns and problems with the west coast of Latin America during this period.

WOODWARD: Our concern with the countries of the west coast was the same as our concern about all of the other countries in Latin America. We were then engaged very sincerely in what was called the Good Neighbor Policy of President Roosevelt, and were trying our utmost to give aid through technical advisers, and Export-Import Bank loans — which were really loans that were designed to help the exporters as much as the importers, by enabling countries to buy things that would be too expensive otherwise for immediate payment. The Good Neighbor Policy was just a comprehensive effort to

do everything we could to make our relations with those countries closer. And one of the things that was being done, we were taking opportunities to express our willingness to replace the military missions of European countries, which were operating in various parts of South America, and lending them the services of U.S. military missions. We started a Naval mission in Peru. A Navy adviser had already gone to advise the Argentine government. (Incidentally, he was the father of Peggy Beam.) Throughout the hemisphere we gradually had replaced, I think, before World War II broke out in 1939, all the European military missions in Latin America. I think we replaced them all. And almost every country had some kind of an adviser maintaining contact with the armed forces of that country. This was of greater political significance than one might think, in that the leaders of the armed forces were often among the best educated and most enterprising people in the countries of Latin America. Many of the civilian universities were not of a very high level. Some were very, very old, older than any institution in the U.S. University of San Marcos in Lima was the first in the hemisphere, I believe. But that did not necessarily mean that the quality of leadership and enterprise was amongst the civilians quite as much as amongst the military.

The United States, far from exclusively imparting military information, had a great deal of influence on the thinking of the leaders of the armed forces. And the leaders of the armed forces, as you well know, in many cases gravitated into the leadership of the country. They became the chiefs of state. They were the so-called dictators. In many cases the people who gravitated into charge through the military avenue were quite dedicated to the improvement of their countries. So the military missions had a very significant political effect, and also managed to develop a network. So that by the good fortune of this relationship at the beginning of World War II, we did not have a lot of disparate tugs and pulls in other directions. There was a great inclination to support, or at least psychologically, of avoiding any kind of hindrance to the United States in the prosecution of the war. This was a very significant thing in preparation for the war which no one knew was going to happen.

Q: This was not premeditated, or anything like that.

WOODWARD: It was only part of the Good Neighbor policy to establish all kinds of relationships. About the time I came into the Division of American Republics Affairs, an inter-departmental group had been formed. The committee was headed by the man who happened to be my boss in my regular country desk work, Ellis Briggs. He was the chairman of the committee. It was to carry out the terms of a law which had been passed by the Foreign Relations Committee of the Congress, by which any government in the western hemisphere could request a technical adviser from any branch of activity that might be encompassed in the U.S. bureaucracy. They could obtain an expert in a field where they thought they needed help and advice, and arrangement would then be made to decide how much extra compensation the expert who had been approached, and who had accepted, and knew he was going to go, would receive. And how that expense should be divided between the United States and the government that had requested him. This was a very simple little arrangement, and any number of agencies had all subscribed to this, and were members of the committee. Well, I was working on my first country desk...I had Brazil, and then I had added to that Colombia and Venezuela. I had come from Brazil and that's how I happened to go into the Bureau. The Venezuelan government strangely enough requested an expert to reorganize completely the Venezuelan National Library. This is a rather unusual type of request, but we found a very well qualified expert in the Library of Congress; a young woman who was very glad to go to Venezuela- -this meant a couple of years on this job of reorganizing the National Library.

Then the question was: who is going to work out all of the details of how much extra income she requires, and how are we going to divide it between the Venezuelan government and the U.S. In come cases the foreign government, if it felt affluent, could even pay her U.S. governmental salary, or part of it, but that was not usually expected. Anyhow, my friend Ellis Briggs said, “Well, there isn't anybody else to work this out, so you work it out, Bob.” So I worked out the deal through the Venezuelan embassy here. First,

of course, I had to figure out what I thought the embassy in Venezuela thought would be necessary for additional compensation. The economic conditions in Venezuela, and the relationship between the dollar and the Venezuelan bolivar were very peculiar because of the distorted results of the great oil exports from Venezuela, and expenses were very high in terms of dollars in Venezuela. I figured out what this woman would need to live the way she would live in Washington on her regular salary at the Library of Congress, and it turned out to be a fairly high figure. One of the clauses of this law that authorized all of this, required that the President of the United States approve each assignment of a technician of this kind. The arrangement had to be approved by the President himself. Well, I prepared the documentation and it went up the line with no changes, and over to the White House. It came back from the White House with the President's handwriting at the top of this two or three page memorandum, it said, “I think these expenses are too high. My sources of information tell me that we can work this out on a more modest basis.” This was signed FDR. It can be found in the archives right now. So I recalculated the whole thing, and tried to pare it down, and pared it down to some extent but not very much, and sent it back over to the White House, and the President approved it. So Miss what's her name went to Venezuela, and had, I believe, a very successful two years there.

We soon got a man to work out these deals, and work out all the administrative arrangements—his name was Melvin Leap, a very good fellow who was better qualified for this kind of work than I was. That was an example of our effort to try to give technical assistance. We sent out military missions on this same basis. In fact, I think we sent a naval mission to Peru, a mission to Venezuela—well, the whole program multiplied. This was really the first organized technical assistance program—it was 1939. This was way before Truman's so-called Point Four. This was going along very well all during the '40s; well, of course, the war developed so our concentration was mostly on the war.

I remember when a crew in the State Department was working out some of the language for the speech that President Truman gave in his State of the Union after he was elected when he defeated Dewey; and I was called into one of their meetings to give them some

comments on the basis of the little program we had in Latin America. At that time the most I felt I could say was that it had been very good psychologically; and that it showed that we were desirous of helping the countries, but that we could not really point to any great improvements in economic conditions because the program had not been large enough to have that much impact. But it was very good psychologically in showing our desire to be helpful. This disappointed Russell who was heading the preparations for this speech. (He later became Ambassador to Tunis.) Nevertheless, President Truman's Point Four was almost a worldwide application of this same idea.

Q: It sounds to me, Mr. Ambassador, as though at the time, in the late '30s-early '40s, as far as our foreign policy was concerned, for probably the only time since then, the Latin American policy was very definitely on the front burner. I mean as far as having an active...trying to do something, was much more there than anywhere else. Did you have this feeling? Could you give a little feel for your outlook, and how you looked upon people like Sumner Welles, and the Secretary of State at the time?

WOODWARD: Well, yes, of course, taking the first thing you mentioned, the question of our concentration on Latin American policy. I think it's a well known fact...I mean it's a rather obvious fact in our diplomatic history that the United States began to emerge as a nation as a western hemisphere power. At first, our relations were particularly close in the Caribbean, even during the Good Neighbor Policy, I would say, because Argentina and Chile did not recognize our influence as much as the countries farther north. But the United States was not a world power as much as a western hemisphere power. As a matter of fact there was a rather western hemisphere trend toward isolation, as I think is also well known to all historians, wouldn't you say?

Q: Yes.

WOODWARD: So we were not working at our relations with the world the same way we were in the western hemisphere. During the war, of course, this all changed completely.

We did not reduce in any way the work that we'd been doing in Latin America, but the non-intervention policy, which had been first subscribed to by Secretary of State Hughes in the early '30s. (He first assured the other countries that we were not interested in intervening in their internal or external affairs, and that was later consecrated in treaties and documents.) That changed because of our fear of communist influence. After the Iron Curtain speech, after the disillusionment in relations with Russia after World War II when there was a great fear of the influence of communism in the United States, the non-intervention principle was whittled away to a great extent...well, you remember that...I think the culmination of this, really, was the World Court decision concerning Nicaragua where we refused to recognize the decision of the World Court.

Q: This is 19...

WOODWARD: ...this is coming right up to the present day.

Q: ...in the mid-1980s.

WOODWARD: That's right. In other words, the dissipation of the non-intervention principle took a long time to take effect. The first striking example of it was, I believe, the incident in which the CIA had a large part of overthrowing the President of Guatemala.

Q: Arbenz, in the '50s.

WOODWARD: There's a very good book written on the decline of the Good Neighbor Policy, but, in a word, it was because of the fear of communism.

Q: Going back to your time, we're talking about '38 to '42. What about the concern about Germany in those days, of course Nazi influence? Was this a really dominating thing? So many of the people I've interviewed spent an awful lot of time trying to eliminate German influence, commercial firms in Latin America. But how did German influence in Latin America appear to you at that time? And what were you doing?

WOODWARD: I wouldn't say it was a very great menace in the minds of people in the State Department, but there was concern about the German efforts to create relationships which would be...well, particularly after the war began...which would create relationships which would be of direct handicap to the U.S. war effort, or in the allied war effort even before the U.S. came in—before we came in formally, you might say. The submarine activity all up and down the Atlantic was becoming very, very serious even before the U.S. entered the war. As a matter of fact it was so serious that along about the middle of '43 it came very close to losing the war for the United Nations. The sinkings in the Caribbean area, and down around the northern coast of South America, where the oil was coming from Venezuela, were wiping out the shipping. There were literally millions of tons of shipping being sunk there. So this was a very serious matter, and there was the fear that...oh, there were several incidents. There was the so- called “bicycle revolution” in Bolivia in which it was feared that the Germans had had quite an active part. This was all a kind of intelligence trick. I believe it was a fake letter that was inserted in the mail where the censorship would open it in Trinidad (a British country). This letter was from the German Minister in Bolivia to Berlin about plans for a revolution in which there would be a group that would assault some key point in Bolivia by a group of plotters on bicycles. It was called the Bicycle Revolution. This letter was turned over to the Bolivian government and it resulted in enough concern so that I think cooperation with the allied, what was eventually the United Nations, became much more pronounced than it had been before.

Q: This was part of British intelligence.

WOODWARD: I believe it was, yes. I don't remember the details very clearly, but it was a kind of a farce. Nevertheless it had an effect. As a matter of fact, as far as I know, the reason that I was even assigned to the Division of American Republics had to do with German commercial influence in Latin America. I was in the Consulate in Rio de Janeiro and my boss, Bill Burdett, was a wonderful friend and a very good man. And one day during the brief period I happened to have been there he said, “I have an instruction here

which Walter Donnelly handed me. It was received at the Embassy and Donnelly tells me that he doesn't have enough staff to answer this request for a report, and he wondered if I had somebody in the Consulate that could do it." We were a mile apart in Rio de Janeiro. And Bill said, "Do you want to tackle this?" So I read the instruction which said the Department would like a detailed analysis of Askimark trade between Germany and Brazil. Now the Askimark was nothing more nor less than a barter account.

Q: That's Askr...

WOODWARD: The Askimark trade was an instrument used by the Germans to just keep the accounting for a barter balance in trade with any country where German products has not been selling quite as well, or quite as large an amount, as the products that Germany had been buying from the South American, or whatever country. They'd been buying a lot of coffee, a lot of sugar from Brazil—at least a lot of coffee, I'm not sure about the sugar. They wanted to sell an equivalent amount of German products to Brazil. This is a fairly simple and obvious problem and I produced all the accounting for it, which was easy to get. But the question was, was there any sinister, or ulterior motive for this, besides just balancing the trade.

Q: This, of course, was before the war?

WOODWARD: This was in 1938. Of course, I didn't know war was going to break out. Who did? But it occurred to me that at least it was developing German industry, because they were selling a lot of typewriters, calculating machines, and goodness knows what, manufactured products. The Brazilians were buying these because they had to figure out some way of using up the Askimarks created through the sale of their coffee. So it did have the effect of developing German industry and, of course, retrospectively after the war had broken out, it seemed rather obvious that they were trying to get their factories running so they could be converted to any kind of a product that was required during the war. They'd have a going concern and so it did have some bearing upon the preparations

for war. Supposedly the Germans were preparing for many years in advance of their attack on Poland.

In any event, for what it was worth, my boss sent the report up to Washington and the result was that when I went home on leave—and I went home on leave after six months there, because I had been counting on that leave from my previous post in Bogota; and when Bill Burdett asked me if I wanted to come (he had the courtesy to inquire, as I had worked for him briefly in Buenos Aires) and he wrote me and said, “Bob, wouldn't you like to come and work for me in Rio de Janeiro?” (He had been transferred rather prematurely, because he was a rather mild mannered gentleman and I think he wasn't considered quite aggressive enough to compete with the Commerce Department's Commercial Attach# in Buenos Aires where he had been assigned as Consul General. So he was replaced by somebody who was going to be more aggressively competitive with the Commercial Attach#—this was our 'standard problem' there—and he was sent to Rio and as a new man in Rio he asked me if I wouldn't like to come and help him. I wrote back and said I was very flattered to be asked if I wanted to go there; and it would be a very nice post; but I was very much hoping that after I finished my assignment in Bogota, I could be assigned to Washington, because I was getting to an age where I really wanted to find an American girl who would be willing to be in the Foreign Service with me. I was determined that I was not going to marry a foreigner and I had come very close to it in Argentina. I mailed that letter back to Burdett, and the next day I got my orders to go to Rio because he had already arranged it. So Bill very kindly said, “Bob, you can have your leave after six months, but, of course, I hope you'll come back to Rio.”) So, when I went up to the Department I was asked right away if I...

Q: This is almost a mating leave.

WOODWARD: Of course I wasn't going to be able to do anything during two months leave. I was really hoping for an assignment. I had no idea that I would be able to get an assignment like that, but I told him quite frankly as a friend that that was my aspiration.

Well, I got up to Washington and naturally checked in with the Department before going home to Minneapolis, and I was asked if I wouldn't postpone my leave for two months because the man on the Brazil desk (a nice old gentleman, he was an historian, Dr. Manning was his name), Dr. Manning was going to go on leave.

Q: He'd written a series of books and collections of official documents on American relations with Brazil.

WOODWARD: Yes, he was a very learned fellow. So I postponed my leave and I was assigned as a neophyte to the Brazil desk which was rather odd. But that was because of that report, and one of the first things I had to do was to prepare a circular telegram—Cordell Hull, of course, was very much interested in trade. He was opposed to the idea of barter trade. So he wanted a circular telegram prepared that would go, I suppose, to all the U.S. embassies in the world, deploring this kind of contrived barter trade. He wanted to have it all loosened up. He was very enthusiastic about his trade agreements program, which was coming along very well, one after the other, trade agreements were being concluded. There was a special division in the State Department handling this under Harry Hawkins, a very able fellow.

In any event, I prepared a circular telegram deploring barter trade and Askimark trade. It was approved by Dr. Feis, who was the Economic Adviser in the Department, and by people all around in the Department, and it went out. I was such a relatively uneducated fellow in the more complicated economic matters; I recall, for example, a problem that was beyond my ability. One day Larry Duggan, who was the chief of the American Republics Affairs, called me in and said, “Bob, the Brazilian Ambassador came in here and they want a gold loan. Do you think we ought to give them a gold loan, and that we should recommend that to the Federal Reserve?” I didn't know the first damn thing about the purpose of a gold loan. Of course, I had had a day or two on that general subject in some economic course at the University but I had to bone up a little bit. My comments to Larry at that time were pretty vapid; I was rather embarrassed because I didn't know what to say.

I just made a few general remarks about the reliability of the Brazilians, and what people thought of the Minister of Finance. Anyhow, I guess the Brazilians got their gold loan but it was worked out pretty much between the monetary experts and the Federal Reserve. Of course, a lot of countries had their gold stored in the Federal Reserve Bank in New York; the nations who thought that was a safer place than any depository in their own countries. All that has been changed, of course, by going off the gold standard.

Q: I still think there's an awful lot of gold from other countries being stored. I understand every few days somebody comes along with a cart and truck and takes some gold out of one cubicle and puts it into another cubicle because it's still considered a fairly safe place.

WOODWARD: With the variety of these chores, you can see how one would receive a rather intensive education in the process of four years. Let me proceed with my assignment there.

Q: I wonder, first can we talk a little bit about— although you only met him once or twice— about Sumner Welles. How much was he a driving force behind our Latin American policy, and what were the emanations from his office? Your impression of that.

WOODWARD: Sumner Welles obviously had very great ability, and he had won the respect and admiration of the Latin Americans in the most remarkable way. I think you can say that he probably was truly the author of the Good Neighbor Policy.

Q: He was also very close to Roosevelt.

WOODWARD: This is exactly how he (Roosevelt) managed. I think he had a great deal to do with the conception in the first place. I think you could say that he had a great ability to find men who could provide him with very interesting new ideas, and who were outstanding thinkers and doers. And right from Harry Hopkins down, Ben Cohen, Brain Trusters. There were many remarkable people, and he had homed in on the abilities of Sumner Welles. Sumner Welles, of course, with all of his relationships did not have

much time for the underlings, but he was always perfectly decent. I mean, every year or two he'd have an occasional big binge out at his house in Oxon Hill where all of us in the State Department, or at least in the Latin American branch, were invited. He was cordial, and he certainly had won the respect of the Latin Americans. All through the early days of World War II he managed to enlist their cooperation in a series of meetings that were held around the hemisphere where he was really the leading spirit. There was a wartime chastity zone that was created around the western hemisphere which was supposed to be immune from submarine warfare, but of course the Germans didn't observe that. Cooperation was really freely given by all the countries with the possible exception of Argentina which was so far away that it didn't matter. The Chileans were not very cooperative.

We were on Sumner Welles. It was really a tragedy that rumor mills—kind of a plot—was developed which resulted in Welles going into retirement.

Q: Was there a sort of anti-Welles group within the State Department, would you say?

WOODWARD: No, there wasn't any of that in the State Department as far as I know, although I think that as time went on, and as the relationship between President Roosevelt and Welles became more widely recognized because President Roosevelt had great confidence in Welles and rightly so. As the war broke out Welles began to take a little more interest in the European affairs—took a lot more interest—and as I recall he wrote a book about some of the important stages as we went into the war. I think Secretary Hull probably was beginning to feel that his authority as Secretary of State was being somehow reduced. He may have felt a little humiliated.

Q: He was, in a way.

WOODWARD: Yes, but I think Hull was not a man to be jealous. He was a very mature politician. He'd been a Senator, and Senators have to take a lot of beating politically so I don't think he was prone to resentment for personal reasons. But I think he began to feel

as though there was a division of authority that perhaps was not the soundest thing as the war progressed. In any event, there was nothing but respect for Welles in the State Department. People held him in some awe but he was always very efficient, and very hard working. He had a very able secretary, Miss Clarkson, with whom we were all much more closely related than we were with Welles himself and she would act as our intermediary in getting Welles' attention to anything that we thought required some prompt attention. He always gave very prompt attention to any unforeseeable situation that arose.

For example, there was a delegation here from Chile at one point and we were trying, of course, to develop a closer relationship with the Chileans. They wanted a big development loan. They were creating a development organization in Chile for assisting new industries, and they wanted a very large Export-Import Bank commitment for equipment that would be brought in for various new projects. We were trying to help them with the application for a loan for this development corporation. It was one of the first times when a general loan had been made to such a foreign development corporation, and not to a particular shipment of machinery, or equipment, or airplanes, because usually the Export- Import Bank was simply a method by which credit would be available to the buyers so the sellers could make a sale.

Anyhow, we were going to help them get this loan through the Export- Import Bank. I was on the Chilean desk at that time, and was asked to go over to the meeting at the Export-Import Bank with the Counselor of the State Department, his name was Judge Walton Moore. He was an elderly judge from Virginia. I had all the papers ready and I was going to brief Judge Walton Moore for an appropriate length of time before we went over to the meeting. The day came around for the meeting and I went to Judge Walton Moore's office, and was told by his secretary that he wasn't coming in that day. Well, the meeting at the Export-Import Bank was about 10:30 and this was let's say 9:30 in the morning, or maybe a little earlier. I was first perplexed and then frantic. Who is going to represent the State Department on this rather important matter? So I went to Miss Clarkson, Welles' secretary, and explained the situation, and she immediately opened the door into Welles' office and

explained to him what it was and he called me right in. He picked up the phone and called Adolf Berle, and said, “Berle, there's a situation here where I'd like to have you help out on this application for a Chilean loan, and Woodward will come in and explain it to you and go over to the Export-Import Bank with you.” I was rather interested in the way in which Welles did not ask Berle to do it, he told him to do it.

Q: Berle's position at that time?

WOODWARD: He was Assistant Secretary in a kind of a general capacity working on miscellaneous topics that came up. He was always ready to show his ingenuity, a very smart fellow. So I explained the situation to Berle, and we walked over the two blocks to the corner of 19th and Pennsylvania where the Export-Import Bank then had its offices, and Berle very briefly made a pitch in favor of the Chilean application.

I remember a very funny incident—who was the Texas banker who was then the head of Export-Import Bank?— Jesse Jones. He was a very well known man in the New Deal government. But anyhow, this old gentleman, the banker, was chairing the meeting. He asked for comments from the various officers— six or eight officers sitting around in a circle—and one of them was the Secretary of Commerce—I don't remember whether he was fairly new, but he was the man who was the head of the company that makes Life Savers, the candies. The gentleman was sitting there looking as though he were paying attention. The proposition of the Chileans, endorsed by Adolf Berle, seemed to be accepted by the group in general, but Jesse Jones was going, as a matter of routine, around the group to ask their opinion. He came to the man who was the Secretary of Commerce and said, “Mr. so- and-so, what do you think of this risk?” And the man said, “You know I just got it.” He thought he was saying, “What do you think of this wrist watch?” I thought this was the pinnacle of the bureaucratic consideration of a serious problem.

Q: One last thing before we cut off this interview. I wonder if you could describe how you saw it...I mean this must have been a time while you were in the American Affairs Bureau,

where this had received, as we say, we were a western hemisphere power, and you were part of the Latin American experts. But Europe obviously in 1938-'39-'40 all of a sudden was our major concern. Was there any feeling in the Department that you felt at your level sort of professionally, that your area was losing out, or were there any conflicts with the European bureau, or the European centers. What was the atmosphere?

WOODWARD: Not in the least. We all felt that our job was to do everything we could to try to be cooperative, and develop relations with any country we were working with, in order to make our solidarity better for whatever crisis was coming, which was rather obviously en route at the moment. Special divisions were being created to handle wartime work. For example, on wartime economic matters, Mr. Finletter was brought in.

Q: That's Thomas K. Finletter?

WOODWARD: When I first arrived in 1938 there was one man in the Division of American Republics Affairs, who was a sort of general economist, who prepared a little summary report for the chief of the division every month on the economic conditions throughout the area. That man's name was James Gantenbein when I arrived and he was being transferred. He was being assigned to the embassy in Quito, as I recall, and Larry Duggan thought from this report I'd written on Askimark trade; (and I'd written a lot of reports on trade from Buenos Aires and from Bogota, but mostly Buenos Aires where we were competing very ardently with the Commercial Attach#—which sounds very petty, but we were), anyhow I was asked to do this general economic work. And, of course, I was not an economist but I did my best. Then I was told that at the end of the summer, since Gantenbein had left (and as you know, I was asked to be there two months before I took my leave), but at the end of this two month period, there was a young man coming in who was working on the staff of the Federal Reserve Board. He had been a staff officer working on foreign exchange in the Treasury Department, a graduate of MIT named Emilio Collado—his parents were of Puerto Rican origin, a fat, rather...very congenial, a very soft spoken gentleman. He showed up and Emilio Collado turned out to be one crackerjack

of an economist. He was one of the best economists, I think, in the United States—a great exchange expert. When Lend Lease was invented, Lend Lease was applied to every country in Latin America. They were given Lend Lease money, and not only was it necessary to determine how much would be given to each country, but how much they would be expected to return—what percentage. Emilio Collado sat down with his secretary and in virtually one session dictated, to her all of those numbers. He calculated himself. He had his slide rule which he had inherited from MIT, and he worked out the figures on how much Lend Lease should be given to each country, and how much they should be expected to repay because of the status of their general economic health.

The sort of thing that was done during those days was really uncanny. He remained in the Division of American Republics Affairs for a couple of years, I believe, but then when the war really got underway, he was assigned to a special office which was the office particularly advising Sumner Welles. The office was on the opposite side of the building and he and two other fellows were in that—one fellow named Jack Hooker who later went to the International Monetary Fund. Anyhow, this man, Emilio Collado, after the war as the Dumbarton and Oaks Agreements were concluded, became the manager of the World Bank after Eugene Myer. He went in there with Eugene Myer, and I think for a while Collado ran the bank if I'm not mistaken. Then, after a year or so of that, he became treasurer of the Standard Oil Company in New Jersey, of Exxon. He was that until his retirement. He's still alive and lives up near Boston.

People were being moved around. There were outstanding fellows who could take on new jobs that pertained to the war. They became the heads of new divisions—like Collado. Finletter had not been in the State Department before. He came in from one of the armed services departments Later he was Secretary of the Air Force. Anyhow, there was no jealousy whatever. Of course, the Foreign Service Officers in the State Department were mostly manning all of the country relations, the country desks, and the four political divisions covering the Far East, the Near East, Latin America, and Europe, which then expanded eventually to Africa. And we all knew each other because the organization was

quite small. I think, in total, including all of the Foreign Service Officers abroad, at that time there weren't over 700. As a matter of fact, they were doing—perhaps this is a parochial comment—but they were doing just about as much work as 4,000 are doing now. In a way it's easier without having so many people that have to cross check everything.

Q: One last thing. I know you are in a hurry but otherwise we'll forget it. Could you comment on this interesting little sidelight about the problem of the commercial officer and the economic officer...was it in Rio? or in Buenos Aires? What was the problem?

WOODWARD: You brought up a very pertinent point because, of course, I suppose there was a certain amount of improvement in reporting brought about by what was really competition between the Commerce Department and the State Department on trade reporting (and the general economic reporting, but mostly trade reporting), trying to develop better help for American companies that wanted to expand their trade, answering trade inquiries, which is one of our principal jobs in Buenos Aires.

My boss in Buenos Aires had been assigned there—Avra Warren—because he was quite an aggressive, determined man, and he had been assigned there partly because of this competition. His predecessor had been a man who later became almost a tradition in the State Department, George Messersmith. Messersmith, had been head of the School Board of Delaware, and who got a job as Consul General in Antwerp where he made a great reputation as being a very active Consul General developing trade in Belgium. He was assigned to Buenos Aires and there he really built up the Consulate, and he had six or seven Vice Consuls to work on his trade reporting and other consular matters. So, as time went on George Messersmith became Assistant Secretary for Administration in the State Department. There, I would think, one of his most outstanding achievements was that he finally organized a complete amalgamation between the Commerce Department Foreign Service and the State Department Foreign Service. On July 1, 1939 he began the consolidation of the offices and gradually they were all made into one office and the commerce service, which was not a terribly large service, was amalgamated with the State

Department. They were all made Foreign Service Officers. The officers were all given a choice of whether they wanted to stay on trade reporting work, or whether they wanted to become general Foreign Service Officers, although that was a matter that could be worked out from day to day administratively.

In any event, that, I think, was a really great step toward efficiency, combining these. One of the results was that some of the outstanding commercial attach#s, to make this amalgamation really convincing to the commerce people, three or four commercial attach#s were made Ambassadors. Walter Donnelly was perhaps the outstanding one. Not only was he Ambassador in several countries, but he became the U.S. High Commissioner in Austria, and then, briefly, before he retired when the Eisenhower administration came in, he was High Commissioner in Germany. He then became a roving representative for the U.S. Steel Corporation with headquarters in Caracas. His wife was a Colombian, and there was a big new steel development going on in Venezuela which he could keep an eye on, although he did not have direct charge of it in Venezuela. Some U.S. Steel people, I think, were giving advice on the development of this mountain of iron ore in Venezuela which became a very important resource in Venezuela.

So the Commerce Department and the State Department were combined. Now one of the preoccupying, sort of troubling, aspects of our government, our whole bureaucracy, is that there's a definite lack of stability and continuity. In recent years the Commerce Department has insisted on having its own service again. They have their own Foreign Service. I don't know just how extensive this is, because I've lost touch with it. But it seemed to me unfortunate that the wheel turns and the work is undone in what I thought was really a great administrative improvement.

There was a point back in the '50's...this amalgamation was July 1, '39, as I recall. In 1958 the Commerce Department was complaining because they didn't have the opportunity to recruit people who they thought were highly qualified to be commercial attach#s, since it was all a State Department recruiting organization. Then people seemed to show a great

bent for the kind of work that the commercial attach# would do were selected for that work, and drifted into it, or gravitated into it. But they wanted to choose some of the people themselves, and they wanted to bring them in...the obvious way was to bring them in as Foreign Service Reserve Officers, which as you know, they bring in ostensibly for four-years which perhaps can be extended, but it's a four year stint in many cases. The State Department agreed in 1958, or maybe '57, to have the Commerce Department recruit, I think, about 12 Commercial Attach#s for key jobs.

When I arrived in Montevideo, Uruguay, the Commercial Attach# there was one of these recruits. He was a man named George Landau and I soon became fully aware of the fact that he was much smarter and more able than the two men on the staff who were above him. There was an Economic Counselor, and a Counselor of Embassy who was my deputy, and George Landau was so much more able, and bright, and resourceful, than these two fellows above him, that as time went on, within a few months, the two above him were transferred and he was the Economic Counselor—I don't know whether we changed his title or not—and we got in a very good Counselor of Embassy, Henry Hoyt who later became Ambassador there. Anyhow, Landau had become rather discouraged, partly because of the supervision he was getting. The Ambassador was a very good fellow, very friendly, named Jefferson Patterson. But the fact is that he was so determined to pursue American interests, and the interests of the American companies, that he was beginning to wear out his welcome with the Foreign Office. The Uruguayan officials became tired of his ardent representations on behalf of the packing companies—there were two American packing companies there who weren't able to get a supply of cattle for their plants because they were being sort of pushed out by the competing government packing house. Anyhow, Jeff Patterson was a very vigorous Ambassador and when I took his place I found that he had really been so dedicated to this work that the Foreign Office was beginning to get a little fed up. Well, I think this is to his credit, but anyhow Landau was a very able fellow and I persuaded him not to be discouraged. I said, “There are really great opportunities for someone like you in the Foreign Service. The thing for you to do is to take the examination

for incorporation into the regular Foreign Service." I guess he had already been in long enough to do that. But I said, "Perhaps the best thing would be to wait long enough so that I can recommend you for promotion as a Reserve Officer to the next higher grade. Then when you take the examination you'll get in at a little bit higher level when you pass the Foreign Service exam." Well, that's exactly what happened. He came in, I think, as a Class III Officer. He'd been drafted out of the business world. As a matter of fact, he'd been reorganizing the Chrysler agency for a Colombian in Cali, Colombia. He had a contract for two years and when he saw the ad asking for recruits for the Commerce Department, he answered it because he knew his contract was coming to an end, and it was something interesting to do.

Anyhow, we had a very fine team there in Montevideo. I was there for three years.

Q: I wonder whether we should cut this off because I want to get back to...not to Montevideo, but to earlier times.

WOODWARD: Let me make one more remark about Landau. Time went on and he got himself assigned to Spain when I was Ambassador to Spain. I had nothing to do with his assignment there. He then got on the Iberian desk in the State Department, where he was for five years while a new base agreement was renegotiated. He was looking for a job as Counselor of Embassy and I advised him—I was here in Washington and was already retired—I said, "George, wait long enough so you're Class I, and if you can get the tiniest embassy, it's a totally new world. If you're in charge of your own embassy, you can lay your plans." Well, George did that and he became Ambassador to Paraguay. He was there four years. He was four years as Ambassador to Chile. He was four years as Ambassador to Venezuela. And now he's working for five different inter- American organizations in New York as a retired officer under the wing of David Rockefeller.

Q: I know you're under a time limit, and we'll continue this.

Today is the 28th of November 1990. This is a continuing series of interviews with Ambassador Robert F. Woodward. I am Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Mr. Ambassador, the last time we more or less ended, you had been in the Office of American Republics and doing various desk functions. The only question I really would like to ask before we move to your next assignment overseas was, what happened; I mean to you and your colleagues— particularly to you—you were home I assume and listened to the radio or something on December 7th, 1941. How did the ARA Bureau operate? What did you do with the advent of war?

WOODWARD: Well, of course, there had already been a lot of preparatory work done in ARA during the war under the leadership of Sumner Welles. For example, the Government had tried to neutralize the waters around the western hemisphere. Representatives of all western hemisphere governments had held meetings to determine the actual boundaries inside of which they tried to prohibit submarine warfare but this, of course, was eventually quite futile. It had some effect at first. Then there was an effort made to give more assistance to the economies of Latin American countries because we foresaw—our leaders foresaw—that there would be a period in which it would probably be necessary to be to some extent independent of the normal channels of trade, particularly with the countries that were already at war in the other hemisphere. And then gradually, with the United States, they developed an effort to help Britain and its allies in Europe with essential materials. I think that even before Pearl Harbor, bases were established in exchange for...

Q: It was before Pearl Harbor. You're thinking of destroyers for bases. Yes, this was before we were in the war.

WOODWARD: This was all quite obviously preparing for a long siege you might say.

Q: What I'd like to do is find out what happened on December 7th for you, sort of at the personal level.

WOODWARD: At the personal level—you don't mean where we happened to be when we heard news? That's probably trivial. But I can recall a striking example which I think tends to answer to some extent your question. I had a very able chief at that time. His name was Paul Daniels, and a man I greatly respected because I never knew a man who could turn out more work day after day than Paul could. He was not only head of the Latin American division in the State Department (it was then called an office). He was a Director, not an Assistant Secretary, that came later. He was also, though, the United States representative to the Organization of American States or the Pan American Union. He was carrying out both these jobs at the same time. Of course, he tried to delegate a good deal of his work in the State Department to me, I was his deputy. But he nevertheless was a lion of work. And this man who was intensely practical, and almost instantly knew the answer to most questions; he said, “Well, these Japs, they attack Pearl Harbor this way, they're going to be destroyed in a matter of weeks. This is going to be over in a matter of weeks.” This was the attitude, not realizing what a long ordeal it was going to be. It was an expression of course of great self-confidence, confidence in the power of our nation to retaliate, this dastardly act. In other words, it wasn't taken as a great change in what already had been going on to try to help the allies in western Europe. Then, of course, in the next few days, the President declared war against Germany and Italy, and of course against Japan, and the Germans declared war against the United States—I forget the precise sequence of those days.

Q: I think actually on December 8th the President made his speech. I think it was December 10th when Italy and Germany...I mean Germany followed by Italy declared war.

WOODWARD: They declared war against us.

Q: I think we then said...you're right, we do have a state of war.

WOODWARD: It was all virtually simultaneous. So then, of course, the truth of our situation began to sink in, that we were going to hunker down and do everything we could. Well, what did that mean in Latin America? We were getting some important supplies from Latin America and the country that I happened to be assigned in the fall of 1942 was Bolivia and there we depended upon Bolivian tin. Tin had not only come from Bolivia but from Malaysia and of course that was very far away, and more subject to submarine warfare. We got tungsten from Bolivia; we got some cinchona which was the source of quinine. This was important for those troops that were going to go over to the South Pacific, and we got a little rubber from the Bolivian jungles. This was all set up already; whatever we could get was flowing in, and continued to flow. And then Lend Lease was worked out. Lend Lease—largely a gift of cash—was given to every Latin American country. I can remember the almost incredible feat of the economist who was in the Latin American Bureau, and who later became for a while in charge of the World Bank when it was started up, and then eventually he wound up as the treasurer of the Standard Oil Company—his name was Emilio Collado and he had gone to MIT and worked with the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board and came into the Bureau of Latin American Affairs in the State Department. He sat down and in one day, dictating to his stenographer (I remember her, Mrs. Carter). He dictated out of his vast store of knowledge, and his judgement, the amount of Lend Lease that he considered should be given to each country in Latin America, and the amount of eventual refund we should expect from those countries after the war. The expected percentage of refund varied from country to country, probably about half of the amount of the Lend Lease. But in some cases we were expecting practically nothing, from the poorest countries like Honduras and Paraguay. In any event Collado did this in one fell swoop. Of course, he had all of his facts and figures around him while he was working on this. He was a very remarkable economist and soon thereafter was put into a little office with two assistants, very good men, and became an adviser to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary for the economics that pertained to the war.

One of the two assistants was a great expert on shipping; and the other one was an expert on monetary affairs and eventually went into the Monetary Fund when that was created. So we had some very able fellows there. Larry Duggan was a very able director of the office. He got in to assist him as a permanent (he thought it was going to be a permanent), deputy director of the Latin American office, Phil Bonsal, who had just come into the Foreign Service. (Bonsal had entered Service just before his 35th birthday. Thirty-five was the age limit for candidates, so Bonsal was mature for a junior officer.) He had been assigned to Cuba where he had served for the ITT communications company, as he had in Chile and Spain before. So he was a pretty experienced fellow, and Larry felt the need for a permanent (at least, a fairly long lasting), deputy because he had had a series of Foreign Service officers who had all been knocked out from under him by being transferred to the field again. The maximum length of time that anyone could stay in the Department at that time was four years, so by the time a man had really become thoroughly familiar with all the work, off he would go to another assignment.

In any event, as I think I told you the other day, the men I ran into were all, I thought, much better educated than I was. Now, that isn't any reflection on the institution that I went to in Minnesota. The University of Minnesota was one of the best, I would say, almost the best, in terms of highly qualified professors, of all the “big ten” State universities. In fact I can recall an article in Harper's Magazine ranking United States institutions of higher learning according to the renown, the quality, the recognized ability of professors. In that list there were 12 universities and the top one, by far, was Harvard. And number 12 was the only member of the big ten, and that was the University of Minnesota. So it's no reflection on the institution that I did not take advantage of the qualities of the professors. There was a very good economist, Dr. Hansen who later went to Harvard and wrote the textbook on economics which was used for years by university students all over the country. There were people in other lines not related to foreign relations: Guy Stanton Ford, who was a great historian and became acting president of the university, was the president of the American Association of Universities. He came to Washington to take over that job after he

retired from Minnesota. So I could have learned a lot more than I did. I suppose I absorbed quite a lot from the series of lectures from Guy Stanton Ford. My adviser in the last year was Harold Quigley who was a real expert on Far Eastern relations, and who incidentally, when I applied for the Foreign Service examination said, “Woodward, I don't think you should take the examination. You're not a good enough student.” I said, “I've already applied, Mr. Quigley, and I'll give it a try.” I guess he was really right, but I got an adequate grade in the written to take the oral, but I failed the oral. I didn't realize how miserably I'd failed it, so I applied over again and fortunately it was the one time, as far as I know, in the history of the Foreign Service examination, when they gave two examinations in one year. I took it in January of 1931, and in July of 1931. I took the whole thing over again. And in the meantime, I had gone to Washington because I discovered a way I could get there, virtually free, by going in the caboose of a stock train from St. Paul, Minnesota. I went to apply for a job as a clerk, because the man who had at first told me about the possibility of going into the Foreign Service—a fellow student named Norris Rediker—had used that method. He'd gone in as a clerk. He had been assigned to Sault Ste. Marie where he said, jokingly, that the first thing that his boss said was, “You must go down to the liquor board and get your liquor license.” He took his examination in Sault Ste. Marie, passed it, and was then assigned to the great post of Corinto, Nicaragua as an FSO. Well, I thought I'd try the same thing since I'd failed the exam. The chief of Foreign Service personnel was then Mr. Homer Byington, a very amiable fellow. He received me personally even though I had failed the examination. This was rather remarkable when you consider now the size of the Foreign Service. You wouldn't see the top personnel man. He said, “I'll give you a job as a clerk if you want it,” which was pretty responsive. But he said, “I've just approved your application for the next examination which is going to be held in a couple of months.” This was early in June that I was talking to him. He said, “My recommendation to you is to take that examination. If I were you I would thoroughly read Time Magazine every week and keep posted on all current events.” So I went back to Minneapolis and followed his recommendations, took the written in July and got a slightly higher grade than I had before, and then took the oral— again going to Washington on a stock train.

(I got as far as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on this train that had two cars of pigs—just in front of the caboose—but there, since the pigs were going on to Philadelphia, the conductor on the freight train said, “There's a car or two going off this train down to Washington with just a locomotive and the tender. They are not stock cars, but I'll arrange with the locomotive driver to let you ride in the engine cab down to Washington.” So in the middle of the night, after three days getting from south St. Paul to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, I rode up in the engine cab on the locomotive. The engineer stopped the locomotive on an overpass—the railroad goes over a highway, right down below the House Office Building on Maryland Avenue. I can remember clambering down the embankment in my dirty clothes and my satchel. I walked over to the middle of downtown Washington on New York and Fourteenth to the Star Valet and “stood in his barrel” while I got cleaned up so I could go over to the State Department. Then, of course, day was breaking and I went to the State Department in the middle of the morning and found where I was going to take the oral.)

A little vignette might be of some interest to record. I was waiting to take the oral and the fellow ahead of me, a man I had not yet met, was named Walter Dowling. Walter Dowling, it turned out, was a very well qualified man, and he eventually was Ambassador to Korea and then Ambassador to Germany. While I was sitting there waiting, there was a man who had been a long-time clerk in the personnel office named Mr. Shreve. Mr. Shreve was a very kindly, wiry little gentleman. He tried to help the morale of the candidates by talking to them pleasantly while they were waiting to be interviewed. He chatted along, and said, “What grade did you get on the oral when you came the last time?” I said, “Actually, I got 60 on the oral.” And he said, “Well, that's an indication they don't want you back if they gave you a grade of 60.” Well, here I was about to step into the interviewing room, and I was told that I should have recognized the signal that I wasn't wanted back!

Maybe I'm repeating myself from the previous interview that you had with me, but the examining board in those days was a group of the very highest officers in the State

Department. Not only was Wilbur Carr there, who was the father of the consular service and the man who had introduced legislation back in 1910 which originated a sort of systematic...

Q: 1906. I think 1905-1906.

WOODWARD: He was Assistant Secretary for Administration. And even the Under Secretary of State William Castle, I believe, was on my board. And another Assistant Secretary of State, and of course, the chief of Foreign Service personnel with whom I had talked when I came down to Washington to apply for a job as a clerk, Mr. Homer Byington.

A rather interesting thing occurred in my oral exam. The question I remember was, what would you do, Mr. Woodward, if you were Congress all by yourself, about the current economic situation of the United States? Well, this was October 1931 or the first of November. The United States' economic situation was extremely troubling. The depression was really settling in for rights then, and Congress was simply boiling with the debate about what to do. So I said, “There are a lot of very competent men up there on Capitol Hill in the Congress who are discussing this subject. I can't possibly presume to improve on what they're doing. I'm a neophyte from Minnesota, and it would be very presumptuous for me to proffer any idea on what to do about the economy of the United States. I simply have to state that I have confidence that they will come up with some good ideas.” Well, the Board kept pressing me to express my own view, and I simply dug in my heels and I wouldn't give them an opinion. I thought this was a disaster, that I had probably really queered my fortune. But not at all, I passed the examination.

The last question I was asked was by Mr. Byington, the Chief of Personnel, and he said, “Woodward, if you were appointed as a Foreign Service Officer, would you be willing to go to any post, no matter how hot, or how cold?” I said, “Of course, I'd be delighted to go anywhere.” Well, what he had in mind as the Chief of Foreign Service Personnel, he was already figuring out the spots he had, and he was planning on; first, making a very

economical assignment because he could transfer Woodward from Minneapolis to the very closest post in Canada which was Winnipeg; and incidentally the very coldest post in the Foreign Service. Of course, I had already become accustomed to cold winters in Minneapolis, but not quite as cold as they were in Winnipeg. So that's where I was assigned.

Q: Can I interrupt here now because you've expanded some things which we had before, but in much better detail which I appreciate.

WOODWARD: What I'm telling you is sort of the amateurish situation from which I came, as compared with the fellows who were educated at Yale, and Harvard, and Princeton, all of the outstanding institutions of higher learning in the United States—and, who had taken advantage of their opportunity to learn. So I received my education from association with them, and working on the problems with them for over four years. (I happened to have the good luck of a temporary assignment before I began my four years, so I had a longer assignment than usual in the Department.) That was my university education. By that time, of course, I had the incentive of really wanting to make progress and do my job properly, but also I wanted to be promoted and have more responsible jobs, and get along in my career. This was my real guiding star. (I would have been married to an Argentine girl if it hadn't been for my persistent desire to make the most out of the career. I was on the verge of being married, just at the time a campaign against foreign wives was begun by Bill Bullitt, the Ambassador to the Soviet Union. He is said to have told President Roosevelt that when he sat down to a staff dinner, there wasn't a woman there who was born in the United States. They were all very fine ladies, but he became fed up with the idea that the U.S. was not represented by U.S. women as well as U.S. men. So I was glad to have an assignment in Washington.)

Q: I wonder if I could then move us...I want to get you to La Paz, Bolivia. You were there from '42 to '44. If you could explain what you were doing, and who was the Ambassador, and what were the main things that you dealt with?

WOODWARD: Since I was the deputy to the Ambassador, I dealt with everything of that nature, other than the protocol area. Our great objective was to keep the flow of raw materials coming from Bolivia which was tin, tungsten, cinchona, and rubber. We succeeded in that. The Ambassador was a man whose previous experience was largely in relations with European countries (except for preceding jobs as Ambassador to Nicaragua, and Counselor of Embassy in Mexico City). His name was Pierre de Lagarde Boal, and he had been in charge of the European division in the State Department when he was sent to Mexico City, and then on to these other assignments. He was a very cultivated man. He had a background which combined both France and Spain, his ancestors had been from both countries. He was married to a French women, and they had a house in France not far from Geneva. He had been in the French Air Force the beginning of World War I and had been wounded. He had a little limp from his wartime wound. Though a man of considerable erudition, he had, apparently, a few flaws in judgement. The first indication of a flaw in judgement (which I think is a fair name to give it), appeared shortly after my arrival. The Bolivian congress was coming to the end of its session and one of their last acts was to push through a revised labor law. The revised labor law had been promoted by some fairly liberal congressmen in the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies, and gave some additional benefits to the mining workers. For example, there were many women who worked in the mines. These were the so-called Cholas who were of mixed Indian and Spanish blood. They were identified by the fact that all the women wore derby hats, a rather peculiar custom in Bolivia. There were a lot of women mine workers. I don't know just what they did, I guess they hauled out the carts from the mines. The law provided, for example, something like two or three weeks of maternity leave if they were going to have a baby. There were some other provisions which were a little more generous than anything that had been done before by the big mining companies there.

The big mining companies were not American, they were Bolivian. There were two big Bolivian mining companies, Patino and Aramayo, and then there was a Belgium-Jewish gentleman who was a very clever entrepreneur who worked a lot of very poor mines by

combining his businesses. He arranged it so he provided the materials for getting the mines in shape to really work them. For example, the mine timbers. He would be selling timbers to the mines while he was extracting the ore and he combined all of these little functions so that he managed to make some money from mines that otherwise would not have been worked, and would not have been useful in the war effort. So we applauded his efforts, and he was given certain advance loans to help him out, as were the other mining outfits. There was one American company, the Grace Company, that had one or two tungsten mines.

The Ambassador became quite concerned, I might say almost excited, because of the provisions of this mining law which was passed at the last moment of the session of congress. He went over to see the President, a man named Penaranda, General Penaranda, an army man elected President, as I recall, although they'd had many, many coups, and many short term dictators in Bolivia in their history. But this man, I believe, was an elected President. Ambassador Boal expressed alarm to him about these increased benefits to the miners because it would raise the costs of producing the minerals and this would make it more costly to the United States to buy the minerals for the war effort.

The President was a rather wise old general, and he said, “Well, Mr. Ambassador, you don't have to really worry about that very much because we're going to have to come out with regulations to carry out the provisions of this new law, and I think we can arrange the regulations so there won't really be a burden upon the buyers of the minerals.” He was just sort of calming down the Ambassador.

We had a Minerals Attach# who was a very practical man and he was called in by the Ambassador, and the Ambassador called me in. The Ambassador said, “I want you two fellows to go through this law, and pick out all the provisions which will increase expenses for the buyers of minerals if they are applied.” The Ambassador seemed to expect that the law was going to be applied. Actually, the administration in Bolivia didn't pay very much attention to those details, but he was very apprehensive. He said, “I want a list of all

these things to show the Department of State, and other agencies of the U.S. government, just what the sinister prospects are from this law." So we went through the law and I can remember sitting there with the Minerals Attach# as we were doing this and reading article after article which, if it had been applied, would to some extent increase costs. We got them all listed and while we were sitting there we said to each other, "This is just like Simon Legree to deprive these workers of these benefits. To report these things as an intolerable increase in cost was really enough to make our faces red." But the Ambassador had requested us to do it. We thought it was very bad judgement on his part. We thought he'd probably cross out some of these things but he took our whole list intact and put it in a telegram and sent it to the Department.

Well, this telegram got into the hands of a man who, as I recall, was working on the staff of the Pan American Union, which hadn't been yet changed to the Organization of American States. This was the fall of 1942. I believe the man in the Pan American Union was of Peruvian origin. He got this telegram from a man named Jackson in one of the wartime agencies, a very ardent New Dealer. The Peruvian gentleman gave the telegram some publicity and there was a great deal of excitement about it in Washington and it became generally known that Ambassador ping to be able to eliminate the actual application of a lot of these rather pitifully liberal provisions in the labor law.

The upshot was there was so much controversy in Washington about this that a labor mission was sent down to investigate in Bolivia. It had some very, very good labor people on it, and the secretary of the committee—there were five men—the secretary of the committee was a good friend of mine in the Foreign Service named Eddie Trueblood who was a very thoughtful and very liberal Foreign Service Officer, and had been selected by Larry Duggan to be the secretary and keep the records of what they did. They stayed about ten days, I think, in Bolivia and we helped them get in touch with all the people they wanted to question, and they quickly recognized that the Bolivian government was not inclined to apply the provisions that would increase costs. It was all sort of a farce, and the

poor Bolivian workers were going to go on with the same miserable lives that they'd had before.

Anyhow, this really got the Ambassador in Dutch and he was then considered to be rather suspect as a hard-liner, a conservative fellow, not really prepared to have a reasonably sympathetic attitude toward the underdog in Bolivia. Well, time went on and in the spring of 1943, Ambassador Boal accompanied President Penaranda on a visit to Washington. This was part of the program of wanting to improve relations with the countries that we were depending on for supplies, and cooperation. President Penaranda went up to Washington and, of course, the officials of our government became acquainted with the President. This had an important effect on the next great event in our relations with Bolivia, in that when the President was suddenly overthrown in December of 1943, he was known to the officials in Washington. Since Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, had met with him and talked with him (of course, through an interpreter because President Penaranda didn't know any English whatever), there was great concern. There was a change of government, and the people who had overthrown the President were a group of youngish lieutenant colonels in the Bolivian army, accompanied by a special group of police who were called the Traffic Police of La Paz. I think they probably had a few people in some of the other towns such as Cochabamba and Potosi and so forth, but anyhow the Traffic Police and these Lieutenant Colonels overthrew the President and then seized the government. The only person in the U.S. government who knew these Lieutenant Colonels happened to be one member of our military mission to Bolivia who, because he didn't have much to do, had offered to teach some of these young colonels English. And this particular group had registered for his English class, and he was teaching them English once a week and they were plotting the revolution in his class, but he didn't know it. But he became acquainted with the fellows who did it. So he was our pipeline to these lieutenant colonels. He was an Army officer who was a rather eccentric fellow. His name was Hardesty, and Hardesty had also learned embalming. He worked for an undertaker in Kansas or Missouri or somewhere as a young man. He was an embalmer whose ability we made use of; he

actually embalmed a couple of bodies in Bolivia of Americans whose “near and dear” wanted sent back in sealed coffins to the United States.

That's all irrelevant, but the U.S. government was annoyed by the presumptuousness of a group of army officers changing a government in wartime, a government supplying us with important war materials. So Secretary Hull, influenced by a telegram that had come from, I believe, the office of the Military Attach# in Argentina which indicated that there had been some communication between the Argentine military, who were considered definitely not friendly to the United States at that time, and the Bolivian revolutionaries. Secretary Hull thought the coup had been influenced by Argentina, and that Argentina was trying to woo Bolivia away from U.S. influence and get them to turn us down on supplies for the war effort. Hull was becoming convinced that the Argentines were really much more friendly to the Germans than they were to us, which I think was dubious. I suspect they were just trying to maintain their neutrality, but that's a very controversial subject.

In any event, I remember Hull was quoted as saying, about this message, that he read about collaboration between the Bolivian and Argentine military, “When you see the tracks of the 'bar,' the 'bar' isn't far away”—an old Tennessee expression. So what happened? The United States influenced all of the Latin American countries, except Argentina, to break diplomatic relations with Bolivia. And part of this, of course, was to withdraw the Ambassador from Bolivia. All the other countries went along with it, except Argentina, and of course that further confirmed Hull's fear that this had been influenced by Argentina. The upshot of it was that I was left as Charg#...I was not formally called Charg# d'affaires because when you don't have relations, you don't have diplomatic relations.

Immediately after the Ambassador left (he left about the first of February, '44), we started to have relations with the Foreign Minister, and the new President, a man named Villaroel, a very inexperienced lieutenant colonel who was right out of the boondocks down in some remote area of Bolivia. He had been selected by the group of revolutionaries as being their figurehead, at least, as President of the country.

On the other hand the Foreign Minister was quite an experienced man. He was a lawyer, and he lived in La Paz and had been in the Congress. So he and I began to discuss methods by which we could convince Washington that they were not against the war effort. And, of course, the first thing was to make absolutely sure that there was no interruption in the flow of the war materials that we were getting. The Bolivians were absolutely perfect on that score. There was no interruption at all in the flow of materials and they were cooperating to the full, and we continued to cooperate with the mining companies. And we tried to emphasize this in our reports to Washington; that we should restore diplomatic relations because this was just another coup. The leaders of the coup had allied with them a little political party that was emerging, which had a number of sort of new ideas, somewhat leftist social ideas called the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario—MNR. And the MNR also had, unfortunately, a plank in their party program which was against the Jewish immigrants that were coming in from Germany and who were competing with Bolivian merchants in towns all over Bolivia such as Cochabamba, Potosi, and Sucre and Santa Cruz. Some of the immigrants were able businessmen and they were operating stores; the Bolivian merchants were complaining about their competition.

The MNR was getting some more support from Bolivian businessmen because the MNR promised it would make sure that there was no unfair competition from the Jewish immigrants. Well, this of course, further inflamed people in Washington who thought that the MNR, affiliated with this group of lieutenant colonels, was going along with the Germans on anti-Semitism. It was an unfortunate accident that this provision was in that party platform. So we got very little cooperation from Washington.

We had a group of very able young officers in La Paz and I got into a huddle with three of them: Bromley Smith who later became Secretary of the National Security Council here in Washington, and a man named Bob Wilson; and another man who had been working with a mining company in Bolivia—an American gold miner, and had been drafted as a Reserve Officer in the embassy, a fellow named Norman Stines, a very able fellow.

Anyhow, I said, “Bromley, could you get together all of the decrees that have been issued by this new government?” Here it was, near the first of February, and they'd come in about the 23rd or 24th of December. So there had been a month of constant issuance of new decrees on various subjects. “...and get together a summary of these decrees, and your appraisal of to what extent they could possibly be considered inimical to the U.S.” I said to Norman Stines, who had been very ably working on the proclaimed list of blocked nationals (the blacklist), “Norman, you've been here longer than any of us, and you know the people and the personalities around here. Can you make a little analysis of the personalities of all the people who are the leaders in this revolutionary movement and who are in the government now or anybody who is a party leader in the MNR. Look particularly for any attitudes on the part of these people that we could consider unfavorable to the war effort?” Now, to Bob Wilson, “Every time a new decree comes out,” and there would be decrees almost every day, “report them promptly, and we'll keep up with the current issuance of decrees, and make a little analysis of them the same way that Bromley Smith will be making an analysis of those that have already been issued. So you do the current reporting on this.” These three men did a splendid job of this, and we got a complete picture, I thought, that should have convinced people in Washington that this was not a movement against the U.S., and that we were really causing ourselves trouble by breaking off diplomatic relations.

Two months went by—February and March—and we hadn't seemed to get anywhere with this, although I think the people in the Latin American division of the State Department were all beginning—almost all of them—particularly Larry Duggan were becoming convinced that we had made a mistake to break off diplomatic relations. But we weren't getting anywhere with the Secretary of State, Hull, and there had already been a very unfortunate misunderstanding between Secretary of State Hull and Sumner Welles. And Sumner Welles had either left, or was on the verge of leaving the State Department. There was a kind of pogrom that was instigated by Ambassador Bullitt who disliked Welles, and he made a number of charges about his personal life, and so forth. In any event, Sumner

Welles could not be much help. Of course, he was intensely interested in the war effort, and the European situation. Although he had been the great Latin American expert, he had transferred his knowledge and his judgement, which was excellent on political matters, to Europe to a large degree. So there wasn't anybody to convince Mr. Hull, except Larry Duggan, and Larry hadn't yet been able to do that.

The Bolivian Foreign Minister and I were talking about this, “What are we going to do to be able to convince Washington that the Bolivian Government really deserves diplomatic recognition and normal relations?” The Foreign Minister said to me (and as I say this was about April 1st), “Now if we were to round up these Germans and Japs, and a few Italians, on the proclaimed list, if we were to round these people up, or as many of them as we could get, would you accept them to take away from here into custody?” I said, “I don't know. I'll ask the State Department that question.” So I sent in a telegram asking the question, and it was clearly hypothetical, as he said, “If we were to do this, would you accept them, and would you consider that a clear indication that we are wholeheartedly in favor of the war effort?” A telegram came right back saying, “Ambassador Avra Warren,” (who had been Ambassador in the Dominican Republic, and was just being transferred to Panama), “Ambassador Avra Warren will be coming to Bolivia immediately to help you with the evacuation of the Germans and Japs.” I took this telegram over to the Foreign Minister right away...well, first I had sent another message saying, “Please look at my original telegram, it's completely hypothetical. They said they'd not offered this, they'd asked the question.” Nevertheless, here Ambassador Warren was coming down to help me with the evacuation.

I took it over to the Foreign Minister and he said, “Well, he's on his way, we'll talk to him when he comes.” That implied, of course, that they were prepared to go ahead with this. And Warren, whom I knew very well, he'd been my boss in Buenos Aires as Consul General (as a matter of fact he'd gone on a couple of these similar missions before), one in Paraguay, to organize the evacuation of people and send them up to detention centers. There was one in Texas, and there was one in North Dakota, one in a place called Crystal

City. Anyhow, Warren came, and his bag carrier—he had an aide with him—was none other than Tapley Bennett who later became our Permanent Ambassador at the UN, and his last job was four or five years as the Ambassador to the NATO Council. Tap has become a very illustrious elder statesman. Well, Tap was the bag carrier for Warren. I first met him there, we've been good friends ever since. Ambassador Boal, when he'd left, had asked my wife and me to move into the embassy residence in order to protect it from vandalism and so forth. We moved out of a little apartment that we'd inherited from my predecessor, Allen Dawson, and moved into the embassy residence. So we took in Warren and Tapley Bennett and they stayed there with us. Well, Warren talked very firmly, and very promisingly, in rather vague terms, but he was very emphatic, and he said, “When people are taken into custody, the reaction in Washington will be very prompt and decisive. There will be a very definite reaction.” He didn't promise in so many words that relations would be restored, but obviously that was what he meant.

The upshot was that after about a week or ten days—we had given the Bolivians a list of the people that we would most like to have taken into custody. So finally the arrangements were made and these people were rounded up and put in a barracks up at the airport, what we called the Altiplano, the high plateau where the airport was, which was 1,000 feet above the city. The city was 12,000 feet altitude and the airport was 13,000, which raised questions about weather conditions. It had to be pretty good weather for airplanes to come in and go out. Anyhow, these people were rounded up and we coordinated this with arrangements with Panama. As I recall nine DC-3s came in in a rather dramatic flight into the airport, and these people were all stashed away on the DC-3s and taken up to Panama as a staging operation to the U.S. And then Warren and Tapley Bennett left to go back to the U.S.

This took place along about the 15th or 20th of April, or maybe the first of May. Warren had told me that, after diplomatic relations were restored, he would make arrangements to have another fellow sent in to be Charg# d'affaires, so I could go home to Washington with my wife, because she was expecting our first child. We had been married then about

a year and a half and she was expecting a child sometime early in July. Well, we waited and waited for recognition and I became nervous as a cat, and so did the Foreign Minister, because the recognition was not forthcoming. It was along about the 10th of June and United States recognition hadn't yet shown up and here four or five weeks had gone by. I can't remember precisely, but at least it was a month. I'd been promised that I'd be sent to Washington after relations came. Long before, we had made arrangements for my wife to go to Lima to a good clinic there; incidentally, the American doctor in charge was Jack Vault who later was in charge of the medical branch of the State Department. He was running this clinic, and we'd made arrangements for my wife to go there, but now the situation had changed and I was going to be transferred to Washington.

So about the 15th of June, Virginia got on a Pan American plane. The pilot was a little reluctant to take her because he was not very good about delivering babies. Another young woman, who was also expecting, the wife of our Air Attach#, went on the same plane and the two ladies went by themselves to Miami and Washington. Well, about a week later we got the orders to present diplomatic recognition, and also the word that a new Charg# was coming. This was a little unfortunate because the next man in rank in La Paz was a very competent fellow, and I should have been more emphatic in urging Warren not to recommend anybody but him to be the Charg# d'affaires. This was Walter McConaughy, and Walter McConaughy later had about six embassies. He was Ambassador to Korea, to Burma, to Pakistan, and for nine years to Taiwan before he retired. Here this new Charg# was sent in, and Walter was sitting there as the Commercial Attach#; a Far Eastern expert who was in Bolivia during the war. There were no posts in the Far East and he was given this post but, of course, he'd already been there two years and he knew the Bolivian situation far better than the fellow who was sent in. It was a man named Ed McLaughlin. McLaughlin is dead now; he was a confident fellow but his personal habits left something to be desired: he immediately established a liaison with a woman who was a nurse attached to a health agency which was part of the Coordinators Assistance Program during the war, and he made a kind of an ass of himself with this

girlfriend. And he had a lovely wife back in Washington who didn't come down there because this job was supposed to be a relatively short term one.

Well, anyhow, I presented the note recognizing the Bolivian administration, establishing relations, and a few days later was able to introduce Ed McLaughlin as the new Charg# d'affaires, and I left. We had regularized relations, at least.

In the meantime Ambassador Boal never got a real job as an Ambassador again. He was assigned to a wartime committee job which headquartered in Montevideo, Uruguay, for the coordination of economic warfare efforts. The U.S. was trying to get the governments of all of the Latin American countries to coordinate their measures along with ours on the proclaimed list, and other wartime measures, and Boal had that job for a year or two and then retired. So I learned quite a lot in that period from February 1st to, let's say, close to July 1st. I think I got back to Washington just about the Fourth of July, the baby was born on the 20th of July.

Q: Then you were rather quickly reassigned, weren't you?

WOODWARD: I was allowed to stay in Washington for a few months and this fitted in with the plans of the Latin American Bureau because of the temporary absence of the man who was in charge of what they called North and West Coast Affairs— which was from Colombia down to Chile, including Peru and Ecuador, and Bolivia. I was put in charge of that temporarily. I was the acting chief of the Office of North and West Coast Affairs. The man who had been in charge of it was a man who was knowledgeable about German affairs, and he was quickly sent to Europe in the spring of '44.

Q: The spring of '44 was when you...

WOODWARD: The spring of '44.

Q: You were in La Paz from '42 until June of '44.

WOODWARD: Yes, approximately the first of July of '44. I arrived in La Paz, I think, about the last week in September of '42, so I wasn't there quite two years.

Anyhow, some very interesting things happened when I was temporarily in charge of the Office of North and West Coast Affairs, because just after I left Bolivia, Ed McLaughlin as Charg# d'affaires, was confronted with a most unusual situation. Hochschild, an important minerals producer—a Belgium Jew with Chilean citizenship—was kidnapped. He disappeared, and there was great consternation. He was not an American and we were not responsible for him in that respect, but he was getting tin out of a large number of very low grade mines. He was an important man, an important cog in the war effort, so we had a legitimate concern for him as the manager of this operation. We had two FBI men in Bolivia. They were intelligence officers known as Legal Attach#s and had been assigned to Latin American posts at the beginning of the war effort. There was a capable young man named Hubbard in charge of that operation in Bolivia at that time; he found out—and how he found out, I'm not sure—that Hochschild had been kidnapped by the National Chief of Police, and the La Paz Chief of Police, in cooperation. These fellows were quite radically nationalistic in their ideas, and they somehow conceived of Hochschild as being a very obnoxious...what was it President Roosevelt used to call them “a malefactor of great wealth”? He was sort of target number one to the people who hated foreign competition, so they'd kidnapped the fellow.

Well, this young FBI officer had also become quite well acquainted already with the President Villaroel. We all knew President Villaroel. The upshot was the FBI man, the Legal Attach#, went around to see President Villaroel, and he said, “What are we going to do about this?” I don't know his exact language, but he broke the news. Villaroel claimed to know absolutely nothing about it, the President of the country, that his two principal police officers were responsible for this kidnapping. According to the FBI man, he broke down in tears, and he said, “I can't control these fellows, and I can't do without them. I depend on them but I can't control them.” Nevertheless, of course, something had to be done, and it

was done; Hochschild and his sidekick, who was a decent Dutchman, a great big fellow named Adolph Blum, were both released. They were both very clever businessmen, and we in the embassy had all known Blum and his wife, very congenial people. Hochschild was a little off in the stratosphere with his high binding activities but he was a very able businessman. He used to invite us over once in a while and give us imported lobsters to butter us up. But anyhow, Hochschild got out, and he left the country right away and he went to Chile. Blum eventually went to the United States, then he went back to Holland. I saw him once later on here in Washington. He was a particularly good friend of Bromley Smith. I saw him over at the Smith's house.

This was the sort of messy thing that goes on with these revolutionary situations. There were apparently wild men in that group of revolutionaries, but they were not against the U.S. war effort. Maybe in retrospect, this period of non-recognition really made the difference. It's hard to tell whether Cordell Hull, with his program of non- recognition, really did have a salutary effect on their cooperation in the war effort, or whether it was totally unnecessary. But the six months, approximately from the first of January when we broke relations, to approximately the first of July, was, of course, a tremendously interesting experience for me, working with the Foreign Minister to try to regularize relations.

I remember there was one fellow in the diplomatic corps whose wise comments and judgement I respected a great deal. I went around and talked to him two or three times during this period, and his name was Bustamente; he was the Peruvian ambassador. He was a very amiable gentleman, and he later became President of Peru. And I still remember very fondly his wise advice and counsel. Of course, he agreed with me that this was a kind of selling operation to restore diplomatic relations. But none of us knew the extent to which the period of non-recognition may have influenced these rather extreme and rather ignorant young military officers. These fellows were brought up as children in rather isolated circumstances in the small towns and villages and later came into the army, and sometimes then began to develop ideas about how the government should be run.

They were often very conscientious, dedicated fellows who thought they were working for the public good, but they would come up with some utterly absurd ideas.

And an example of that was an army officer who I think was a colonel, later on became President of Peru for a while. In any event this man came up with some perfectly absurd economic ideas, but a lot of them were distortions of better ideas which they had picked up from the members of U.S. military missions. One of the things in Latin America which should not be underestimated is the extent of the influence on political thinking by members of the U.S. military in aviation and naval missions. Some of these United States officers become very friendly, and even, you might say, intimate advisers with officers of the other country in the course of their long acquaintance with them. This has had, I believe, a lot of effect upon development of new thinking in Latin America, much of which has been very wholesome. Occasionally it's perverted by the thinking from other sources, and other influences, so it develops a certain distorted appearance. I think it is worth making this general observation.

Q: I think this is valuable.

WOODWARD: Anyhow, that was the principal development while I was in charge of the North and West Coast Affairs, this Hochschild incident. Of course, we were handling this as though it were a dramatic detective story from Washington and receiving reports every day or two from the embassy. So vicariously, I had my continuing adventures on Bolivia after I left there.

Then I was about to be assigned to Costa Rica as the Deputy Chief of Mission, and I had a conversation with the chief of Foreign Service personnel at that time, who was a man named Nathaniel Davis, a very, very sound citizen. He was known as Pen Davis, and Pen Davis was thoroughly well liked, and respected. And as I was discussing with him going to Costa Rica, he said, “I think maybe we better send a fellow who is older than you are to take hold in Costa Rica,” because he didn't have much confidence in the man

who was then Ambassador. So I was assigned to Guatemala as Deputy Chief of Mission. The Ambassador who was there at the time was a man named Boaz Long, a man of vast experience, and a very conservative gentleman. He spoke Spanish perfectly, came from New Mexico, and he had even been in charge of Latin American relations in the Bryan administration of the State Department in 1916. Here it was 1944 and he'd come back in the Democratic administration. He'd been Ambassador to Ecuador, and he was then Ambassador to Guatemala. I arrived in Guatemala about Thanksgiving time in 1944.

Well, when I was already assigned there but had not arrived, there was a coup d'etat in Guatemala. The long time dictator, Ubico, had voluntarily left office because he felt hurt and unappreciated along about the first of July of 1944. He had been dictator for about thirteen years, and run the country pretty well even though he was a dictator. He was known as a great friend of the Indians, and of course the Indians are well over half the population of Guatemala. He'd been succeeded by a prot#g#, a man named Ponce, President Ponce. President Ponce was overthrown in the last week of October, and at the moment Ambassador Long was up in the United States. The Charg# d'affaires was a very able young man, named Bill Affeld who had been a schoolmate of mine at the University of Minnesota. He was the man that I was going to replace, but Bill had handled our affairs excellently during this coup d'etat. As a matter of fact he had been present when Ponce finally capitulated under the aegis of the Papal Nuncio. For the representative of the United States filling the shoes of the Ambassador, to be on this capitulation—on this change in Governments—was slightly dubious. But he had conducted himself in a proper way, and I admired what he'd done there.

Anyhow, when I arrived Boaz Long had come back from his leave; I was there from November of 1944 until January of '46. It wasn't very long. A little group, one was a captain, one was a lieutenant colonel, and one was a local businessman, a triumvirate, who had led the coup, and who took over the government. The businessman was a young firebrand named Jorge Torriello who ran a electrical supply business in Guatemala City. The captain of the army was Captain Arbenz who had been a student in the military

academy. It was right across the street from the American Embassy and which was headed by an American army officer, and who knew Arbenz very well because he'd been a student there. The third man of this triumvirate was a very rough, provincial army lieutenant colonel, who was an effective and very popular army leader but not much respected by the other two members of the triumvirate who considered themselves to be more sophisticated intellectuals. That is, Torriello and Arbenz. Anyhow, the three men came out with a lot of pious declarations when they took over the government, including a promise that they were going to have very prompt elections.

Well, just a few weeks before this coup occurred, in anticipation of the possibility that there would be an opportunity to resume political activities, after Ubico had left the government, (Ponce was not much known or much respected) a man who had been a rather popular political leader, and who had been exiled—I guess mostly voluntary exile—was a school teacher named Arevalo, had come back to the country with the idea of getting back into politics. He'd received a great ovation at the airport, welcomed by a group of enthusiasts who remembered him from earlier days. He'd been out of the country for a rather large number of years, if I'm not mistaken eight or ten years. He was a professor of economics. He'd been a professor at the University of Tucuman in northern Argentina, and he'd also been in Chile for a while teaching. He was a rather elegant fellow who talked in rather flamboyant terms about...what was the term he used for his theory of government —"spiritual socialism". He had rather obviously applied the adjective "spiritual" to appease the fears of people who were afraid of the term socialism.

Anyhow, here he was in the wings at the time this triumvirate came out with their pious declarations they were going to have elections. Well, they had their elections about Christmas time, having taken over I think the 20th of October. Of course, Arevalo, who had a lot of publicity, was elected. These fellows were not enthusiastic about Arevalo at all, and they rather deplored the fact that they'd gotten themselves trapped by the fact that they had committed themselves to elections. (In Cuba, Fidel Castro also said he was going to have elections but he didn't trap himself, he never had the elections.) But

these fellows were conscientious enough so they thought they had to go ahead and have the elections. Anyhow, they were cooperative, and they reconciled themselves to this, and Torriello was made Minister of Finance, Arbenz was made Minister of Defense. And the third man, whom we thought was probably the most promising fellow to be president eventually, because he was very popular in the army, was given a new position as “Chief of the Armed Forces”. And he was a rather rough amiable fellow, a sort of street-smart type.

They also had had a constitutional convention, the very first thing they did. They started discussing a new constitution and they created a new position which was supposed to protect the democratic integrity of the government. It was called Chief of the Armed Forces. And the Chief of the Armed Forces was given certain constitutional authority to ensure that there were democratic elections. It was a permanent job under the constitution, and this man that I'm describing was made Chief of the Armed Forces. Whereas Arbenz, the younger man, was made Minister of Defense. Well, this government took over under Arevalo on the 15th of March of 1945, and the United States sent a special emissary as we usually did to inaugurations. The emissary was none other than the American Ambassador to Cuba, Spruille Braden. I remember going out to the airport and Spruille came over in his Air Attach#'s plane from Havana—Havana was not terribly far away from Guatemala City. He arrived there in the nick of time to go to a special reception that was being given to all of the special emissaries in the presidential palace, and they, of course, had to be garbed in their formal finery. Spruille got out of the airplane and under the wing of the airplane where there was more room for him to change his clothes, he changed into his formal 'morning clothes' out at the airfield, and we drove him in to the reception. Anyhow, he was there for several days huffing and puffing about, as was his wont. He was very filled with himself. Anyhow, nothing particularly happened and the inauguration went off in the normal way.

So I was there while the government of Arevalo continued...this was '45. Shortly after President Arevalo came into power his Secretary of Foreign Affairs, who was a highly

respected lawyer in Guatemala City, came out to see Ambassador Long at his house which is very, very unusual in Guatemala because in these small countries, at least particularly in my experience in Guatemala, they are very careful not to give any indication that they are kowtowing to the U.S. because they are independent, sovereign countries, and they're all equal. As a matter of fact, Sumner Welles added to this by making the representatives to every country in Latin America Ambassadors. When I first came into the Service there were many Ministers rather than Ambassadors. Anyhow, they're all equal so the Foreign Minister made this very unusual step of coming out to call on Long. I didn't even know that he'd done this until after Boaz came back into his office, which adjoined the residence. He called me in, and he said, “The Foreign Minister just came out to see me. He sat down there and he wept.” He said, “There are a group of hotheads in this government who don't like you Mr. Long. They think that you are a carry-over from the days of Ubico.” He said, “I don't know whether they're going to harm you in some way. It worries me terribly. I feel I must tell you that you might be in danger.” Well, Long was telling me this and he didn't give any indication as to what the next step was going to be but a day or two later he told me that he had decided he'd better go up and consult about this in Washington. So Boaz went to Washington and never came back. In other words he was in danger and the Foreign Minister had advised him.

A few days after this happened President Roosevelt died. I was Charg# d'affaires and there was a most impressive outpouring of grief in all the countries of Latin America. There had been tremendous sympathy for President Roosevelt in the war effort. There is, of course, a Latin American tendency to identify these things with personalities. It's true in our own country but I think a little more so there. There really was a very genuine expression of sorrow at the death of President Roosevelt. We had some memorial services.

It so happened at this time that an old politician who had been a diplomat in the Hoover administration was then making a brief visit to Guatemala. His name was Roy Tasco Davis.

Roy Tasco Davis was at that time in charge of an agency of our government which was called the Inter-American Educational Committee which sponsored and assisted American schools throughout the hemisphere. He was making the rounds of American schools and laying plans for programs, and changes in the amount of financial support here and there. He was in Guatemala at the time of Roosevelt's death. He was staying with us in the house we had...the Deputy Chief of Mission's. I'd known him pretty well in Washington. He'd been a Senator in the State Senate of Maryland, and he was an accomplished politician, a speaker, and a very jovial fellow. So we were going to have a memorial service in which there would be a Protestant preacher, a Catholic priest, a Jewish rabbi, and a spokesman for the U.S. government. Well, I thought, here's this man who is a very accomplished speaker, and I'm a very amateur, rather timid speaker. At that time I was particularly timid, and I asked Roy Tasco Davis if he would be willing to make the speech for the U.S. government. Roy said, “Yes, I'd be glad to do that even though I'm not a Democrat. I'm a Republican, but I'd be glad to do it.” So we had the service. It was a very solemn service, and very largely attended. And when Davis made his speech he wound it up with a peroration in which he said, as he looked up at the ceiling, “After all, to live in the hearts of those who love you is not to die.” Of course, he had everybody in tears.

When we got back to our house for lunch afterward, my wife Virginia said, “You know Mr. Davis,” (I guess we all called him Roy because we knew him well) “...that was a beautiful peroration. Where did you get that? How did you happen to think of that?” And Davis said, “As a matter of fact I read it off a tombstone in the pet cemetery out in Gaithersburg.” A couple of years later we were going past that cemetery and she said, “Let's go in and see if we can find that peroration of Roy Davis's.” We went in and we found it after a lot of hunting, and we were very much impressed with the eloquence of all these tombs. You know, people express their emotions spontaneously, more over their pets than they do over human beings, and that pet cemetery had some absolutely beautiful sentiments. People absolutely love their pets. Well, anyhow, we found it and the dog had died only

about two or three months before the date of Roosevelt's death. So Davis had been out there quite recently before his trip to South America.

Then a new Ambassador was named, Boaz Long, of course, having left. (Boaz at that time was 69 years old and getting a little bit long in the tooth for an Ambassador, when one considers that Foreign Service career people were expected at even the very highest grade, which at that time was Career Minister, to retire at 65. And if they're not Career Ministers, they retire at 60.) Anyhow, Boaz Long had stayed there until he was 69, and the new Ambassador was a man named Edwin Kyle, who had been Dean of the Agricultural School of Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College, better known as Texas A&M, a very highly respected school in Texas, and he'd been the Dean of Agriculture. And he was 69 when he was appointed as Ambassador. I eventually discovered how he happened to be appointed. This is rather interesting from the viewpoint of career versus political appointees.

Kyle was not only Dean of Agriculture, but he was a great friend of the football team, and he was known throughout the college as being a great supporter and enthusiast for the Texas A&M football team, which was a damned good football team and winning a lot of games. So the president of Texas A&M had either died or resigned, and there was a vacancy in the presidency. And there was a great push on the part of the people with whom Kyle was popular to make him president. Well, the trustees of the college were not as enthusiastic about making Kyle president as the football enthusiasts were. So they appealed to the great Texas Senator who was at that time Chairman of the Foreign Relations of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate, Tom Connally. Not the Connally who was known recently, but the Senator who had hair curling down over his collar, and was a very good chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee during part of World War II.

Q: It was Connally, Vandenberg and George were the main powers in the Senate in those days.

WOODWARD: Anyhow, Connally was prevailed upon by I suppose the trustees of Texas A&M to find an embassy for Kyle so they could put in the president they wanted at Texas A&M. And that's how we got our new Ambassador. But Kyle was a sensible fellow. He was a rather pleasant egotist in that I remember he had been called the Friend of the Americas when he, as an agriculture expert, had been sent on a mission...part of the many wartime missions of sending experts around to consult and give advice with their counterparts, and he'd been sent on an agriculture mission. He was called, in the State College, the name of the town where Texas A&M is situated, “the Friend of the Americas”. As a matter of fact, during the time he was there, I found one of these little desk ornaments put out by Pan American Airlines, which had a sort of ark-like wooden base with holes for the flags of all the American republics. I had a little brass plate made to put on the base saying: To Ambassador Edwin J. Kyle, Friend of the Americas, and gave it to him. He took this quite seriously. It was really kind of a prank on my part because I was just pandering to his ego. He was very proud of this, and he put it in a prominent place on his desk as Ambassador. But he was a good fellow, and an enthusiastic hunter and a great fisherman, a great family man. He got all of his Texas relatives down. But he'd also done one very great thing in agriculture. He collaborated closely, and was partly responsible, for the creation of what everybody has now at Thanksgiving, which is the broad- breasted turkey. The broad breasted turkey was a completely new breed of turkey, which had an immense amount of meat on its broad breast. He was very proud of this achievement, and well he might be. It has been a great thing, you get a lot more meat from a turkey. Well, he got one of these for a banquet he was going to have and it wouldn't fit into any oven it was so big. Well, we had quite a problem with that turkey but we finally got somebody to cook it in a restaurant. But we solved that problem fairly easily.

We got called in on the most odd problems. I remember one day I was sitting in the office, as I say it adjoined the residence there, and Mrs. Kyle, a very nice woman, sent a message that she wanted to see me right away. She said, “I've got two problems at the moment. The cat is up on the roof, a one story building. I can't get him down, I just

don't know what to do about it." And she said, "What's more, the tap on Mr. Kyle's bathtub doesn't work properly." So, first I got a ladder and went up and retrieved the cat— it was very easy because the ceilings were not high, and the roof was fairly close and I got the cat off the roof very quickly. And then I went to work on the faucet on the bathtub and I was a pretty good plumber. I fixed all the minor things, and have for years in my own house. So I fixed that for her.

Q: Such is the work of the Deputy Chief of Mission.

WOODWARD: And as a matter of fact, on that day a very strange phenomenon...I heard a noise on this one-story roof as though somebody were rolling a steel drum across the roof. I thought, "What in hell can that be?" And damned if it wasn't an earthquake. It was a small earthquake, and it was making this noise—there wasn't any drum up there at all, but it somehow created this noise. It was like a rumbling as though there was something going across the roof. It's earthquake country, they have frequent little tremors, and there had been some in the history of the place—some absolutely dreadful earthquakes. The city of Guatemala had been virtually destroyed—there was one after I was there that virtually destroyed it. And the Antigua had been destroyed. And there was an 'old Antigua' nearby which had been totally destroyed, except the remnants of an old, old church, just a little bit of ruin. There was a dead volcano not far from the town of old Antigua which had cracked open in an earthquake and the crater had been filled with water. It was a lake because it had filled up over the years, a large volume of water, and the crack let all the water out and that devastated old Antigua. That's why there was nothing but a ruin there. The whole place was absolutely wiped out by this deluge. And then they established the new Antigua but then they became afraid, after an earthquake had damaged a couple of the big churches—destroyed them—they decided they better move it up to Guatemala. Both those places had been the capital. And then it was called Antigua, and the completely ruined one was called Antigua la Viejo.

There was a lot of speculation of just what Arevalo meant by his numerous utterances about “spiritual socialism”. There was concern about just what he was up to, whether he was really a 'dangerous' President or not.

But before his term came to an end someone, and you can guess who, contrived to kill the man who was the popular army officer who was Chief of the Armed Forces Lt. Colonel Arana—the one who was supposed to be the 'watch dog' over Colonel Arana was killed so he could no longer be a contender in the next presidential elections. The result was, that in the next election Arbenz was elected president. An attempt had been made to kill Arevalo before he finished his term, but he escaped. In any event Abenz came into power, and this was long after I left Guatemala.

Q: Why don't we leave that because what I'd like to do is concentrate on your experiences. You went from Guatemala to Havana. Who was the Ambassador then?

WOODWARD: The Ambassador was R. Henry Norweb. I had known him pretty well because before I went to Bolivia; I'd been on the Peruvian desk, as well as the Bolivian desk for the months or year just before I left Washington, and had many consultations with Harry Norweb. Even though we 'desk officers' were underlings we got onto a first name basis with the Ambassadors to the countries which we were working on as country desk officers. So when I went to Bolivia Harry Norweb, who was in Lima at that time, asked me to stop over for a couple of days and stay at the embassy and talk things over with him because I'd been on his country desk operation. The upshot was that even before I got to Bolivia I knew Harry pretty well. So when he was transferred from Lima to Havana he asked to have me sent there as his Counselor of Embassy.

Q: That would be now the Deputy Chief of Mission.

WOODWARD: Incidentally, during the time that he was still Ambassador to Peru, and I had finally persuaded the woman I had hoped to marry, I persuaded her to come to

Lima and be married. Ambassador Norweb was very generous to us and had a wedding breakfast. He was my best man at the religious service in a small Episcopal church, which was a hole in the wall in downtown Lima and a very inconspicuous little church but there was an Episcopal church there. We were given the choice of being married only by the municipal judge, whose services had been arranged by my good friend Milton Wells, a secretary in the embassy. Milton Wells had met us at the airport where we came in from opposite directions almost simultaneously, although I had tried to come several days in advance in order to arrange to become a “citizen of Peru”. I had not known that one of us had to be a “citizen” of Peru when I asked Virginia to come to Lima as a kind of neutral ground because she had suggested that we get married in Mexico City. So my sort of off-the-cuff reaction was, “Virginia take a look at the map and come a little closer to Bolivia because I can't get away from work quite that long, so come to Peru.” I should have said, “Why don't you come to La Paz.” As a matter of fact it would have been a great deal easier because the Bolivian laws were much more relaxed on requirements for marrying in the sense that you didn't have to be a citizen of the country. Well, when Milton Wells told me I had to be a citizen of Peru on furlough, he said, “I think we can arrange that, but you'll have to come here several days in advance.” I tried to do that, and I sat in the airport waiting for the airplanes to move but they couldn't because the weather was so bad. And finally I got to the airport in Lima a half hour before Virginia. Milton was there and he said, “Everything is arranged. You're going to be married tomorrow morning by a municipal judge and if you want to, an hour afterwards you can be married in the Episcopal church.” So we said, “Of course, we want to.” George Butler, who was an old friend in the embassy, stood up as my best man with the municipal judge, and Harry Norweb was my best man in the church.

Q: So that's how you...so you went to Cuba.

WOODWARD: I went to Cuba as a friend of Harry Norweb's. As a matter of fact, he had a vacation house above the cloud line in the Lima region, a little cottage he used to get up in the sunlight because of that blanket of clouds that hovers over Lima for months of the

year. I was there during the month of February, and he loaned us this little house for our honeymoon.

Q: How wonderful.

WOODWARD: Anyhow, our relations were very pleasant. And all during this time, my relations with Norweb, I had not become well acquainted with his wife, Emery Mae. Emery Mae was an extremely wealthy woman. Harry Norweb had married into this large funding and Emery Mae tended to terrify the wives of the young officers, but she kept to herself a great deal of the time. Her relations with her own daughter, whom I understand was a very attractive young woman, in Lima were such that when the young daughter had a frustrated love affair with a secretary of the Spanish embassy, she went into a cloistered convent and is now the Mother Superior of a small group of cloistered Carmelite nuns in New Jersey.

Q: Good heavens.

WOODWARD: I attribute this, perhaps unfairly, but it seems probable that it was because of relations with her mother. Anyhow, we went to Havana under these circumstances, where I knew Harry Norweb very well, I didn't know his wife, nor did Virginia, my wife. Well, the upshot was that Virginia had virtually no relations with Mrs. Norweb. But my wife was the most extraordinary adaptable woman, and there was never a word of complaint about this. She just took it in her stride and whenever we were able to pick up the crumbs of some relationships, some affair that Mrs. Norweb was managing as she did occasionally, we'd cooperate in every way we could. There were a couple of times when the Ambassador went off on consultation, or went up to Cleveland on business, and we would drop around and have a martini with Mrs. Norweb. She always made very good martinis, and she always made martinis no matter who was there. In any event we got along. I thought we were doing fairly satisfactorily, but I was pretty young to be Counselor of Embassy there. I went there in January of 1947...

Q: '46, and you left in March of 1947.

WOODWARD: That's right. I went there in January of '46.

Q: You were rather young to be the...

WOODWARD: ...let's see, I was 38 years old. Well, there weren't very many Counselors of Embassy in embassies quite as large as Havana who were that young in the Foreign Service. There were exceptional cases. Caffery, for example, was Ambassador to Salvador when he was 38. The reason I mention this is because the other senior officers there, the Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs was 53 years old; the Commercial Attach#, George Howard, was about 48 or 50; the Consul General, Prescott Childs, was considerably older than I was; and the Agriculture Attach#. He was very important there because sugar was the big industry and our big concern during the war. This was just after the war and we were still buying all the sugar; the United States was responsible in the United Nations Food Board for redistributing the allotments to the countries that normally would be importing it directly. The United States had the contract for the purchase of all the sugar, except for the amount that was left in the hands of the Cubans for free sale. They produced about 6 or 7 million tons of sugar a year. They kept maybe a million for their own individual sales from time to time.

But anyhow, I went there by myself and lived in a hotel for three months because Virginia was having our second child back in Washington. I went there directly from Guatemala with the intention of getting to Washington a couple of weeks later for a few days when the baby was born. My plans carried out exactly as planned, but the baby's didn't. The baby came before I got there and I was able to get there a few days after the child was born. Everything went all right. Ginny stayed at her mother's house, as she had before we were married, so the problem was well taken care of.

Time went on. In this particular spring of 1946 the sugar agreement was renegotiated annually at that time because the price had to be revised, and some other considerations probably were introduced. The negotiations were going on during the first months of 1946 in Washington, and they were not getting anywhere. The Secretary of Agriculture was getting kind of worried about this because the system in the sugar harvest in Cuba is to harvest all the sugar, usually before about the first of June, and it's all shipped out. There's no adequate place in Cuba for storage of more than modest amounts and it has to be shipped. And so the sugar was being shipped in the spring of 1946 at a tentative price, and the contract had not yet been negotiated. Finally along about April or May the Secretary of Agriculture, who as I recall was Clinton Anderson—a very able man who had been a Senator—finally got fed up with this whole thing and he had some very good experts. He said, “I'm going to come down to Havana personally and get this thing negotiated.” So the negotiations were transferred from Washington to Havana, and all the experts were to get together in Havana.

Well, at this time, rather strangely, we had a notice of maybe about a week or ten days that this was going to occur. The Ambassador thought this negotiation was off on the wrong foot completely. I believe he must have, because he said, “I've simply got to go off on business up to Cleveland.” And he left. Well, he left me as Charg# d'affaires, the Secretary of Agriculture was coming in and they were going to negotiate. As soon as the Ambassador left, two or three days before Clinton Anderson was going to arrive, I had a searching talk with the Counselor of Economic Affairs—who was great fellow, he was one of the best friends I ever had, his name was Al Nufer. Al was married to a Cuban he'd met when he was a Vice Consul in Cienfuegos. He'd been a Vice Consul years before and from that point on he was assigned to Havana and he became a rather permanent Commercial Attach# in Cuba. He stayed right in Havana, and as he grew older, he was then 53, he was Class I in the Foreign Service. I was Class III or IV, and I was supposed to be his boss which was kind of ridiculous. But the result was that Al and I became the closest of friends.

And I'll tell you why he didn't want to be Charg# d'affaires, because he had been, at one point years before, when the Ambassador went away and he was called upon to make a speech at the American Club. All the people who were interested in sugar (he was going to talk about sugar, being an economist). And he made some comments advising the Cubans as to how they could improve their handling of the sugar business. He suggested that they develop new industries to find work for the Cubans during the off season because the harvesting and cultivation was a very seasonal thing, and the workers were without employment during a large part of the year. So he was much concerned about this and hoping that they could find some supplementary industries. But this was resented by the Cubans. The fact that he presumed to give advice to them—and this is one of the problems that we, handling Latin American relations, always had to be very, very careful about—that anything that presumed to act like tutelage, or giving advice on how they run their affairs unless they sought it, which they very infrequently did. They would occasionally ask for an expert on some subject and we'd find an expert for them. In fact, we had quite a little system hunting for experts and arranging to assign them where they were wanted.

But anyhow, Al didn't want to be Charg# d'affaires. He said, “I got so badly burned by that, I never want to be Charg# d'affaires again, so I'm delighted to have you be here to be the Charg#, and to cooperate with the other fellows.” Well, when I settled down with Al, I said, “What are we going to do to help Clinton Anderson? Here I am, I don't know the first damn thing about sugar.” I'd been there just four or five months. I said, “We've got the Agriculture Attach# who is a very knowledgeable man, but not a man with imagination.” It's hard to describe. I like him very much. His name was Minneman. He'd been educated in a German university and he always identified himself very precisely as Minneman. But he was a good fellow, and his wife was a lovely woman. Anyhow, Al and I figured that if any ideas were going to be developed, he and I would have to develop them.

My first idea, off the cuff, was now here Anderson is coming, virtually the entire sugar crop has been delivered. They're going to begin getting ready for the next year's crop. I said, “How about our suggesting to him that he negotiate two year's crops at once? The one that's almost completely delivered, and the one that's going to be created this coming year, the rest of '46 and into '47.” And Al said, “Let's suggest that to him and see what he thinks about it.”

Then I said, “Al, you speak absolutely perfect Spanish, and you can speak absolutely perfect Cuban Spanish,” which is another breed of cats because anybody who is a Castilian might have great difficulty understanding a Cuban. When the Cuban gets a little bit excited, he gets to speak rapidly and with many colloquialisms. Al was absolutely drenched in Cuban, and his wife was a Cuban. So I said, “You're going to have to really do this for him. You're going to have to really do this negotiating.” We went over to the airport, I guess it was the next day, to meet Anderson and we sat there in the National Hotel where we had made arrangements for Anderson to stay. He had with him a couple of his real experts—they have some very able sugar experts in the Department of Agriculture. And incidentally, the sugar law in the United States, we discovered, is virtually written by the principal lobbyist here for the sugar industry in the United States. Of course, the cane industry is adequately protected—because there's a big cane industry, and a big beet industry out in Colorado and the west.

Well, anyhow, we made this suggestion to Anderson and he thought it was not a bad idea to negotiate two years. It would take a lot of the problem out of this if we could work out a good two year deal. So he called Washington and the experts up there okayed that idea, so that's the approach he took. Then the real idea was developed up at the negotiating table by Al Nufer who was a very practical down to earth fellow and had read carefully the results of the long negotiation of the General Motors workers under that famous labor leader...

Q: Roy Reuther.

WOODWARD: ...and his brother when they were both up in General Motors. They had come up with what was then a unique labor agreement on the system of wages, which was that they would establish a base price, and then have it changed according to an average of three different cost of living indexes. I think one was the production index, and one was the cost of living index, and then there was another...I can't remember just where that came from. But anyhow, this was a widely heralded understanding that had been reached by the labor unions for General Motors. So Al, in the course of the sugar negotiations, said, “Let's establish a fair price for today on sugar, and have it modified by these same price indexes that are in the General Motors contract.” And surprisingly, that's what was approved. The price at the moment was established in what would appear to be a ridiculously low price today, but it was a very good price list—4 cents a pound, or something.

The upshot was that there was a very successful negotiation, and a hell of a big celebration at the presidential palace. Of course, Clinton Anderson was widely feted as being the great negotiator by the president of Cuba who was President Grau San Martin, and all the Cuban labor experts, and there were some very, very sharp, able Cuban lawyers who were always in on these negotiations. I remember one in particular, Arturo Manas, a very able lawyer. Anyhow, everything was a great success. Harry Norweb was up in Cleveland on leave. And incidentally, during this short period he was gone there was another important visit other than the Secretary of Agriculture. As a matter of fact, when we had a reception out at the Havana Yacht Club for our Secretary of Agriculture, we also had as a guest of honor Admiral Halsey who was on a goodwill trip to Latin America, as a war hero after the war. This was the spring of 1946 so the war had been over for a year. There was a great conclave in which Admiral “Bull” Halsey made a speech where I introduced him at the American Club in Havana and then we were able to include him at the same reception with Clinton Anderson, which was a rather happy coincidence. I

remember it was the only time I ever saw Hemingway. Hemingway lived in Havana and he came to that reception to see Halsey. It worked out very well.

And then during another brief absence of Ambassador Norweb, we had a visit from ex-President Hoover. I was Charg#, and President Hoover had in his entourage the man who had been his director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce during the Hoover administration, Mr. Julius Klein. And he had Hugh Gibson who had been one of his favorite Ambassadors during World War I, or just after World War I, when Hoover had been handling the war relief in Europe, and Gibson was Ambassador to Belgium where they became very close friends. He had Gibson and Klein and the U.S. government had provided him with an airplane, and his job was to go to all the countries that might be able to contribute to supplying food for the UNRRA, the United Nations Relief & Rehabilitation Administration, for post-war relief. I thought it was a great experience being there to receive Mr. Hoover.

As a matter of fact the night he was there just one night, he was the guest of President Grau at a dinner at the presidential palace, to which I was invited—it was a stag dinner—and I was with President Hoover in the National Hotel while we were waiting for the proper hour to go to the presidential palace for the dinner, and I remember Hoover— quite unlike the image that had been built up in the minds of a lot of people—was very relaxed and congenial. After he had had three martinis, I said to him, “You know, Mr. President, you're the only President of the United States that I ever voted for.” I had voted in Winnipeg on an absentee ballot a short time after I went to my first post in 1932.My family had always been Republican, and I voted for President Hoover in Winnipeg. Then I never voted again during my entire Foreign Service career because I figured I was a non-partisan public servant.

Hoover thought this was rather funny. He said, “Which time was that? The first time or the second time?” I said, “It was the second time.” And he said, “That's when I really needed it. So thank you very much.” President Hoover was then a very good natured man. The Cuban government gave him a very large tonnage of sugar out of that part that they could

dispose of as they wished, and that they'd not contracted to sell to the United Nations. So he got a good gift from the Cubans.

I had a very interesting tour in Havana as a result of all these things I'm telling you about. I did make one mistake which I'm glad to say was never noticed. Wanting to do some reporting on my own, and nobody else seemed to be working on it, I decided I would make an appraisal of communism in Cuba. And at that time there was quite an active little communist party, and it was a legal party in Cuba. They got about 5 percent of the vote, a really small operation, but there were a couple pretty vigorous communist leaders. They weren't getting very far in their proselytizing. So I made a report about the personalities of the leaders, whom I had to admit seemed to be very capable men, and there were a couple who were quite interesting intellectuals. Then there was a fellow who was the most popular leader, his name was Blas Roca, which was obviously a kind of a pseudonym which had been developed in his party work. I even went around amateurishly trying to see what they were doing, maybe I could overhear a conversation.

I wrote this report—I didn't really have much inside information in it—but I got together bits and pieces as much as I could and my final conclusion was there was not much likelihood of Cuba ever going communist unless the entire region of the Caribbean was to become overwhelmed somehow by the enthusiasm for the communism. In other words, I never foresaw a phenomenon such as Castro's, which was very, very largely contrived. I don't mean to be jumping into the later history because I'm not a real expert, but it was quite obvious when he came into power he was not a communist. But he had been greatly influenced and was listening a great deal to Che Guevara who had joined up in his small invasion of the Sierra Madre down in eastern Cuba, and his brother, Raul Castro, had been, I think, pretty well sold on this maybe by Che Guevara. Anyhow, they were the ones who really quite artificially planted communism in Cuba. There was no enthusiasm for communism except by this small group.

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Today is January 4th, 1991. This is a continuing set of interviews with Ambassador Woodward on his earlier career.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, we have you leaving Havana, Cuba in March of 1947, and I'd like to take you to your next assignment which I have here as Deputy Director of American Republics Affairs, ARA, in May 1947. Could you explain what that job involved, and some of the personalities, and talk a bit about what the issues were that you dealt with?

WOODWARD: The situation in the office of Latin American Affairs in the State Department at that time was in a somewhat parlous state because it was the only geographic division of the State Department that had an Assistant Secretary in charge, Spruille Braden. He had two or three competent personal assistants; there was Carl Spaeth who shortly afterward became dean of law school at Stanford University; there was a Spaniard who had been in the Spanish Republican Army, a very decent businesslike fellow who had been with Braden in Cuba as an assistant; and there was Tom Mann who later became Under Secretary of State and years later, was Ambassador to Mexico. These were all assistants to Braden. And there was a Director of Latin American Affairs who was Ellis Briggs, a well known Foreign Service Officer. And he had with him a personal assistant, Bob McBride, whose principal function was going through all the daily telegrams and picking out those that were important for Ellis to read, and summarizing many of them so he wouldn't have too much to read. Ellis was a very fast worker and he could scan messages very quickly, but he wanted to save his eyesight, he had one eye in which he had only peripheral vision because his eye had been damaged in a hunting accident— he was a great hunter.

But anyhow, here was this unusual combination, and at the same time it was rather apparent, even in March of 1947, that Spruille Braden was on the skids. He had been fighting on policy with George Messersmith who was the Ambassador to Argentina. Braden had been in Argentina where he had carried on a personal campaign against

Peron, he had virtually entered into the election campaign at the time Peron was elected as President. Messersmith thought the time had)come to accept Peron.

Q: I recall in one of our oral histories somebody arriving there and saying the chant of the street was, "Peron si, Braden no."

WOODWARD: That's right. In any event he was very anti-Peron. Peron continued to be in power, and Messersmith had been named Ambassador there, and Messersmith was inclined to think that we had to come to some kind of a modus vivendi with Peron. The result was that there was a kind of a feud going on, and the Secretary of State was becoming a little fed up with this, the Under Secretary, and even the White House.

Q: This would have been Dean Acheson.

WOODWARD: Or was it General Marshall?

Q: General Marshall probably at that time, yes.

WOODWARD: In any event this rather immobilized Braden's office for general work. And Ellis Briggs was a very capable man, was carrying on so his office really was (for all intents and purposes during these two or three months, before Braden actually left which I think was the first week in June), his office was running the ordinary work of relations with Latin America. In any event, Braden was invited over to the White House, the first week in June, and given the Medal of Freedom and told that he and Messersmith were both leaving the Service at the same time because, in other words, heads were really being knocked together and they were being let go because of this fight that was going on.

Well, this meant that there was going to be an overhaul in Latin American affairs. Ellis Briggs had been a very enthusiastic admirer of Braden, which rather surprised me because Ellis was much more a pragmatic than Braden. So it seemed necessary for him to get out. Another adviser of Braden's was a very capable Foreign Service Officer, who

was what you might call a natural, because he was not the studious, contemplative type, but he was an extremely practical fellow, named Jim Wright. It was decided that Ellis Briggs should leave, but continue, of course, in the Foreign Service. And there wasn't any opening amongst the embassies in Latin America. In fact there wasn't any opening in any embassy for Ellis at the moment, and he was rather desperate. And then, by an odd coincidence, a man who had, very briefly, early in his life been a Foreign Service Officer, but had subsequently been in business—I think in banking in Texas—had been named as Ambassador to Uruguay. He was about to embark on a ship to go to Uruguay from New Orleans, and in his hotel in New Orleans, he suddenly had a heart attack and died. And Ellis Briggs was immediately made Ambassador to Uruguay.

This left the question of who was going to be in charge of Latin American affairs. Well, Jim Wright also had been asked if he wanted to go out and he was offered the job of Ambassador to Nicaragua. He'd never been an Ambassador before. He was a Foreign Service Officer of about Class II. He had leukemia, he was in remission. He'd had leukemia for several years—three, four, or five years—and seemed to be in pretty secure remission. But he said that he had to stay in the United States, he couldn't go abroad with this disease. So he was put in charge of Latin American affairs, and I was made his deputy. This happened about the latter part of June or the first of July of '47. Well, Jim said to me, “I'm going to try to concentrate almost entirely on one major problem and that is the restoration of our relationship with Mexico on the subject of the oil properties that were taken away from all the American companies. I'm going to try to work out some kind of a more permanent arrangement by which there will be a modest amount of compensation to the companies, and perhaps a renewal of a cooperative relationship on the production of oil, and I'd like to have you take care of everything else if you can.” So that was what we started out with.

During the months of July and August there was a rather odd situation arose, where Jim felt that he had to sort of keep his hand in, although I was trying to decide what we could do about it, and just what we wanted to do. And that was that the Cubans, under

Grau San Martin, where I had just been the Counselor of Embassy in Havana—Grau San Martin was an odd fellow. He was, in a rather cautious way, quite leftist—or, rather, nationalistic—and had to keep up the tone that Cubans resented American interference in their affairs which was minimal. We did have the base in Guant#namo which they found a little offensive. They had always tried to act as though they were very independent, and they succeeded pretty much, except for that base. I guess I went into this in the previous session, the fact that we were really being pushed around by the Cubans in our day to day relationships. We bought all their sugar for the distribution we had to carry over from the war effort.Anyhow, the Cubans were engaged in an effort to overthrow the dictator of the Dominican Republic.

Q: That was Trujillo?

WOODWARD: Trujillo, yes. And the Cubans were mounting an invasion attempt on an island, a key, off the eastern end of Cuba. This was being done secretly, or supposedly secretly. Efforts were being carried out very largely by a fellow who was a great satellite of Grau San Martin, and his principal lieutenant Prio Socarras, the Minister of Interior. (The Minister of Education was their great money bag man. He was engaged in widespread corruption of appropriating money for school houses and never building them. The money was going into the coffers of Grau San Martin, and Prio Socarras.) Anyhow, they were mounting this invasion attempt on an island called the Candy Key, Cayo Confite, off the eastern end of Cuba. At that time we were not exactly protecting the dictator of the Dominican Republic, but we were very much against this type of international interference amongst the American republics, and were opposed to the idea of one country trying to overthrow the government of another regardless of the quality of the government they were overthrowing, or might be attempting to overthrow. This was something of a dilemma because nobody liked Trujillo personally.

Q: Excuse me, but I have often heard at the time that Trujillo had some very strong proponents in Congress. How did that affect you in the State Department?

WOODWARD: The State Department wasn't really tussling with these proponents, they were developed by the representatives of the dictators. There was a large claque, for example, General Franco of Spain. It was developed here by professional lobbyists who were able to develop these claques for foreign governments, presumably by campaign contributions. There were some 25 Congressmen who subscribed every year to a Congressional resolution of some kind, a sort of complimentary resolution, on the anniversary of the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, things like that. But the claque wasn't very large for Trujillo, as I recall; there was some people that he'd taken in and won over by favors, and by elaborate vacations in the Dominican Republic. He sort of bought them up. There was one very prominent doctor here in town who was a great advocate of Trujillo, but I believe he actually did some good work in a hospital in the Dominican Republic. The question of what to do about this Cuban plot to overthrow Trujillo was one of my first jobs. It was rather a dilemma and actually the efforts given to carry out this embarkation from Cayo Confite petered out. It was a thoroughly impractical scheme. I think they did send one boat over and it was apprehended on the beach in Haiti. I can't remember whether the Haiti government was trying to cooperate to some extent. Haiti was a next door neighbor; just out of self protection they wanted to maintain a friendly relationship on the same island with the Dominican Republic. I better not continue that because I'm not sure enough about my facts.

Anyhow, that problem dissipated. Along about the latter part of September in 1947, Jim Wright had a relapse in his general physical condition, and he told me he just had to take a vacation. He was going out to his wife's hometown in Missouri. He was going to take the train to Kansas City. I remember him looking rather wan the evening before he departed. He made a rather interesting comment to me. He said, “Bob, I just want you to remember as you continue to work here, this whole business is just dog eat dog.” And that was virtually his goodbye as he went to the railroad station with his wife to get on the train. And before he got to Kansas City he was dying, and he died either on the train or in the hospital in Kansas City of leukemia.

This news came to us on a Sunday morning. Norman Armour was then Assistant Secretary coordinating the work of all the political divisions in the Department, but I assume that he had been requested to keep a special eye on the work of the Latin American division. He'd been called in after Braden's departure to do this job, and I believe it was thought particularly that he ought to keep an eye on Latin American affairs. I remember on the Sunday when I got the word of Jim Wright's death, I was going over the pending work and wondering what to do next, and wondering whether I should go out to Kansas City for Jim's funeral, and sitting in my little cubbyhole in the State Department when Norman Armour came in on this Sunday morning and he said, “Bob, who do you think should be in charge of Latin American affairs? How about you?” I said, “No, Norman, I don't think I'm ready for it.” I was about Class III or II in the Foreign Service. I was rather a timid character. I was not terribly self-confident. So I said, “I don't think I'm ready for it. There are some good men around here. For example, there's George Butler. He's up on the Policy Planning Staff now. He's a very capable fellow, he could do it.” And Norman looked a little dubious...and I said, “There's Willard Beaulac,” I forget where he was at the moment, “...he's a very experienced Latin American expert.” But he was a very reserved man, sort of a totally self-contained man, a very capable fellow. But he was not a team worker at all. He did everything by himself, and very capable. So Norman thought, “No, he's not the man. He's not a team worker.” I don't think he said that, but that was the general idea. Then I said, “There's a very, very capable fellow who is arriving in town today from his post where he is Ambassador to Honduras, that's Paul Daniels. Paul is an incredibly hard worker, very practical. He knows exactly what he's doing all the time. He's coming up here for preliminary work in preparation for his being the U.S. representative to the meeting of the Economic and Social Council of the OAS,” (then the Pan American Union, it hadn't been reorganized to be the Organization of American States yet). I said, “I think he would be our man. I think he's a fellow that really could do this job the best.” I said, “Paul is arriving this noon. As a matter of fact I've invited him to come over to my mother-in-law's house where Virginia and I are still staying while we look for a house.” We hadn't even found a house yet. We were still with my mother-in-law. I said, “He's

coming over for lunch today." Norman said, "Well, proposition him. Tell him we want him to be director of Latin American Affairs." So here I was commissioned to solicit my boss. That's want happened and Paul came to lunch and I said, "Norman and I have just been talking this over and Norman would like to have you be director of Latin American Affairs." Paul said, "I'm very happy in Honduras. I like it there, I like my job and am enjoying it thoroughly. I don't want to be director of Latin American affairs but, of course, if I'm asked to do this, I've got to do it." I said, "You don't have to be so reluctant. You'll get a big job after this." And he said, "I don't want a bigger job." He's a rather obtuse fellow, but he's a good man, a very able fellow. Anyhow, he became the director of Latin American Affairs.

The next spring, time went on and we were handling work as it went along...as a matter of fact something very important was taking place at just this point. It was apparently being handled on a very high level because I had had nothing whatever to do with it. It was the conference in Rio de Janeiro which resulted in the Rio Treaty, which was the mutual defense, the basic treaty for the American Republics. General Marshall, the Secretary of State, was handling this with Bob Lovett, the Under Secretary, a very, very capable man who either had been, or was going to be Secretary of Defense. This treaty was being concluded and the next spring there was an Inter-American conference at which the whole Organization of American States was converted from the Pan American Union into a new type of organization, the basic element of which was formal equality between the United States and the Latin American countries. We were all in this together, and it was no longer a question of having the big chair at the head of the table of the Pan American Union occupied by the Secretary of State of the United States. But there was going to be a rotating chairmanship, and there was going to be a regular elected and more authoritative Secretary General. So this conversion was made. Of course, my boss Paul Daniels and Norman Armour, and General Marshall, all went to this conference in Bogota, Colombia where this reorganization was carried out. And that's where the rioting known as the "Bogotazo" happened.

I remember in the middle of the night I was awakened by a telephone call—and I was still in my mother-in-law's house up at 2409 Wyoming Avenue—and the telephone call came to somebody across the street, and they came over and awakened me. I don't know how that happened but apparently they couldn't get our house for some reason. They told me that the United States delegation was in a building that was burning down in Bogota. So I hurriedly put on my clothes, and rushed down to the State Department. We made a telephone connection promptly—without difficulty—with the people who were in this burning building. I talked with Paul Daniels, and he said, “This is a big building and the stores on the ground floor of this hotel where we are living- -the shops—are burning. I can see out the window, I can see the awning and there's a textile shop on the ground floor that's on fire. The fire department is trying to put it out, and we're marooned in this building. The Secretary of State, General Marshall, is in a residence in the residential district. The rest of the delegation is in another hotel, I don't know what condition that's in.”

Well, the upshot was that a chaotic mob of people were roaming around the streets of downtown Bogota. There was no objective to this group of people. They had seized a radio station, but they didn't have any objective, and they were all chagrined because a very popular candidate for the presidency, who had been mayor of Bogota named Gaitan, a strange leftist character who had become very popular, had been murdered. He'd been shot on the street by an unknown assassin. The motives of the assassin were never established. He was a workman, a house painter I believe, and shot Gaitan on the street that afternoon. Then buildings were set on fire and cars were overturned around the town and burned up. The assassin was promptly mobbed and killed. It was simply a manifestation of popular chagrin and sorrow in man that they had placed a lot of hope in, as a potential president, had been killed. And killed in a wanton, inexplicable way.

There were delegations there from other countries, and a delegation from Cuba, and as was the case in a number of delegations, there were appendages of people, who were sort of self-appointed delegates, and among them was a student delegation from

Cuba, and Castro was their representative. He had already been in jail for a while in Cuba because of a kind of abortive revolutionary attempt in Cuba, and he'd been let out. He was representing a student group sort of appended to the Cuban delegation to the conference. Whether it was appended officially, or whether it was actually part of it, or totally unsolicited, I don't know.

Anyhow, that gave reason for subsequent conjecture that he had been somehow responsible for the chaos that ensued. But it was chaos that just came from the grass roots. I think that Castro may have joined in, in some of the demonstrations of the people because the man who had been killed was a popular leftist type, and Castro would have had sympathy with a popular uprising.

This all calmed down after a day or two, and the delegation of the United States was not harmed, and no other delegation was harmed. There was talk of adjourning the whole thing down to Panama, but it was decided that they could go ahead and have their final plenary session and conclude the agreements which had already been organized by the committee. So it wound up in a reasonably peaceably way, but it was exciting for a while. The demonstration was totally inconclusive.

Q: Was there a retaliatory...because it begins to come back that the Colombian president was sought out in his house and killed, and his body dragged down the street by a mob.

WOODWARD: I can't recall accomplishing anything in the State Department about this demonstration except talking on the telephone repeatedly with the people who were in the building, and they got out all right and handled their affairs in a very stout and courageous way. Paul Daniels is a man with a lot of guts. It turned out that Paul was much more conservative than I had imagined he would be. At that time ideologies weren't seeming to matter very much. We were just handling practical problems, mostly economic problems, and Paul was very able at this sort of thing. He was also carrying on the work of being the Ambassador to the Organization of American States. He was carrying on two jobs at once,

but he could turn out more work in a day than any man I ever knew. He got into a lot of arguments and they grew in significance because he knew what to do, and he did it, and some of the people in other parts of the State Department who were initialing telegrams, didn't always agree with him. But Paul, I think, always, always had the right answer. He got into trouble with Willard Thorp who was the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. The upshot was that Paul wasn't very popular in the State Department, unfortunately.

In the broader ideological sense, his judgement was not the most perfect. For example, his principal object at this meeting in Bogota was to get across a resolution which he himself had designed, and which he got passed by the conference...I forget the number of it, but it had a famous number for a while—it was a resolution asserting that the nature of a government, the ideological nature of a government, should not be the criterion for reestablishing diplomatic relations.

Q: Okay, we were interrupted but you were talking about Daniels being more conservative and...

WOODWARD: ...yes, and about the question of his resolution, which is still on the books. This resolution says in essence (it's a very brief one), that when there is a revolutionary change in government that our decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with the new government should not have any relationship to the nature of that government. In other words that we should continue our diplomatic relations as consistently as possible, and not be concerned that an unattractive dictatorial government had come into power. The reason this shows a certain defect in judgement, is that the American public was composed of many different groups, and elements, and individuals who have their own opinions about this are very prone to express their opinions unfavorably about a government that comes in by brute military force and becomes a dictatorial government. Some hesitation, some delay in continuing diplomatic relations may be a useful method of expressing a public attitude on the part of the United States, even though other, “practical” considerations virtually require a continuing relationship.

Then there is one school of thought which is now very much manifested during the last 10 or 15 years, that our government is promoting democracies throughout the world, and that therefore it is obvious that when something that is inconsistent with this spirit of promoting democracy in a type of government that takes over, that there is going to be a lot of reluctance manifested on the part of groups, or individuals in the United States, having diplomatic relations, acting as though we're friendly with this new government. So the resolution is going against nature, you might say. I mean the resolution that Paul promoted.

One of the first instances that came up for using this resolution was the takeover of the Venezuela government by a military man named Perez Jimenez. So naturally our inclination was to promptly resume relations with Perez Jimenez despite the fact that he had kicked out an elected government. The Under Secretary, Bob Lovett perceived that there was a lot of press comment, and a general feeling that we should not be hasty about resuming relations with a government of this kind. We had quite a lot of discussion about it. As a matter of fact, I was carrying on most of the discussion with Lovett, as I recall. I took up to him a telegram in which we were seeking the advice of the Ambassador to Venezuela, who was Walter Donnelly. We were inclined to favor the idea of going ahead and having relations with Perez Jimenez. I remember Lovett expressing quite a little doubt to me about doing this. So we hesitated, and we waited. Obviously Lovett's judgement prevailed.

An interesting feature of this was, to me, and I was constantly watching the conduct of our Ambassadors abroad, and taking personal lessons of soaking up of what I thought was wise conduct, and what might not have been. I noticed that Donnelly would not take a stand on the question. Donnelly found ways of saying on the one hand, yes, on the other hand, no, and he would not take a stand. As a matter of fact he wasn't very helpful on this, and I made a mental note on it. He was a very able fellow, and of course, from his own

viewpoint, he was probably doing what was practical. In any event, I made a note. You're asking about the conduct of Ambassadors.

Q: I think there's a process that's going on all the time by Foreign Service Officers of looking at their superiors and saying, this works, this doesn't work, this is bad. I mean there's a learning process, and a formation process that's going on in every person.

WOODWARD: I was very fortunate in a way because I was exposed to the work of a couple dozen Ambassadors; I was a Deputy Chief of Mission in several places, and I was in the State Department on the country desks, on a variety of them, and that's where I could see what they did. I suppose each one of us has his own personality and character which may not be entirely the result of soaking up the actions of others, and examples of others. I always felt that even though you might be exposing yourself to criticism on the part of influential people, that you should take a stand. You should make use of the fact that you're abroad in the local situation in order to make your recommendation. It might not be the ideal recommendation from the viewpoint of those who are watching the American public, and people in our own country who have views on this subject. But in any event, I think later on when I was a Chief of Mission, I tried to make clear cut recommendations, even though they were sometimes quite unpopular here. But we delayed quite a long time before we resumed relations with the Venezuelan government and I think Lovett was quite correct in that this resolution of Daniels simply is unworkable. We've got to orchestrate our relations to a very large degree according to the ideologies, and actions, and the violence, of takeovers abroad, and according to reactions expressed in the media in the United States.

Of course, one of the facts that always entered into...actually it was the primary factor in Paul Daniel's thinking was, that we have interests in each one of these countries, and that we have to try to be watching out for those interests. And if we don't have relations we're handicapped in carrying out the relations, and therefore we should get closer to the

so-called Mexican policy which is the Estrada Doctrine, which is that there is no lapse in relations, that there is automatically a continuity in relations. That is the Estrada Doctrine.

Q: Maybe Daniel was also reacting against what was the Wilsonian principle when we rejected the Huerta government in Mexico because we didn't approve of it. This came under a lot of criticism later on as being an unworkable situation, and the pragmatists were opposed to the ideologists, particularly in Latin America.

WOODWARD: Actually, you bring up a point there in my own thinking.

Q: Continuation of interview with Robert Woodward. It's January 4th, 1991.

WOODWARD: You just mentioned the situation, and recognition or non-recognition, of the Huerta(?) government in Mexico, and that reminds me. I think I'm a prime example of a great defect that exists in Americans in that they do not profit by a past history. I wish now, of course, that I had been a much better student in university, and in my own private life, so that I would have known everything that went on in that Wilsonian period in our relations with Mexico because there were undoubtedly many, many lessons to be learned. I think we're rather inclined to sort of reinvent the wheel.

Q: In a way, in a very small manner but I think, in a practical way, this is what this oral history that we're doing right at this moment is about, is trying to collect the experiences and to have them available hopefully—I have to remark that I'm dubious about it—but for upcoming diplomats who can learn from the experience that has gone on.

WOODWARD: Actually I'm, you might say, astounded at the fact that I managed to get anywhere in the Foreign Service because I was superficial, and so really uneducated even though I'd gone to the University of Minnesota where there were great opportunities, and a wonderful library, and good teachers, but I simply did not apply myself. I was more interested in making my living. I had a job after school which I enjoyed and managed to do

well, and ran a little printing shop for a big wholesale house. In any event, I marvel at the fact that it's possible for somebody to get ahead despite these defects.

Q: Well, it's a fast moving time, and also this is how maybe Americans work. I mean we charge ahead rather than to intellectualize and to learn. Sometimes it's effective. Sometimes it's not.

WOODWARD: And also it can be at great cost, and right at this moment we're in a situation...

Q: We're speaking about the Gulf crisis between Iraq and the United States.

WOODWARD: And when one thinks of the possibility of a war in which literally thousands of the young Americans can be killed, it's just heartbreaking. It's absolutely heartbreaking. And one wonders whether we've just presumed to bite off more than we can chew in becoming the world's policemen.

Q: I don't want to dwell on this because I want to come back to Latin America just before 1950. Were there any other issues that occupied you during this time before you went off to the War College?

WOODWARD: I don't think of any major issues. There was a constant stream, of course, of being in charge and relatively minor problems that arose. I can think of one thing that did develop which might be of some general interest. There was a rather rapid change—I believe it was at that time—the sequence of Secretaries of State. When Secretary Jimmy Byrnes, who had been a Senator and an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court...

Q: This would have been quite a bit earlier.

WOODWARD: Well, there was a period there when I think he initiated a practice of trying to develop a policy paper for each region and each country. It was during the period that I was working for Paul Daniels when I was assigned, along with one of the members of

our staff, Louis Halle who was a very good writer and later described by Mr. C.P. Snow of England as “one of the world's great thinkers,” to write these policy papers. Lou Halle and I found it extremely difficult to decide what our policy was, what our policies were. I still find it difficult to decide what our policies are. It was a very interesting exercise though because it brought out varying attitudes. One of them, for example, was expressed by George Butler who was then on the Policy Planning Staff and had been in his career almost entirely in Latin America. He said it was not a question of having objectives, it was a question of having rules of conduct which would prevail in any situation that arose. In other words, that we would deal fairly with the other guy whenever some problem arose. Things of that sort. In other words, there was no objective.

Q: It sounds like the difference between going out and doing something as opposed to maintaining a set of relationships unless there were overriding reasons not to.

WOODWARD: I think that's right. As a matter of fact, I think the Good Neighbor Policy, which we still thought was in existence—I say we still thought, because it soon developed as the ideological contest in the world began to develop after the Missouri speech by Winston Churchill, and the Iron Curtain speeches, and the general feeling that the Russians were engaged in a sinister attempt to take over the world, that the Good Neighbor policy gradually began to dissipate. We weren't quite aware of that in Latin America. I mean we Foreign Service Officers were still acting under the Good Neighbor Policy when it developed that the CIA, for example, was not operating under this policy, that they were fighting communism, and they were planning a coup to overthrow a man who seemed to be playing footsie-footsie with communism, Arbenz in Guatemala, and proceeded to carry out eventually his overthrow. This, of course, was quite at odds with the Good Neighbor Policy. We still were unaware of that. We still thought that we could sort of pick up the vestiges of it, and continue as the good neighbors.

As a matter of fact, there is a strange dichotomy even today...well, now that the communist threat seems to be dissipating, there isn't this dichotomy quite as much. For a long period,

40 or 50 years, that it ensued...40 years I'd say...there has been a powerful element of trying to be the good neighbor, and trying to be helpful, and trying to help the Latin American countries to grow in prosperity, and now in democratic development, and at the same time we've been fighting communism. That was the dichotomy that existed, which led to a somewhat confusing policy at times, or confusing relationships.

I remember our struggling over these policy papers, and having such a hard time with them. We spent a lot of time, and Lou Halle and I had a lot of discussion about this which has led to a lasting friendship with Lou Halle, whose whole life has changed completely. He was subsequently, after I left, put on the Policy Planning Staff, and there he ran into Senator McCarthy. He ran into McCarthy when Scott McLeod came into the State Department to supervise personnel and security, and Scott McLeod was a very unusual character who, among other things, made a speech out in Iowa in which he said he was speaking not as a government official, but as a red-blooded U.S. citizen...maybe he didn't use the word “red- blooded”. He said the Foreign Service should be infused with real Americans, football players, and cowboys, and people who really represented the soul of American ideals.

Q: Main Street America.

WOODWARD: ...Main Street America, and he went on with this theme, perhaps well-intentioned, but in an amateurish way. The upshot was that Lou Halle, who at that time was on the Policy Planning Staff, and who was not a Foreign Service Officer, he was a Departmental Officer, had nevertheless been named a member of the board of the Foreign Service Journal because he was a good writer. He was a very good writer, and he'd written a very popular little book called Spring in Washington, which is still widely circulated, and a gem of a book about the first signs of spring in this region. He was a great naturalist, and a great bird watcher. In any event, Lou, incensed by this speech of McCarthy, told his fellow members on the board of the Foreign Service Journal that he was going to write an answer to this, and he would like if possible to have it published in

the Journal. So Lou wrote his answer tearing apart the speech of McLeod, and saying he was not speaking as an official of the State Department, or even of the Foreign Service Association, but he was speaking as an American citizen, a man on the street, refuting these assertions of Scott McLeod. The upshot was that McLeod obviously didn't like it. So Lou was sort of subtly frozen out of his work. He was not given any assignments on the Policy Planning Staff, and he began to realize that he was becoming persona non grata in the current officialdom of the State Department. So he thought of his old friend who had been an Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, and who was then the head of the Rockefeller Foundation, none other than Dean Rusk. He called up Dean Rusk and he said, “I'm obviously not popular around here,” and he explained why, and he said, “Do you think I could get a job teaching somewhere?” And Rusk said, “You pick out the university where you want to teach, and the Rockefeller Foundation will finance it.” So Lou, entranced by this idea, thought, “Well, my family is enjoying Washington, my kids are in school here, so I'd like to go to the University of Virginia, and I can commute.” So Lou went to the University of Virginia, and at first he wasn't even a teacher, he had a study and research assignment. Then he became a teacher, and then he was asked by an institute of international relations which had become pretty well known and popular in Geneva, Switzerland, if he would come over for a year as an exchange professor. So he accepted this opportunity and there he was sufficiently well liked so he was asked to extend it. And then, as time went on and he was quite happy there, he was asked if he would become a permanent member of the staff, and he accepted. Then he and his family became Swiss citizens, and they still are Swiss citizens. He has written some very large number of books. He wrote one, an almost incredible tone, called “Out of Chaos, which is a story of the development of the world out of the original gas in the nebula. So he had to study astronomy, geology, biology, every science known to man, virtually, to write this huge volume Out of Chaos, and the ultimate development of the various civilizations and religions that exist throughout the world, and all of the industrial development. So, I've had a little correspondence with Lou, and when he came back to the States to accept an award

from the Audubon Society for one of his splendid books on the birds of Antarctica he lived at our house.

Last summer I went to visit a lady of whom I was fond in Switzerland, and took advantage of the opportunity to spend two or three days in their mountain retreat, near Martigny in Switzerland.

Q: I want to move you out of Switzerland, and back to Latin America. Before we leave this particular time, this was still during the Democratic administration—the Truman administration. How did you see the interest of the President, the Secretary of State, and Congress, in Latin America at this particular time, because we'd like to get some other point, maybe talk about how it was later on.

WOODWARD: Well, obviously, the interest was manifested primarily in the Rio Treaty and the reorganization of the Organization of the American States. And at that time I think we were hoping that through these multinational arrangements, relationships between the American Republics and the United States, and between themselves, would be handled more by the group rather than under sort of, not exactly supervision, but leadership from the United States. It would be more of a group so that we could leave our relationships more, to a large extent, to the many, many American companies and organizations that had relations throughout Latin America, and the development would take care of itself through the thousands of individuals who were working on it rather than being a matter that the U.S. government per se had to pay so much attention to. Before the war, of course, we'd had a sort of hemispheric policy; that is, President Washington's farewell admonition to “avoid foreign entanglements” was still having its residual effect, and the strength of the United States had not compelled our Government to be a world power. From George Washington's time, from Monroe's time as our international relations developed they were first largely with Latin America and we tried to stay away from the embroilments of Europe.

Well, of course, we were head over heels in the rivalries of Europe in World War II, so that the natural evolution was that primary attention was going to be paid to our relationships with Europe, and eventually with the Soviet Union, and the Marshall Plan that ensued became the great centerpiece of our relationship. So that Latin American relations were obviously secondary, as compared to before the war. A great deal of attention had been paid in the Roosevelt administration to relations with Latin America, which was, of course, the Good Neighbor Policy, and which had helped engender cooperation during World War II with all except the most remote countries which had long had a sort of spiritual pipeline with Europe. The Argentines always considered themselves to be the second Paris of the world, and the Chileans were in some respects a close second although they'd had a much more of a relationship with the U.S. than the Argentines had. But they were stand-offish.

In any event, there was a very large relationship with Latin America. And the people who were working on Latin American affairs were, many of them, officers who had never served in Europe; there were several outstanding examples: George Butler, Willard Beaulac, Paul Daniels, and in later years Maurie Bernbaum. Each had had maybe one post which was not in Latin America. Maurie Bernbaum was first assigned to Singapore, for example. I don't think that Maurie ever had another post outside of the Western Hemisphere.

Q: I don't think so either.

WOODWARD: Willard Beaulac, during World War II, was Counselor of Embassy in Madrid, and interestingly enough, although he had one of the most outstanding careers as an Ambassador in Latin America, the one in which he took the most pride was his position as Counselor of Embassy in Madrid. His last book—he wrote three or four books, the earlier ones all about Latin America—his last book was about our relations with Madrid in which he tended to go a little bit overboard in eulogizing the cooperation we were getting from Franco during the latter days of the war when Franco saw that the Germans

were losing. In the early days of the war General Franco was very much pandering to the Germans but he was a crafty, canny fellow who in talking with Hitler on the train near the Spanish border—when Hitler controlled all of France—gave Hitler such a hard time. I don't know what the contention was, but I think maybe Hitler wanted Franco to become more overtly a member of the Axis group, and therefore be better able to frustrate the American landings in North Africa. But Franco was very astute in keeping clear of this entanglement, and it was said afterwards that Hitler exclaimed that he'd rather go to his dentist any day in the week than have another discussion with Franco.

Q: I keep putting you back on the question. Did you feel that ARA bureau was holding its own with the other bureaus when you were there? This is the '47 to '49 period. Or was Europe and maybe perhaps Asia getting the attention?

WOODWARD: Well, Europe and Asia were getting the attention but the Latin American bureau was not only holding its own, it was operating quite independently from day to day, and one of the pleasures of working in Latin American affairs was that we were able to run our affairs without too much complication with other parts of the Departments of the government, because attention was being focused on Europe and Asia, except for, on a higher secretive level, the operation of the CIA, and this we considered to be handicapping our Good Neighbor relationship with Latin America. And we did not perceive the danger of communism in Latin America to the extent that it was being perceived by the CIA, or by people for example like General Smith, who was Under Secretary of State; Bedell Smith, who had been the head of the CIA.

Q: And also had come from being Ambassador to Moscow, too.

WOODWARD: Yes. So it was under Smith's regime that the plot against Arbenz prospered, and which really tended almost to wreck...

Q: That came somewhat later than the period we're talking about, I think, because we're talking about '47 to '49. You left ARA and you went to the War College for a year from “49

to “50. Then you went to Stockholm as Deputy Chief of Mission. How did that assignment come about? That was really yanking you out of...

WOODWARD: You see my boss, Paul Daniels, became quite unpopular because he was a rather firm, decisive party, and as I say, I thought he knew what he was doing most of the time, but other people in the State Department weren't always in agreement. The result was that he was going to be replaced in charge of Latin American affairs. I was his deputy, and I liked him very much, and he delegated a great deal of work to me—just the day to day work. I remember the only compliment I can recall Paul giving me. One day he said, “You know, you're the most conscientious person I've ever known.” I thought that was a compliment. He'd give me tiresome chores, like writing all the efficiency reports on everybody that had to be sent in on all the Foreign Service people, and I'd write these things out and I'd have to work at night a lot of times to do it. Anyhow, we had a very good relationship, and as I say, I liked him as a friend, and always did.

So the question came up, who is going to be in charge of Latin American affairs? Well, here again, one person after another was considered and rejected. I think Norman Armour was still there and Norman and I discussed this repeatedly. Finally the person that seemed to be just about the ideal was Walter Donnelly, who was Ambassador to Venezuela. So Walter Donnelly was brought up to the State Department to discuss this. He occupied an office adjoining Paul Daniels, which was sort of painful. He was being considered to replace the man who was doing the work right next door, and Paul was being asked to continue as the Ambassador to the Organization of American States to work with whoever was taking his place. It was a very trying situation and we just had to try to keep a straight face on this. And I had several discussions with Donnelly about the work. Donnelly didn't want the job and he knew it had no future whatever. So Donnelly said, “I have a terrible problem. I've got to see my doctor about this. When I get under tension, and this is a job that will create tension, I get a terrible skin rash, it's very annoying and very irritating. I'm afraid that I just can't handle this because I'm sure that I'm going to get this malady as soon as I get underway on this job.” He was talking with Armour and other people around

about the job—he was there about a week as I recall. He finally said that the doctor told him he shouldn't take the job, and he went back to Venezuela and a short time afterward he was made High Commissioner to Austria which was a very important job because the communists were still sharing it. I don't think the agreement for them to move out...which was the only country they ever evacuated after World War II, I don't think that had been concluded yet.

Q: No, no. It came later. It came during the Eisenhower administration which would have been after '53, because Dulles went to that, I'm sure.

WOODWARD: In any event, Donnelly did not suffer from the refusal on the job and went back to Venezuela, and it wasn't many months before he was asked to go to Austria. And finally a man from the outside, who had been brought up in Cuba, whose father was the local manager of one of the biggest sugar companies there—who I had known very well in my assignment in Cuba, Mr. Miller—Eddie Miller, who was a lawyer working in the Dulles firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, was asked to be Assistant Secretary. Then I was asked by him and the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, who was Jack Peurifoy, if I wanted to stay under Eddie Miller, if I would continue to be deputy, and I said (you know I felt very badly about the treatment of Paul in this because I liked him and thought he was very able), “No, I think I better go to another assignment, perhaps the National War College (my name had already been put on the list of candidates), I said I'd like to go there, I'd like to go to the War College and then get an assignment in some other part of the world.” I'd always wanted to go to Europe sometime, and maybe I could get assigned to some good posts. I didn't even mention Paris at that point, I thought that was getting a little bit ahead of myself to say that, but that is what I had in the back of my head.

So then Peurifoy called me up one day and he said, “Bob, would you like to go as Counselor of Embassy to Rio de Janeiro under Herschel Johnson?” I said, “I think I'd like to go to the War College.” And also Jack said, “Would you like to be Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern affairs?” I said, “Jack, what are you talking about? I

don't know the first damn thing about the Arab world. I just don't think I'm qualified for that job. What's more, I think I'd be quite content to go to the War College." Here I had the offer of continuing as deputy, going as Counselor to Rio, being Deputy Assistant Secretary for Middle Eastern affairs. And I chose the War College.

The War College was a very good year. It's a wonderful sabbatical year. The very first week I found it fascinating, and particularly in retrospect in that I learned more about atomic energy in the first week at the War College, than I've ever learned at any other time of my life. I read the Smith report, which is really an incredible report because it was written in concert with all of the atomic energy scientists—it was written basically by Mr. Smith of Princeton University, who was in the heart of the atomic investigation and research—but gone over by all of the others, Oppenheimer and Fermi, and Heller. It was supposed to be establishing the limits of what could be revealed to the public, and where we have to stop in revealing it so there would not be any further question in press interviews, or in conversations between officials who have worked on atomic energy program, and the public, as to how much they can tell. This is it, and all you have to do is hand them the Smith Report and that's the maximum. And the maximum was a hell of a lot.

Q: I want to keep coming back to our stream.

WOODWARD: This is part of my career. Anyhow, going on about Latin American affairs—is that what you want me to talk about?

Q: Not really no, I mean after the War College...in the first place, how did you find the War College outside of a good sabbatical? Did you find this gave you a better viewpoint of the military, and how they operate?

WOODWARD: Immensely. Of course, it was called the War College. I don't know what it is called now. They changed the name, and they've got a different...

Q: And there's a Defense College.

WOODWARD: In any event, it should not have been called the War College. I think Defense College would have been better because it was primarily a course in international relations. There was a good deal of discussion of the military in the course of the lectures, and the committee projects that were taken on. But basically it was international relations. I think the students were the cream of the crop of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and there were a few from other agencies but not many, and there were a couple of Canadians, and a couple of British as participants, and they were a party to everything that went on. There were no holds barred. It was not only very interesting, and very mind-stretching, because we learned more than a smattering about our relations all over the world— particularly for someone like myself who had been concentrating on Latin American affairs, and who had not been a very good student in the university, it was really a revelation. Because outstanding officers of the armed services were there, one received an immensely better impression of the quality, the mentality, and the intelligence, and the judgement of these service people. They were really outstanding men, and they compared in every respect favorably with the intelligent people in the State Department. So one's confidences in the services was immensely improved. My relationships had been largely with Military Attach#s. Military Attach#s in those days were officers who were supposed to have concentrated on intelligence work and reporting, but often they were people who had one Military Attach# job after another and who were very good at establishing personal friendships, who were men with very pleasant personalities in a large part. Well, in a word, they were usually not the outstanding members of the services, but they had their own fine qualities for establishing personal relationships, and for presumably ingratiating themselves enough so they might obtain information of an intelligence nature which would be helpful to headquarters. So knowing this other type of officers in the War College was really a great boon to the relationships between the State Department and the armed services.

Q: It was confidence building for one thing. How did you get your appointment...you went to Stockholm as the Deputy Chief of Mission in July of 1950, and you were there until June of 1952. How did that assignment come about?

WOODWARD: Well, the man who was the administrative officer in the European division was a rather energetic and persuasive fellow and he knew that I wanted an assignment in Europe. I think I made it known that I'd like to go to Paris, but he had the job of finding people for various jobs. He had offered my name to the Ambassador in Stockholm as a possible replacement to the man who was there as Counselor, Hugh Cummings. The Ambassador was H. Freeman Matthews. Doc Matthews, who was one of the more outstanding, and more highly respected European officers, and he was given, I think, three names and he chose my name to be his Counselor. I'd known him somewhat because during the time when he was in charge of European affairs, just before he went to Stockholm, we had a system of a weekly meeting between the heads of the various regional political offices in the State Department, and their deputies—there were five, the International Organization's secretary who at that time had been Dean Rusk. The five directors or Assistant Secretaries got together and had a lunch, there was a table for ten people. Well, we added the Director General of the Foreign Service—we had eleven people when everybody was there. We had a luncheon every week. And, in the meantime, if there were any overlapping problems we freely discussed them between deputies, or between the men in charge. In other words if the deputy were available—in this case it was Tommy Thompson who later was Ambassador to Moscow, his final post, and Doc Matthews, two of the outstanding Europeanists. Well, Doc complimented me by asking for my services as his Counselor. This was a very attractive post, and working with a man like Matthews would be a great benefit. If I'd gone to Paris I would be down in the staff somewhere. So naturally I didn't hesitate a moment, I'd forget about going to Paris. I'd done my major paper, and my presentation at the War College on politics in France—a rather poor job, as I recall because it didn't have much to do with relations with the United States. It was just about internal politics in France.

Of course, this was all happening at the end of the War College in June. I think we got our assignments perhaps as early as the end of May. Anyhow, before June was passed, Doc Matthews was assigned back to the State Department as Deputy Under Secretary of State, sort of a general supervisory job. His replacement was then Walt Butterworth. Well, Walt Butterworth during this period when we had these weekly luncheons, and all were well acquainted, Walt Butterworth was in charge of Far Eastern affairs. He'd been working with Dulles on the Japanese treaty. So the upshot was that, if anything, I knew the new man better than I knew...or as well, as I'd known Matthews. So it was a very pleasant arrangement. When I went over there, Hugh Cummings was in charge, and Hugh told me that he wanted to stay in charge until Butterworth arrived. But he said, “You can do the work. We have a boat here and we'll go out in our boat and we'll go around the end of Sweden, and you can be for all intents and purposes, Charg#, although I will be nominally Charg#.” Well, he was getting the Charg# pay while he went out in his boat, and I was doing the work.

As a matter of fact, when I came back after this assignment to be Chief of Foreign Service Personnel, the only specific accomplishment that I can recall was that I got the regulations totally rewritten, simplified, and greatly improved according to my own lights, on the question of Charg# pay. At that time it wasn't possible to draw Charg# pay until you had been in charge at least a month, and maybe more than that.

Q: Charg# pay being extra pay when the Ambassador is out.

WOODWARD: You got the difference between your pay and one-half of what the Ambassador was getting. In other words, if you were getting less than half of the Ambassador, you would get up to a half.

Anyhow, I got that regulation changed so that one would receive...the problem was that at one point during my stay in Stockholm, Butterworth was asked to be the chief of a delegation in Geneva to a conference on telecommunications. This was the assignment

of radio frequencies, and the decision between countries as to radio frequencies so they wouldn't be interfering with each other in the air waves. It was a long, long drawn out conference and the chief of the delegation, of course, only came in on significant problems. He had numerous experts, and some very good experts. I remember one was Francis DeWolfe who was the great expert on telecommunications, in the State Department, who was there as a lieutenant to Butterworth on this conference. But Butterworth would come back to Stockholm. He wanted to keep his hand in. He would come back just on the eve of the time I was going to begin to receive Charg# pay, and he'd have a party or two, and then he'd go back to Geneva. So I never got any Charg# pay, and he was gone at least three months, maybe more. So I thought, “This is something that doesn't work properly.” I had a lot of interesting experiences there.

Q: Were there any, at that particular time...we're talking about '50 to '52, the Korean War had started, NATO was getting built up, were there any particular things that you saw that were developing between Sweden and the United States that you think might be of note?

WOODWARD: Yes. Of course, the Korean War was very much in everybody's mind, because that had begun just as our session in the War College was finishing. I can remember particularly one Marine Corps officer, who I admired very much. He was a very stout, practical fellow, named Tom Worman. And Tom Worman looked just like the picture of a bulldog Marine. His photograph ornamented any publicity material for the Marine Corps. And as the War College ended, Tom said to me one day, “You know, we've studied every conceivable situation in international relations here, except the one that is just developing.” But we never dreamed this one was going to come about. He was put in charge of Operations of the Marine Corps during the Korean War. In fact a lot of our people there went right into the Korean Conflict. The Air Force deputy in the command of the Marine Corps was put in charge of all the Air Force operations in Korea. The man who was the Naval deputy- -the Army man was a Commandant—and the Naval deputy was

put in charge of all the naval forces over in Korean waters. In other words, it was a primary recruiting ground.

In Sweden, before Butterworth got there and during this period when Cummings said, “You do the work, and I'll go off in my boat, and it will be interesting and a good experience for you.” Well, I was happy with that situation but Hugh hadn't yet turned over his apartment to me, which was the only place I could possibly have lived, there wasn't anyplace available and we had to live in a summer resort out in the great delta, little islands at the mouth of the river. Stockholm is on a river going into the ocean, but it is quite a river in Stockholm where it is dumping into the Baltic, but beyond that there is this myriad of islands, and out there about 18 miles from town was the Hotel—Saltsj#baden means salt water bathing. We managed to get two little rooms in the hotel—I don't know if we even had two rooms because we had come over with a Swedish maid who was returning from employment by friends of my mother-in- law's here, an Army General who had long had this Swedish maid, and she was going back to retire in Sweden and she went on the boat with us and we employed her to take care of our children. And she very kindly said she owned a little house out in the suburbs, and she would take our children to the house to take care of them because we couldn't find any place to stay. We stayed briefly in a little downtown hotel for a day or two and then we got this place out in a summer resort. I think we were living there about two months, including the entire period when Cummings was out in his boat, and I was waiting for Butterworth to come, and Hugh Cummings to leave and turnover his apartment.

During this period I, of course, was following the work of the people in the Embassy, and there was a young officer in the economic section who was writing reports on Swedish trade with the Eastern European countries. There were two products which were being shipped from Sweden which were probably of immense strategic use to the Iron Curtain countries, and particularly to the Soviet Union. These products were going to Eastern Germany, as I recall. There was a fine quality of steel wire made out of Swedish steel (which I believe was the highest quality steel in the world), coming from mines in northern

Sweden, and this very, very fine wire was used in the United States in creating a wire mesh through which, with a coating of some kind of gelatinous material on the mesh, was used to strain uranium converted into gas to strain out the fissionable material from the non-fissionable material in uranium. In other words, to get the U-235 and therefore be able to enrich the basic material by a constant straining through hundreds of these meshes under pressure. This created the material which was fissionable because with a little more enrichment it became subject to a chain reaction. So this steel wire was a very important strategic material.

Also, the SKF ballbearing company in Sweden is one of the best known ballbearing companies in the world. I don't know what other products it makes besides ballbearings, but they were making out of this same quality of steel, minute ballbearings which were indispensable for such as bomb sights for certain instruments for scientific research, were absolutely invaluable. So the tiny ballbearings, and the very fine steel wire, were two materials which if we could find some way of keeping them from being shipped to Eastern Germany, where they would automatically be put into the enhancement of the products which would be further advanced and sent on to the Soviet Union, we would be making a contribution to the cold war. The cold war, of course, was already developing.

So I suggested to Butterworth, when he arrived, that since we were no longer even hoping to get Sweden into the NATO Alliance—they had firmly resisted that, and they had held out, hoping that they were going to have a parallel alliance with Denmark and Norway, a Scandinavian alliance, and this had been basically frustrated by the fact that both Denmark and Norway had come into NATO so there was no longer any hope of a separate alliance. They had established “neutrality” in the person of their Foreign Minister —his name was synonymous with Sweden neutrality, and we'd gotten to the point— although Doc Matthews had done his best, I think, to convert the Swedes—we'd given up any hope of getting them into NATO. So when Walt Butterworth got there, that was no longer anything to be worked on. I said I thought this would be a pretty good project

for him to try to get the Swedes to cooperate in stopping these shipments of these very important strategic materials. I believe Walt dealt with that very successfully.

Anyhow time went on and we had...I don't recall any other important matters that arose in our relationship with Sweden. Ralph Bunche came over and had a great goodwill tour. The Swedes feted him greatly. Of course, it was their method of showing their disapproval of our discrimination against the Blacks. And their was their famous sociologist who wrote...

Q: ...it's a bible. I can't think of it right now.

WOODWARD: The American Dilemma.

Q: Bunche also had replaced Count Bernadotte (who had been assassinated in Palestine), too, who was a Swede.

WOODWARD: Was Bernadotte actually working for the United Nations? He did a great job in saving a lot of Jews.

Q: He was there, I think, at least in part and Bunche took his place. I'm not absolutely sure, but I think that was true.

WOODWARD: That is still considered to be a great mystery as to what happened to him. I think, through some circumstances, probably local Soviet authority, I think he was killed.

Q: There's also some feeling that it could have been members of the present Israeli government when they were in their role as terrorists were also involved in that. I'm not sure.

WOODWARD: I don't know why the Israelis would ever...he was so helpful to the Jews.

Q: We were talking at a time when it looked like he was going to settle the Palestine problem. This is at the very early time, and these were people who were in the terrorist element. Well, anyway, I'm just not sure of my ground there.

I was just thinking, why don't we cut it off because I would like to talk to you, particularly next time, about your time in Personnel although it was a relatively short time, I think it was rather important during the height of the McCarthy period. And then we'll cover back in ARA and that will tie into your previous interview. Okay?

This is tape 5, of an interview with Ambassador Robert F. Woodward concerning his career. It is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies. Today is January 25th, 1991.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, we've reached the point now where you have returned to Washington to be Chief of Foreign Service Personnel. This is in 1952, which was a bad time to be coming back to this job. How did you get this job, and what was the situation?

WOODWARD: When you say, how did I get this job, there is a faint implication that it was something to be coveted which is contrary.

Q: No, no. How did this job come to you?

WOODWARD: Before I went to Sweden, I had been in the War College and the State Department Liaison Officer, one of the deputy directors of the War College, was Elbridge Durbrow, who was assigned immediately after the War College to be Chief of Foreign Service Personnel. I had, of course, become well acquainted with Durbrow during the year at the War College and evidently he thought that I had the qualifications to be Chief of Foreign Service Personnel. So he selected me as his successor and got his superiors to more or less order me into the job. One of the ideas that Durbrow developed to make the job a little more palatable and attractive was that I should go on a trip to learn about the posts in parts of the world where I had never been assigned, and that was the Far East,

the Middle East. So I took a trip around the world for a month before I entered upon my duties as Chief of Foreign Service Personnel, accompanied by another young man who was working in the State Department administration and took advantage of this opportunity to get a trip around the world.

It was a very interesting experience for me. We started out by going from the west coast to Japan, and Korea, and then to Hong Kong and to Vietnam, Burma, India, Pakistan, and on through Rome back to the United States. All of these posts in the Middle East and the Far East were all completely new to me and the only time that I have ever seen that part of the world was on this trip.

Q: What were your impressions of the personnel, how things were run, morale, etc.?

WOODWARD: Well, of course, in these superficial visits that I made I didn't see a great deal of difference between the way the people were living and operating as compared with Latin America. Obviously there were great differences, in the sense that living conditions differed, I would say, primarily in the number of people who were available—the servants, the lower living standards of the generality of people—with the result that the Americans were living in conditions that were somewhat more of a contrast to the generality of the populations. But otherwise I didn't perceive many subtleties of different lives in the Far East and the Middle East.

Q: You settled in to the position of Chief of Foreign Service Personnel in the summer of '52 about?

WOODWARD: Yes, the summer of '52 and I had the job only about a year and it was during the period—in the middle of that period from July of '52 to July of '53 President Eisenhower came into office, and President Truman left. This was more or less the culmination of the campaign of McCarthy against what he considered to be liberal communist tendencies in the State Department. McCarthy, of course, had made his career trying to take advantage of his charges that there were communists in the State

Department to gain popular acclaim in the United States, and he was surprisingly successful in doing so. So much so that he gave the same idea to Nixon who was campaigning for the presidency because Nixon was a great pal of McCarthy's. I mean they were close enough so that Nixon was getting a lot of political pointers from McCarthy.

Q: That's right. He was the Vice Presidential candidate.

WOODWARD: Yes, and Nixon made his career as an anti-communist, and with Helen Douglas, and the male politician out in California that he...

Q: Jerry Voorhis.

WOODWARD: ...that he campaigned against. That's how he began to gain prominence, and he gained prominence by his charges against Hiss. But, anyhow, here we were in the State Department handling personnel, where McCarthy was accusing us of having within that group of personnel some...what was it? 93 communists? When that Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, John Peurifoy, said these people, which McCarthy has charged with communism, aren't communists, they're just homosexuals, which I thought was sort of faint praise, or rather faint defense.

Q: When you arrived...you arrived before Eisenhower took over?

WOODWARD: That's right, six months before.

Q: At that point were you given any sort of directions, or how you were going to handle these attacks that were coming out of the Republican Party on the personnel problem?

WOODWARD: Oh, absolutely none. Nothing was said to me at all. We were just handling the problems from day to day, and denying these charges, and doing our utmost...particularly my deputy who was a remarkably able fellow named Bob Ryan, a man who had a law degree and who was a great administrative officer. He was our daily liaison with the security division, and was paying very close attention to any charges that came

up against any individual, and seeing to it that they were thoroughly looked into, and these individuals, when there was no proof whatever of justification for charges against them, but they were constantly watched. He personally took it upon himself to keep tabs on every one without trying to molest them in a way that would detract from their performance of their duties. He was being very, very careful to make sure that no charge that could possibly be justified was not thoroughly looked into. This was the only way in which I had any awareness of the problem of McCarthy.

When the change in administrations occurred we hadn't expected the methods; that the McCarthy group—meaning Cohn and Schine, his two prominent assistants, and McCarthy would take immediately upon the change in administration. The object of their strategy was to prove that we could never prove that they were wrong. So, therefore, they got, by some tactic that I've never quite understood, they persuaded the file clerk who had charge of the files in the personnel division, to come to their committee at a hearing, and testify that we kept the files so chaotically that we were taking out papers, and were putting in papers in the individual files so it could never be proved that McCarthy was wrong in making charges that there were at least 93 communists amongst all these people about whom we had files. This method of getting the file clerk to make a declaration that we were completely chaotic was their method.

Q: Was this Mrs. Baylog?

WOODWARD: Mrs. Baylog. Whether she volunteered this, or how they worked this, I never knew. But then the procedure was to make this appear to be something like an authentic hearing; to bring in one after the other, starting with the lowest personnel in the personnel division, the people who took care of efficiency reports, and to try to interrogate them in ways that would show that the files were kept very carelessly. The files weren't kept carelessly at all, they were kept with the utmost conscientiousness on the part of the people who were working on them.

One of the first people that we called in was a man named Vladimir Toumanoff, a man with a Russian name. Cohn & Schine said to him in his hearing (and mind you he was at this hearing completely unaccompanied by anyone; I had not been able to persuade the new Legal Adviser of the State Department to give these people any legal advice, or have them accompanied by anybody from the Legal Division. In fact, I had gone over and visited Herman Phleger in his office a few days after he'd taken office, and said that these people were being really victimized by the committee because they had no experience before in hearings, and that they ought to have at least someone beside them who could give some advice. Phleger, in response to my plea, picked up the telephone and called Mr. Dulles, the Secretary of State, while I sat there and he talked to Mr. Dulles about this on the phone. He laid down the phone, and he said to me, “Mr. Dulles said that McCarthy will have a free hand in the State Department to investigate anything he wants, and that these people need not have any legal advice.” So I went back to my office fruitlessly. I mean, I failed in my little mission)...

Anyhow, here was Toumanoff being queried about his background. He was asked, “Where were you born, Mr. Toumanoff?” Mr. Toumanoff replied, “Well, my mother was fleeing from the Soviet Union. My father had been a game keeper for one of the members of the royal family, and my mother was leaving and she was in Constantinople when I was born. She was on her way to the United States.” So, “How did that happen? Where were you born? How could you have been born in Constantinople.” He said, “As a matter of fact my mother said I was born in the Soviet Legation in Constantinople.” And they said, “What date were you born?” And he told them. That date was after the Soviet revolution. “That Legation was a Soviet Legation, and you are a communist.” Tubanov said, “I certainly wasn't a communist. My mother was fleeing from Soviet Russia.” But he said, “I don't know how this could have happened.”

So the hearing was over, and Vladimir, Vlad as we called him, called me from the capital just after the hearing, and he told me this. And he said, “How could this happen? I know

my mother was not a communist, and I'm certainly not a communist. But how could I have been born in the Soviet Legation after the communist revolution? I said, “I don't know, but I can find out for you because I know a man in the Middle Eastern work who is a great historian and knows all about that period. His name is Will Wright. I'll give Will Wright a call right away, and ask him if he can explain this.” So I called Will right away while Tubanov was coming back to his work in the office from the Hill, and Wright said, “That's an easy one. The Russian Minister in Constantinople would not give up his building for two years after the revolution, and he gave asylum to every prominent refugee that came out of the Soviet Union.” And he happened to give refuge to Toumanoff's mother while she had a baby.

The next morning in the Washington Daily News there was a headline that Cohn and Schine had found a Russian communist, named Vladimir Toumanoff, in the State Department. This is typical of their effort to try to blacken the character of people who had something to do with the personnel files. Toumanoff's job was to read efficiency reports that came in, and if they were grossly badly done in the field, he would make a few suggestions, and send them back out to the field to have certain parts of them done more thoroughly. Of course, therefore, he had full knowledge of what people were putting into efficiency reports, and therefore he was a very sensitive character, and it was alleged that he was a Russian communist.

This is the sort of ridiculous monkeyshine that Cohn and Schine were engaging in...

Q: Toumanoff stayed on. How did you save him?

WOODWARD: Well, we informed the committee, the Un- American Committee, that Cohn and Schine were working. Immediately we informed them, even before this item came out in the Daily News, but they wanted to get the publicity, and they didn't give a damn about the truth.

As a matter of fact, when Cohn died a few years...

Q: This is Roy Cohn who became a renowned lawyer in New York with all sorts of unsavory connections.

WOODWARD: One of the things that I took note, and the newspaper gave quite a little publicity to his funeral, I took note of the people who were his close friends, and who went to his funeral. And one of the things I noticed was that Barbara Walters went to his funeral, which gave me pause...

Q: She's a well known journalist, no, journalist is not the right term, personality.

WOODWARD: I don't mean that Barbara Walters was communist, but he was a completely disreputable character, I thought.

Q: Phleger, who was the right hand man of John Foster Dulles at this time, and Dulles being a renowned lawyer when he came in to the State Department, made a statement on the first day there that he wanted positive loyalty, which sent a chill up and down the spine of most of the Foreign Service. How did you, sitting in personnel, feel about what you were up against? Did you feel that you were sort of sheep being thrown to the McCarthy wolves?

WOODWARD: We never had much discussion about this, but I think all the people in the Foreign Service instinctively felt that when anybody became well acquainted with them, and with their work, and what they were doing, that they would never be able to find a more loyal group of Americans, and a more non-communist group, than the Foreign Service, and that we were in no basic danger because all people needed to do was to become acquainted with us. So there was no great alarm of any kind. There was thorough-going disgust with the kind of political tactics we were seeing. That people like Dulles, and President Eisenhower himself, were pandering to people like McCarthy because they thought they had a certain amount of popular support, and they wanted their political

support, and were sacrificing principle in order to get political support. We were all aware of this. We didn't openly criticize our superiors, Mr. Dulles or Eisenhower, but it certainly lowered our esteem for them. We continued to be loyal to the United States of America.

There is no group of people that feel the responsibility of representing the American character more than the Foreign Service because we're living and working and surrounded by foreigners, and like Ernest in the Great Stone Face, we begin to take on the personal feeling that we have to represent the ideal of the character of the American people.

Q: We're referring to the story by Nathaniel Hawthorne, on the great stone face. I'm trying to get to the sort of spirit at the time that you felt? You're sitting in personnel, personnel was really the pinpoint of McCarthyism was hitting, for one thing. Did you find that you were having to adjust? I mean, making your own adjustments, or was anybody telling you to "don't send so and so there," "watch out for somebody with a foreign sounding name." For example, what did you do with Tomanov?

WOODWARD: I had nothing to do with Tomanov's next assignment which came along a few months after this hearing. He probably wanted to go into different work. Actually, I never had any further discussion about a new assignment for Tomanov, but he was sent as administrative officer to the embassy in Iceland, he went to Reykjavik. As time went on Toumanoff, because he knew the Russian language well, was a natural to be assigned to work pertaining to the Soviet Union. He was in the embassy in Moscow later on, long after I had nothing more to do with personnel. Now, he's retired here and I ran into him about a year or so ago at the funeral of John Muccio. Muccio had been the Ambassador to Iceland when Toumanoff went there as administrative officer, and there was a friendship that developed between the two men. At Muccio's funeral I happened to see a man in the crowd beckoning to me, and it took me a moment or two to recognize the older version of Toumanoff, and we had a happy reunion. As a matter of fact, this reminds me that I should call him up. We agreed that we were going to have lunch sometime together, and we haven't had, so I think maybe I'll call him up and do that.

Q: In personnel, for this period of time, I wonder if you could talk about how you operated? I mean did you feel that you were under siege and that you really had to be very careful about appointments? Did you change file operations? Or anything else?

WOODWARD: Well, actually, there were no communists in the ranks. There was no problem. Every charge and accusation was very carefully looked into, so there were absolutely no communists. But the problem we did have, was that there was also a campaign on what the Republicans, at that time, considered their standards of morality. For example, there was a very deep-seated opposition to having any homosexuals in the Foreign Service. There was even a very, you might say, puritanical attitude toward anyone who was known to have had any extramarital affair. Or even an unmarried person who was known to have an affair or affairs.

Q: Affairs outside of...there was no such thing as live-in girlfriends, at least overtly.

WOODWARD: No, that was considered very taboo. One very able fellow was promptly removed from the Foreign Service, just after Scott McLeod came in to be supervisor over personnel and security. He was a single man, he had never been married. The charge was that he had had, not only relations with loose women, but that in a very, very isolated post, and being a rather adventurous and exploratory type, and in the course of getting in the local call girls—and I can't imagine what kind of girls they were- -he got in a “call boy” one time. This, of course, was a heinous offense, and he was immediately removed from the Foreign Service, but he was a brilliant officer, and this was part of his adventuresome brilliance.

Q: I wonder if, to put it in context. In the first place, at that period of time, homosexuality was not, you might say- -I don't know if it is the right term—but it certainly was not an accepted thing even beyond the right wing. I mean, within the Foreign Service, in what would pass for polite society.

WOODWARD: No. As a matter this would have been enough reason normally for questioning the further service of anybody who was known to be, even known in a local community, or generally suspected to be a homosexual. This would raise questions about his usefulness in the Foreign Service. So the Foreign Service Officers—there were a few, and some very, very capable men who were very much closeted homosexuals. This was, of course, the prevailing way of life of homosexuals at that time. They were usually closeted homosexuals, and not generally known even to some of their closest associates, as being homosexuals.

We had two or three of those who were...it was almost tragic that we lost their services because they were doing such able work, and they were very widely accepted by the people of the community as being able, congenial, likeable people. But we lost their services.

Q: Could you explain a little bit what was the rationale behind this?

WOODWARD: The Security Division was caused to set up standards which were very specific and arbitrary. For example, I had gone to great effort to get a deputy Chief of Mission for Saigon.

Q: Tom O'Keefe? I was just thinking of who was the Ambassador at the time. Well, it doesn't make any difference.

WOODWARD: Ed Gullion had been transferred. Ed Gullion was a very able fellow, and I was hunting for a replacement for him. I found a very, very able guy and this was one of the duties of the Chief of Foreign Service personnel, was to try to get very able people for very important assignments. I went to quite a lot of effort to get this man, and I wanted to persuade him—he'd never been in the Far East—I wanted to persuade him of the importance of the assignment. This was, as I recall, just before Dien Bien Phu. It was a very critical time for the French...

Q: This would be 1954, early 1954, I think.

WOODWARD: Well, I was in personnel in 1952 to '53.

Q: Maybe it was 1953, excuse me.

WOODWARD: Anyhow, the man was going to take up his duties that I considered important, and I think that he'd been persuaded were important. He was about to depart from the United States. I think he was in New York, when I was suddenly informed through Bob Ryan, who was in constant liaison with the security division, that the man had resigned. Well, I couldn't understand it, because I had had several talks with him just a few days before, and everything was going according to plan. I discovered that the security division had brought him in and had a very tough interrogation with him. They had a criterion that if any person in the Foreign Service were found to have had any kind of a homosexual relationship after a date six months after his 21st birthday, that he must be discharged from the Foreign Service. This man that was going to Saigon was 45- 46 years of age, happily married, had children. There was no question of his homosexuality whatever. But in the course of the interrogation he admitted some kind of a homosexual incident within that narrow margin just after the cut-off date, six months after his 21st birthday. And he was out of the Foreign Service. Of course, there was nothing I could do about it, and I had to find somebody else to go to Saigon.

But, a few years later, I remember reading in the Foreign Affairs Quarterly a very learned article, an admirable article, written by this man, and he went on to some academic work, I believe. This was an example of what we were experiencing.

Then there was the great argument that had gone on alleging that the Democratic administration under Roosevelt and under Truman, had “lost” China. And during this period there were certain officers in the Far Eastern division who had argued that we might better face the fact that the Chinese communist revolutionaries were going to control

China—were already controlling it to a large extent, and Chiang Kai-shek was fighting a rear guard action and was going off to Taiwan. In other words, they were advising some further thought on our relationship with the Chinese communists. Therefore, they were considered to be disloyal by the Republicans. And one of these people was John Patton Davies. John Davies was a very intelligent, very capable Far Eastern expert in the Foreign Service. He'd had a running, you might almost say, persecution over the fact that he had counseled second thoughts on our relationship with China. There were a couple of others like the Service brothers.

Q: Yes, and John Steward Service, Oliver Edmund Clubb, and there were some others.

WOODWARD: I forget just what he was doing at this point. Anyhow, I was called in by the Under Secretary of State, and he said, “Mr. Dulles wants to have Davies sent to a post in Latin America which you would consider to have the least communist influence.” So my task was to pick out the embassy where John could be sent that would have the least communist associations of any kind. Well, I thought Lima would be a pretty good choice at that time, and John Davies went to Lima. There was already a perfectly acceptable Counselor of Embassy in Lima and we transferred him to Bogota, and he never knew the reason. As a matter of fact he was an old friend of mine, Willard Barber. I was talking about this with him the other day, he invited me to lunch. Anyhow, John went there and eventually he felt compelled to retire, and he went into business in Lima, rather unsuccessfully, making artistic wall hangings. He sent me one as a present once, and he's been bouncing about the world since then. He retired for a while in Spain, but I think he's living in North Carolina now. But, anyhow, this sort of destroyed the career in the Foreign Service of a very capable Far Eastern expert. There I had no participation except to find a post for him.

Q: Were you sort of on the side saying, I mean on other assignments, here is somebody who there have been allegations against for one reason or another, that you found out that this is a bad time, let's put them in Geneva, in a way, tuck them away somewhere out of

the line of fire. Were you conscientiously in your job doing things that weren't as overt as the John Patton Davies thing?

WOODWARD: Not at all. As a matter of fact the day to day work for the Chief of Foreign Service personnel was to find able men for important jobs, and to find jobs for those who were less able, who were conspiculessly less able, but not sufficiently lacking in quality so that they should be considered for discharge. The selection out system was catching up with these people fairly rapidly anyhow, and naturally we were concerned about having people who could just as well be in some other kinds of work but who weren't conspicuously candidates for dischange. And that was the purpose, of course, of the selection out system. It's worked pretty well on the whole. There were many aberrations such as the automatic selection out of people who were kept too long in class. They automatically went out, and this was very unfortunate in many cases, because there are a lot of people who are very able and useful officers who were kept too long in class because there weren't enough slots for promotion.

Q: At that time personnel keeps being moved around. Who was your direct boss? I mean where did you fall in personnel in those days?

WOODWARD: When I first took the job, the first six months before the administration changed, my direct boss would be the Assistant Secretary for Administration, who at that time was a very capable Foreign Service Officer named Tom Wailes. And then, also, a person to whom I could go for advice if I were trying to work out any kind of new system related to personnel—and there were two new systems that I could take some credit for—I would consult the Director General of the Foreign Service who at that time was Gerald Drew. Gerry Drew, another very capable man, and whose function was more of a morale-building function. He did not have anything to do with day to day direct transfers, but he did have quite a lot to do with any questions that arose of a personnel nature over Ambassadors. Not so much the placement of Ambassadors, because that was worked out

pretty much by the geographic divisions with the collaboration of the Director General. I didn't come in on the assignment of Ambassadors really much at all.

A system, for example, that I thought needed remedying when I came into personnel was the result of my own experiences as Charg# d'Affaires in Sweden and in preceeding posts that I'd had. The Charg# d'Affaires, after a certain period, which was a rather long period, I mean about a month or six weeks, I forget the exact amount, was entitled to receive the difference between his normal salary and one- half of the salary of the Ambassador, or the Chief of Mission. The Charg# pay came in very usefully for Charg#s because there were always a stream of visitors coming to almost every Foreign Service post, and the representation was always rather limited, and could be used only for entertainment of foreigners. And a great deal of the entertainment had to be for Americans who were coming through, Senators, Congressmen, government officials from the Executive Branch, and private businessmen, and people of a cultural nature- - writers, newspaper reporters, musical artists, painters, motion picture artist, etc. Anyhow, there were a lot of expenditures. Well, it so happened that the Charg# d'Affaires rarely received these because there was never a sufficiently uninterrupted period to fulfill the requirement of the regulations. So I managed to get new regulations on that score arranged so that Charg# d'Affaires would receive the additional compensation substantially sooner after they'd taken over the functions of being in charge.

When I was the Deputy Chief of Mission in Stockholm, there was one period when I think I was in charge for about three months, or maybe even more, but the Ambassador, who had been detailed to Geneva to be the chief of a delegation to a Telecommunications Conference, which was a very, very extended and detailed job, came back to Stockholm for a couple of days every month to have a few conversations with Swedish officials, to have some kind of entertainment to sort of keep his hand in, and the result was that my period of being Charg# was interrupted repeatedly, and I never received a penny of Charg# pay. This was what I was going to remedy, and I managed to do that.

And then another matter arose that officers wrote to me- -I can remember two in particular, who were able fellows—and they said there are efficiency reports in our file, written years and years ago, which mention some mistake that we made early in our careers; and that in the keen competition, and the rating people in the selection, these incidents which were 10-15 years ago, are enough to knock us out of the competition. And we are being severely handicapped by a mistake that we made long ago, and which was a lesson to us that resulted in our not making any mistakes of this kind since then; and we feel having this material in the file, is harming us unjustifably.

Q: I think, having served on selection boards, I agree with you. I know the problem. You're always looking for something negative, you can't help but do it.

WOODWARD: So the question was, should we, in extreme incidences of this kind, remove a report from a file so that it would no longer be a handicap to the man when it was read in the selection board? Now here, of course, Mrs. Baylog had testified to the McCarthy committee accusing us of taking papers out of the files, which made these files even more sacred. We had never dared to take anything out of them. And they were always, as a matter of fact, cluttered up to the point where they had to have, really, two personnel files: one with a lot of administrative letters, complimentary letters from people who had been entertained that were sort of secondary material, but which ought to remain in the file; so there were files with all the hard material, and all this secondary material, but they were always kept together, and always considered sacred. Nothing was ever removed from either of them.

I had a long heart to heart discussion with Gerry Drew, and Tom Wailes about this problem. And we decided that if the three of us decided unanimously that a paper should be removed to protect people against unjustifiable discrimination of this kind that I just described, that we would remove a paper from the file. And we did this, I remember, in two instances. I can remember those very well, and these officers went on and each one became an Ambassador and did his job very well. So I think our decision was a good one.

I don't know if this continued after my short period as Chief of Foreign Service personnel or not, but that was one thing that shows the sort of collaboration that goes on between the higher authorities and the Chief of Personnel. Otherwise, all assignments were worked out by us with the geographic divisions, and their administrative officers or the person designated to be liaison with us, always had a great deal to say about assignments in their territories, and their countries. In fact, there were periods when the geographic divisions would just by gravitation of individual abilities handle a very large amount of the personnel work and assignments in their conversations with Personnel.

For example, when I was in the Latin American division I had a virtually free hand for long periods, and any assignments that I wished to influence in our area. Otherwise, the arbitrary actions taken on individual cases by F. Scott McLeod, of course, immediately alarmed me and I saw there was going to be very little recourse to any of his decisions. I then found an opportunity to influence my own assignment back into the Latin American office in the State Department. I took advantage of this opportunity and was reassigned to the same job that I had before I went to the National War College as deputy to the man in charge.

The way this happened was rather interesting. In the first few weeks of Mr. Dulles sojourn in the office of Secretary of State, he asked three old time Foreign Service people to give him a list of Foreign Service Officers who might be qualified to be Chief of Mission in every diplomatic post in the Foreign Service, so that he could give this list to the Republican political authorities who were hunting for qualified Ambassadors for political appointees, and they could sort out the posts they wanted for political appointees, and those for which a career candidate would be approved.

These three officers were Joe Grew, who had been Ambassador to Japan and Under Secretary of State; Norman Armour, who had been Assistant Secretary of State, coordinating the work of the geographic divisions, and had been Ambassador to Spain and to Argentina; and Hugh Gibson, who had been in the Hoover administration, Ambassador

to Belgium, and an associate of Herbert Hoover, and who had later on been Ambassador to Brazil, and Delegate to the Chaco Peace Conference. These three men, of course, had lost their knowledge of the Foreign Service Officers. They'd been out of the Service long enough so they were obviously going to have a difficult time making up the list. So they turned the job over to Gerry Grew and Tom Wailes, and a man named Ed Montague (who was supposed to be a supervisor over my office, but who never exerted any supervision whatever, because he didn't know the Foreign Service, and had no views on the assignments). These three in turn, thought their day to day knowledge of candidates was such that they delegated the entire job to me, and asked me to make up the list of career officers for all the posts in the Foreign Service, and they gave me Mr.Dulles' specific instructions. Mr. Dulles said, “I want immediately an Ambassador to India, and a new Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American affairs. And I want Livy Merchant and Bob Murphy assigned to the Department. I don't care what jobs they have in the State Department, I just want them here so they can give me some advice, and I want the post in Mexico City reserved for Francis White,” a man who had been Assistant Secretary of State the last days of the Hoover administration. So, of course, he was assigned very promptly to Mexico. And I thought, “Who will be a good man for India? Chester Bowles has been there. It seems to me we ought to have a man who can be as good at publicity, and a man who's known to the media.”Well, the Foreign Service Officer who had been in charge of the work of the USIA when it was in the State Department, was George Allen, and George Allen incidentally had been advertising manager of the Foreign Service Journal, not exactly the same qualification as a man who had been in charge of an advertising agency as Bowles had been. But anyhow, he was my candidate for India.

For Assistant Secretary for Latin America affairs? Well, there was Jack Cabot, a man who was very, very well acquainted, and high enough in grade—he had been Minister to Finland, and he had been Consul General in Shanghai just before the communists came in. He had been offered, at the end of the Truman administration, Pakistan. He didn't want to go to Pakistan as Ambassador, so he was in suspended animation in Washington. So

I thought, “What better way to get a qualified man, who knows a great deal about Latin America, and who is a very able officer for that job.” So I put his name beside that job of Assistant Secretary for Latin American affairs, and I happened to be at his house— he'd invited me over for a cocktail party one afternoon, and I said to him, semi-jokingly, but with a certain element of sincerity (because I had just encountered the supervision of F. Scott McLeod), I said, “Jack, I want to tell you. I've recommended you to be Assistant Secretary for Latin American affairs. If you get that job, will you ask for me to be your deputy?” And Jack said, “It's a deal. I certainly will.”

Well, he was made Assistant Secretary, and he did ask for my assignment as his deputy, and he wrote a memorandum to Scott McLeod asking for my services as his, Cabot's, deputy. McLeod, of course, promptly telephoned me from his office, and said, “I've got this memo asking to have you transferred to the Latin American division. I don't like this idea of people raiding my territory.” I said, “Mr. McLeod, I knew that he was going to ask for me, and I thought maybe you would want to get someone who is completely in your confidence to take this job.” He said, “Well, you've got a point there. If you want to go over there, I'll agree to it.” So I was given my exit from Personnel, and I think George Wilson came in to be Chief. He was a man who'd been up on the Hill. He turned out to be a very able Chief of Foreign Service personnel, and a man who, because he was from the Hill and therefore in the confidence of McLeod who was also from the Hill, and who was a satellite of the man who was the Senator from New Hampshire who was a very ardent anti-communist, and a friend of McCarthy's.

Q: I thought he also had Francis Walters as one of his bosses, from Pennsylvania, but maybe I'm wrong on that.

WOODWARD: He may have been, I don't know. But anyhow, so I went back to the Latin American office and worked there with Jack Cabot for about six months or more, when he came into some disfavor with General Bedell Smith, who was Under Secretary, and had been in charge of CIA. Bedell Smith wanted to get Jack Cabot changed, and get

Henry Holland, a lawyer from Houston, to be Assistant Secretary. And that change was made, and Cabot went to Sweden as Ambassador, and did a very good job in Sweden. He learned Swedish with amazing speed, enough so he engaged in group conversations all over Sweden, discussing relations between Sweden and the United States, and with groups in schools, and other groups in Sweden, in a most unusual way. And Henry Holland, in the meantime, became Assistant Secretary and was therefore my boss, and an extraordinarily able fellow. Holland was sworn in by Dulles, in Venezuela, at an Inter-American conference, where Dulles was working on a resolution which would be an anti-communist declaration by all of the American Republics, and which he succeeded in having passed by the meeting. When Holland came back from this conference, he tried to obtain from me explanations of my conception of our policies toward Latin America. I felt as though I was somewhat floundering in my efforts to explain just what we were trying to accomplish, because at that point, I was somewhat baffled by the changes, and attitude, of the the outgoing and incoming administrations.

Along about the first of April in 1954 Holland called me in and he said, “I've just been told that the CIA is mounting a plot in Honduras, organizing and training a movement that is going to carry out an attempt to overthrow the President of Guatemala, Arbenz. The CIA is helping in the mounting of a military invasion. I told Mr. Dulles that I didn't accept the job of Assistant Secretary to handle relations in this way. I'm tempted to resign. I'd like to have you give me your opinion as to what I should do. Don't tell me now, think about this and come back when you feel that you can give me your advice.” Well, a few hours later, it may have been the next morning, I went into his office, and I said, “I've had enough time to think about this. I could have told you the same thing when I was in your office when you told me about this. My recommendation is that you try to persuade Mr. Dulles to let you make an effort to handle this problem with Guatemala in some other way.”

Q: Was it Honduras, or...

WOODWARD: The revolutionary movement was being mounted in Honduras, but it was going to come into Guatemala against Arbenz. I said, “I recommend you should try to handle this in some other way, because if you do this with a military intervention, directly contrary to a whole array of inter-American commitments, our treaty commitments. This is going to destroy the Good Neighbor Policy, the non- intervention policy. I recommend that you make an effort to try to handle it in some other way. I can't exactly outline at this moment any other way, but I think it's worth the effort to give it the most serious thought that we can.” Henry professed to have done this, to carry out my recommendation with Dulles. A couple days later he told me that Mr. Dulles had given him until the end of that year, of 1954, to try to accomplish the removal, or the danger, of the communist tendencies of the Arbenz administration in Guatemala in some way other than a military intervention. Henry Holland told me that Dulles had said that if he couldn't handle it before the end of the year, they would go ahead with the military movement.

Well, another month or two elapsed—about another month actually, sometime the end of April or the first of May—we got a report that there was a ship coming from what had been the German port of Danzig, which was, of course, then part of East Germany.

Q: Now Gdansk, which would be Poland.

WOODWARD: ...coming from a satellite country, at least. A Swedish ship, as I recall, was coming with a load of armament from the Skoda factory in Czechoslovakia for the use of the Guatemalan government, which would make a military attempt against the government more difficult, obviously. We didn't know what kinds of arms these were. Well, the ship was very carefully surveyed by whatever intelligence methods were available, and alarm increased about this. There was consideration of intercepting the vessel, but it came to Puerto Barrios, on the Caribbean, and huge crates were unloaded and put on the railroad system that ran up to Guatemala City. This became fairly intolerable to the people who had been plotting the military effort against Arbenz. And one morning in the first week in June, after this process had been continued, and as I recall a train with the crates was

just on its way up to Guatemala City (the crates hadn't been unpacked and we didn't have any intelligence information yet as to what was in them), and the invasion took place. This dispite the alleged promise of Dulles to Holland that he could have until the end of the year.

Holland had been calling meetings at odd times with groups of Latin American Ambassadors discussing how they could they could isolate, or put the pressure, on the Guatemalan government. Presumably these discussions were going on, the meetings were being held. I was not privy to what was being said in the meetings, although on one occasion, on a Sunday, I actually went to the place of a meeting with Holland, I was not allowed in the discussion. I was left outside reading a book, occupying myself privately, at a place out in The Plains in the Virginia countryside.

Q: The Plains is in Virginia.

WOODWARD: ...a town out in Virginia where there was a property owned by an American businessman who had lived in Havana a long time, spoke Spanish quite fluently, had been Ambassador to Brazil, Bill Pawley. He owned the bus system in Miami, and I think a streetcar system in Havana at one time. He was a rather wealthy businessman. Anyhow, he was helping with these discussions, or at least he loaned his house for them. The discussions had obviously come to nothing, and the CIA plot was being carried out. The small military group, which was moving up into Guatemala territory in a rather isolated, wild region between Honduras and Guatemala, where there were really no roads to speak of at all. Probably less than 100 men, and I heard later that they were a rather motley crew of adventurers, and people who had been hired on for this military effort.

I suppose that the strategy was that they expected defection of the Guatemalan forces, or no opposition. Well, the Guatemalan army had moved on toward the border, and there was no way for this small group of invaders to make any progress. They were stopped. It looked as though the plot was a failure. For a day or two there was a great dismay, both in

the State Department, and in the CIA, and nobody knew what was going to happen next. Well, Pawley was quickly dispatched to Nicaragua, and President Somoza allowed at least the use of his air force, his bases, and I don't know whether they used some World War II fighter planes, two or three fighter planes, that he possessed for the purpose, or whether they were from some other source. I never knew. But they got these planes to fly over Guatemala City, firing off their machine guns, and dropping the empty cartridges on the streets of Guatemala City. Through some stratagem of the CIA they managed to persuade the Catholic Cardinal of Guatemala City to come out with a strong speech condemning the communist tendencies of the Arbenz government. And, at least to my complete surprise, the Guatemalan army totally defected against Arbenz. They turned against Arbenz, and laid down their arms. Of course, this group from Honduras just walked into Guatemala City, and the leader, who was a man named Colonel Castillo Armas, shortly thereafter, moved into the Guatemala government through the efforts of the American Ambassador, and the CIA.

Q: John Peurifoy.

WOODWARD: There had been other officers from the Guatemalan army who were, for a few days, temporary presidents before Castillo Armas could be moved in, but they got him in and he became the President of Guatemala. This, of course, really virtually destroyed the American Non- Intervention Policy, and it was in complete opposition to our commitments. But it exemplified the fact that our Latin American commitments had all been completely subordinated to the fear of communist infiltration, and influence. And this has been the basic characteristic of our Latin American relationship ever since then, although, at the same time, there has been a kind of an overt effort to continue the Good Neighbor Policy in ordinary day to day matters. It's a rather strange contradiction which has existed in the basic principal of our relationship with Latin America. And which has made it very hard for anyone to describe honestly what the policies are of the United States because fundamentally we've been governed by anti-communism; but we

nevertheless have had, day to day, a very charitable, and very helpful, attitude toward the Latin American countries.

In other words, we have denied their sovereignty in situations where our administration considers that there is a serious element of communist infiltration. So that was such a change in our Latin American policy that I really could not comprehend it at first. I didn't realize there had been such a complete reversal in fundamental matters. I think Holland perceived this, and he knew that I had been utterly unsympathetic with this military invasion. In fact, I think books by people on that Guatemalan episode mention my name as being the only person with any rank whatever who opposed the idea. I don't think I was the only person because the whole operation had been kept quite secret to all of us until Holland told me about it. There was one officer in the Central American division with whom we were supposed not to interfere because he was collaborating on certain matters for the CIA. That was Ray Leddy. I never questioned anything about the communications that he was handling privately, and handling with and for the CIA. I don't know whether he was an authentic Foreign Service Officer. I think he may have been CIA, operating separately, as they all did in the field, with Foreign Service titles which didn't seem to fool anybody. Their personal histories were described in such a way in the Bigraphic Register, put out periodically by the State Department, that a clever intelligence officer could identify most of them.

Q: We could all identify them.

WOODWARD: A person who was aware of the administrative details could probably perceive that they were CIA people.

Q: This was about the time that you were assigned as Ambassador to Costa Rica.

WOODWARD: Yes. One could say that my experience was not unlike that of Loy Henderson, the great Foreign Service Officer who was symbolic of the Foreign Service (he was called Mr. Foreign Service), who once said to me, “Every important job he had he got

because he was being kicked upstairs." He was being removed from the job that he had. Well, I think that's the way I managed to become an Ambassador. I was being removed because I was considered to be unsympathetic with the methods that were being used.

I could not take communism in Guatemala very seriously because there were actually only three or four well known local communists, who were advisers and collaborators with Arbenz. One was named Fortung, and another was Pellecer. Fortung was later employed by the United Fruit Company. He had been one of their most outspoken enemies, but he was mercenary, and he was glad to get a job publicizing the work that had been done by the company in raising living standards and productivity.

Anyhow, if I had considered this as being a danger to the U.S. to have Arbenz there in the government, I would have been much more tolerant, and even sympathetic, to a military effort to overthrow him.

One evening shortly after this revolution had finally succeeded in putting Castillo Armas in power, I was sitting in this room with Henry Holland—where we are right now. He came over and he had a whiskey and soda. He said, "Bob, what's your ambition in the Foreign Service?" I said, "The same as any other Foreign Service Officer who has had the opportunity to see how embassies work. I've been a country desk officer, at one time or another, for most of the countries in Latin America, and I've been a Deputy Chief of Mission in two or three countries. And, naturally, I've formed a lot of ideas as to what I would do if I had the opportunity to be in charge of an office." And I said, "I'd like nothing better than to have the opportunity to try to see what I could do in charge of an embassy, and to be an Ambassador somewhere, and to plan objectives and try to carry them out, and accomplish something. I'd just love to have that opportunity." He said, "Where would you rather go, to Salvador, or to Costa Rica?" I said, "There's no question about that. I'd much rather go to Costa Rica. It's a much more democratic country, and it has an elected president and he's trying to carry out some new ideas. I think it would be very interesting to go to Costa Rica." He said, "Well, I think I can arrange that for you. I think I can get

that approved." So, damned if he didn't. See, he was kicking me out. But he was a very good fellow, and he was very sympathetic. And I considered him to be a very good friend. I admired his ability greatly. I've never known a man who could concentrate in a sustained way, on any problem, as well as Holland could. And who spoke Spanish so perfectly that if he'd had an opportunity to debate with someone like Che Guevara, he could have carried out a very successful debate, say, about the allegations of Castro that our influence and actions had been inimical to Cuba. Unfortunately he was not an Assistant Secretary when there might have been an opportunity to do this.

Q: This leads into where our earlier set of interviews really started about your Ambassadorialship, and this is to fill in, so why don't we cut it off right here.

WOODWARD: Well, there is one comment I'd like to make, and that is during the period that I was Chief of Foreign Service personnel, the judgement, the calm evaluation of the pro and cons of, and every problem, of Bob Ryan, I thought were so admirable, and he's one of the most judicious fellows that I have ever known in the Foreign Service, and one of the most fair officers. Bob Ryan subsequently became the administrative officer of the Middle Eastern geographical office in the State Department. He then became Assistant Secretary for Administration, and then he became Ambassador to Niger. And when he retired from that job, he was made Administrative Officer of the United Nations. He held that job in collaboration with a Russian counterpart, whom he said really took no interest in the job at all. The Russian was just a time-server, and Ryan said he was not a bad guy. He didn't interfere with the work of the administration, but Bob was able to handle that administrative work for the whole UN. He was ultimately, of course, under the Secretary General. Now Bob is working on efforts in Florida, where he's retired, to promote more systematic and organized foreign relations between Florida and the Caribbean, and Latin American countries, working with the office of the governor, and with business firms. He's a great fellow. I admire Bob extravagantly.

Q: Thank you very much. I appreciate this.

End of interview